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In spite of numerous programs and policies that encourage private investment in 
affordable housing, particularly after hurricane disaster, insufficient numbers of 
affordable units exist to meet demand.  Some low-income households are displaced in the 
course of disaster recovery, and others face severe housing cost burdens as demand for 
affordable housing outstrips supply. Some suggest competitive uses for limited funds 
impede production.  Others suggest that disaster and recovery policies tend to favor 
homeowners and economic recovery. Little attention has been given to the development 
decisions of affordable housing developers during disaster recovery.  This study 
examines LIHTC development risk after the 2004 hurricane season.  Stated preferences 
are identified from the public housing agency and LIHTC professionals to identify factors 
that impede or encourage investment after disaster.  Statistical and spatial analysis is 
used to compare development patterns to risks identified from stated preferences of 
LIHTC developers.  The number of LIHTC units found within storm surge boundaries 
places communities, households, and owners at significant risk. This study suggests that 
policy preferences steer LIHTC development to coastal communities in spite of risk.  
Ultimately, policy can also take steps to encourage mitigation of current and future 
hurricane risks.     
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Chapter 1  
THE HAZARDOUS COAST 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has sounded a 
wake-up call for urban policy makers.  Scientists have stated with 95% certainty that 
human activity and greenhouse gases are extremely likely to be the cause of global 
warming (IPCC, 2014).  The effects of global warming include sea level rise, increasing 
periods of drought, extreme weather conditions, and more extreme tropical storms and 
hurricanes.  Experts warn that in the U.S., Florida and Texas are especially vulnerable to 
the effects of global warming (IPCC, 2014).   
 Florida has experienced exponential growth over the last 40 years.  The 
population increased by more than 195% from 1970 to 2010 (Florida Department of 
Health, 2012).  It is well understood that the most significant disaster risk for the state is 
from hurricanes.  The state is also vulnerable to sea-level rise, particularly in Miami-
Dade County, which is considered one of the most vulnerable locations in the country 
(Revi et al., 2014, p. 555; Beatley, 2009).  This study takes a closer look at how disaster 
recovery and housing policy affected affordable housing development in Florida after the 
2004 hurricane season, specifically multifamily housing produced using Low Income 
Housing Tax Credits. 
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DISASTER IN THE COASTAL URBAN ENVIRONMENT 
 The threat of disaster poses special challenges for coastal communities, 
particularly in the multifamily housing sector.  Programs and policies that effect 
outcomes for community redevelopment after disaster typically favor homeowners and 
economic development projects favored by community leaders and their constituents 
(Comerio, 1988; Fischer and Sard, 2006; Peacock, Dash and Zhang, 2007).  A constituent 
could include business leaders, advocacy groups, or any other group that has access to 
power (Rehfeld, 2005).  When thinking about local and regional projects promoted by 
those who control the purse strings within a community, the constituency generally 
includes participants within the business community that favor allocation of funds to a 
diverse range of redevelopment options (Comerio, 1988; Fothergill and Peek, 2004).  
One subset of redevelopment is affordable housing.  
 This research focuses on redevelopment of affordable housing during disaster 
recovery using the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program.  Since 1996, the 
LIHTC program has been the predominant mechanism for funding affordable multi-
family housing production across the U.S.  In spite of developer participation in LIHTC, 
affordable multifamily housing shortages continue to be problematic, especially after 
disaster.  The intent of this study was to understand how LIHTC preferences influenced 
affordable housing development after the Florida 2004 hurricane season by examining 
perceived risk in the context of disaster recovery.  
Growth and Development in Coastal Communities 
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 Since 1970, an exploding U.S. population has migrated to the coast.  Population 
on the coast has generally followed national trends.  The problem, however, is coastal 
population is concentrated within a limited land area (Crossett et al., 2004).  A densely 
populated coast places a significant burden on local and state governments who need to 
assess environmental and economic challenges imposed by potential hurricane damage.  
Hurricanes are the most common natural hazard in east coast communities, regardless of 
climate change (Pielke et al., 2008).  The effects of climate change are expected to 
intensify hazardous conditions.  
 Growth in coastal communities is driven by economic activity related to 
recreation, tourism, water-reliant industry and commerce, and employment (The Heinz 
Center, 2000; Crosset et al., 2004; U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004).  Economic 
activity along the coast supports not only the year round coastal population, but also the 
more than 180 million seasonal visitors to coastal regions each year.  Tax revenue from 
tourist activities alone encourages policies that support even more growth.  Commercial 
activities surrounding natural resources in coastal areas generate billions of dollars each 
year (Marlowe, 1999; U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2005).  Fisheries generate 
more than $32 billion in income and over 1 million jobs in the U.S. (National Marine 
Fisheries Service, 2014).  In 2010, the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimated that 
coastal shoreline counties generated 45% of gross domestic product (GDP) for the U.S 
(NOAA, 2013b).  Shoreline counties generate over 54% of GDP for coastal states.  More 
than 50 million jobs and $2.7 trillion in wages were generated in coastal shoreline 
counties, including the Great Lakes Region (NOAA, 2013b).  All of this robust economic 
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activity encourages even more development that in turn contributes to a continuing 
migration to coastal communities.  
 Population density in coastal areas has been expanding at a rapid pace for nearly 
half a century.  In 2010, population density for the U.S. was 87 persons per square mile 
(NOAA, 2013a, p. 3).  During the forty years between 1970 and 2010, the U.S. added 36 
persons per square mile overall (Crowell et al, 2010; NOAA, 2013a, p. 3).  In contrast, 
coastal shoreline counties added 125 persons per square mile during the same forty year 
period resulting in a density of 446 persons per square mile in coastal counties (NOAA, 
2013a, 3; Crossett et al., 2004).  Population density of this magnitude puts more pressure 
on the natural resources and economic stability essential to a sustainable existence.  The 
current U.S. coastal population is estimated at 123.3 million or 39% of the national 
population and growing (Crowell et al, 2010; NOAA, 2013, p. 5).  Coastal population 
growth is expected to increase another 8%, meaning that by 2020, another 10 million 
people will reside on or near the coast (NOAA, 2013, p. 4).  Coastal counties encompass 
roughly 10% of land area in the United States, excluding Alaska.  Population density of 
this scale imposes significant risks on those that live, work, and operate businesses on the 
coast, particularly when disaster strikes.  The effect of disaster places an even greater 
burden on coastal states that must allocate limited resources while attempting to project 
the potential impact of coastal disaster on housing and essential services. 
Climate Change and Disaster in Coastal Communities 
 Climate change is predicted to affect the intensity of natural coastal hazards in the 
coming years.  Sea level rise is likely to increase in more than 95% of the ocean causing a 
 
5 
twenty percent increase in mean sea level in 70% of coastal areas worldwide (IPCC, 
2013, p. 1140).  The U.S. will not be immune to the effects of climate change.  Rising sea 
levels will contribute to higher storm surges, causing more extreme flooding and storm 
damage from even minor coastal storms.  Climate change also contributes to warming 
oceans which in turn causes more intense and destructive hurricanes.  Over the past 30 
years, the duration and wind speed of hurricanes have shown an increase in the 
destructive power in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (Emanuel, 2005).  There has also 
been an increase in the number of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes, correlating with rising 
ocean temperatures (Webster et al., 2005).  Future storm models suggest that storms are 
likely to become even more intense with an average rainfall increase of 18% over the 
next eight years (Knutson and Tuleya, 2004; IPCC, 2014).  Storm modeling trends are 
impeded by limited availability of storm data creating uncertainty in the literature 
(Knutson et al., 2010).  Regardless, most scholars agree that climate change will cause 
tropical storms and hurricanes to intensify in frequency, strength, and damage potential 
while the frequency of less intense storms will decline (Knutson and Tuleya, 2004; 
Knutson et al., 2010; IPCC, 2014).   
 Hurricanes can cause significant damages when they strike.  Property owners are 
susceptible to damages from wind, flooding, and storm surge.  Social and economic costs 
associated with these damages can be significant and devastating to individuals, business 
and communities.  Blake et al. (2011) found the greatest number of deaths from 
hurricanes occurred in 1900 when 8,000 people were killed after a Category 4 hurricane 
struck Galveston, Texas.  Since then, deaths from hurricanes have declined in part 
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because of more advanced early warning systems allowing coastal inhabitants to evacuate 
or take precautions.  However these systems have not been perfect.  The most significant 
U.S. death toll from a hurricane occurred in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf 
Coast.  As many as 1,833 people died from causes related to Hurricane Katrina.   
Disaster can also have a devastating effect on the social and economic fabric of 
coastal communities.  Increased development along the coast costs millions in taxpayer 
dollars after disaster as shown from federal flood insurance claims and disaster assistance 
programs (Godschalk et al., 1989).  Between 1980 and 1999, economic damages from 
hurricanes totaled more than $68 billion in the U.S.  (Davidson and Lambert, 2001 
quoting NOAA, 2000).  Beven et al. (2008) found even higher costs during 2005, the 
most active hurricane season on record since 1969.  The economic cost of the 2005 
hurricane season included over $100 billion in damages (Beven et al., 2008).  Pielke and 
colleagues (2008) found the 2004 and 2005 hurricane season caused more than $150 
billion in damage averaging $75 billion over the two year period.  Normalized damage 
estimates of hurricanes from 1900-2005 found the decade between 1996 and 2005 as the 
second most costly decade after the ten year period of 1926-1935.  The Great Miami 
Storm of 1926, which struck during the Florida land boom of the 1920’s, was the single 
most damaging storm during the period, causing between $140-157 billion in normalized 
damages (Pielke et al., 2008).  While deaths from hurricanes have declined, economic 
costs continue to rise, arguably as a result from coastal development. 
Hurricanes since 2000 have exposed the disparity that exists between 
homeowners and renters, wealth and poverty, and the upper and lower classes of 
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American society.  Like with renters, programs and policies that favor homeowners and 
commercial interests during recovery do not always extend to multifamily housing 
developers.  Investors in affordable and low-income multifamily housing often struggle 
post-disaster because recovery programs do not meet their financial needs (Wu and 
Lindell, 2003).  Programs and policies tend to favor economic development geared 
toward infrastructure, commercial businesses, and homeowners (Comerio et al., 1994; 
Quarentelli, 1999; Mueller et al., 2011).  In spite of numerous programs in place to 
address housing needs for low-income households after Katrina, sufficient incentives for 
investors failed to meet the needs of displaced renter households resulting in housing 
disparity and affordable housing shortages.  McCarthy and Hanson (2008) found the ratio 
of permits for damaged single-family units were issued more often than for multifamily 
units.  After Katrina, housing units with less severe damage were more likely to be issued 
permits quicker than those with extensive damages, contributing to the overall reduction 
in available low-income rental housing during recovery (McCarthy and Hanson, 2008; 
Unity, 2010).  Vuk (2008) suggests this view is misleading stating that vouchers offset 
claims of insufficient available housing.  Vouchers are used to rent single or multifamily 
housing and are recognized by some as a more viable alternative to affordable housing 
than government incentivized housing production (Savas, 1987; Savas, 2000).  Much like 
affordable rental housing, which often has long waiting lists and barriers to access, 
vouchers are also limited and taken alone cannot rectify affordable housing shortages.  
This research examined LIHTC multifamily rental housing development during the 
recovery period after disaster.  The 2004 hurricane season in Florida provided the 
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backdrop to analyze development patterns for LIHTC.  This study focused on role of 
LIHTC after disaster by asking how perceived risk influences development during 
recovery.  The results of this study identified risk through the stated preferences of 
LIHTC professionals in the context of disaster recovery and compared development 
patterns of LIHTC multifamily housing between 2004 and 2010. 
 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 The motivation behind this study came from the realization that affordable 
housing programs have had little success in providing enough affordable housing for the 
households that need assistance.  This is especially true after disaster even though billions 
of dollars are spent on redevelopment.  The goal of this study is to understand the 
influences that motivate multifamily development during disaster recovery.  The aim is to 
understand how LIHTC developers’ perceptions of risk influenced development 
decisions.  
 Numerous studies have analyzed the impact of disaster on low-income 
households.  Struggling low-income populations in disaster areas are more likely to fall 
behind during recovery and often fail to reap the benefits of new investment (Cutter and 
Emrich, 2006; Fischer and Sard, 2006; Fothergill and Peek, 2004; Popkin et al., 2006; 
Finch et al., 2010).  Communities struggle continuously with poverty, particularly the 
lack of affordable housing.  After a disaster occurs, recovery provides an opportunity to 
address affordable housing issues, which are often magnified as a result of disaster 
(Fothergill and Peek, 2004).  Unfortunately, the recovery process often increases 
disparity and decreases accessibility to affordable housing (Cutter and Emrich, 2006).  
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 Several federal housing programs exist that communities depend on to support 
housing and are also used to address post-disaster housing needs (Table 1-1).  Among 
these are Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), HOME Investment 
Partnerships Program, Housing Choice Vouchers Program (HCVP), and the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program.  These programs can be combined or used in 
conjunction with disaster programs to jumpstart economic recovery and redevelopment, 
including housing production and restoration.  In spite of the availability of these and 
other local initiatives, funding for affordable housing can fall short of the amount 
necessary to shelter those in need.  The loss of more than 51,000 rental units in New 
Orleans after Katrina very likely contributed to a doubling of the homeless population 
once recovery was well underway (Unity, 2010).  Prior to Katrina, 51 percent of renters 
paid more than 30% of their income in rent and utilities.  The Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) defines housing affordability as rent and utilities at 30% or 
less of gross household income.  As of 2012, the number of renters exceeding this 
amount had increased to sixty-three percent (Plyler, 2013).   
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Table 1-1: Funding Resources for Disaster Recovery 
Program Purpose
Supplemental LIHTC
Supplemental LIHTC were granted by Congress after Hurricane Katrina.  In 
some cases, credits were advanced from LITHC that was to be awarded in 
future years. 
Federal Disaster Loans
Individual assistance in the form of housing, grants for personal use, low 
interest loans, counseling and other assistance.  Public assistance is 
available for communities.  Low interest loans for renters and homeowners 
may be available.  Issued through the Small Business Administration (SBA).
Hazard Mitigation Grants (HMP)
Applicants come from the State, local government, Indian tribes , and 
private non-profit organizations.  According to FEMA, homeowners and 
businesses must apply through one of these applicants.  
Disaster Bonds
Tax exempt debt instruments issued by Congress and administered by 
States to direct private investment dollars to disaster recovery.
New Market Tax Credits
Target tax credits to low income markets.  Credits are used to encourage 
investment in economic development and jobs creation in low income 
communities. 
Physical Disaster Loans
Administered under the SBA.  Physical disaster loans can be used to repair 
or replace real and personal property.  Businesses of any size are eligible.  
Interest rates are capped at 4% if no other financing is available or 8% if 
credit can be obtained elsewhere.
SBA Loans
Other types of disaster loans include Home and Personal Property Loans, 
Economic Injury Disaster Loans, and Military Reservists Economic Injury 
Loans.
Provides grants to States and localities that are often used in partnership 
with local nonprofits.  Eligible activities include constructing, buying, and 
rehabilitating affordable housing.  Funds can be targeted for rentals or 
homeownership.  Low income households may qualify for direct rental 
assistance.  HOME is the largest block grant program. 
HOME Investments Partnerships Program
Provides resources to communities for a wide range of community 
development needs.  Annual grants are allocated to larger cities and urban 
counties for housing and expansion of economic opportunities.  The 
primary beneficiaries are principally low- and moderate-income.  CDBG has 
mutiple programs for a wide array of activities.  Diaster Recovery Assistance 
are flexible grants under the program and are subject to availability.
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
 
Sources: FEMA, U.S. Small Business Administration 
 
 Studies indicate that multifamily housing falls behind other redevelopment efforts 
during recovery.  Hurricane Ike damaged 88% of Galveston’s low-income housing units 
in 2008.  During recovery, multifamily reconstruction lagged behind other redevelopment 
efforts (Reece et al., 2011).  Very few studies concentrate on multifamily development 
after hurricane disaster.  Those that do exist focus on programs that favor homeowners 
and economic development and expose the disparity experienced by multifamily 
 
11 
developers.  Researchers studied CDBG allocations after Katrina.  Galster et al. (2004) 
found that low-income neighborhoods did generally improve.  However, about 62% of 
CDBG funds were allocated to homeowners and only 18% were directed to rental units 
during recovery (GAO, 2010).  This resulted in fewer low-income units overall.  
Affordable housing also takes a back seat to economic development.  Louisiana and 
Mississippi were criticized because tax dollars funded the rebuilding of fewer low-
income units than were in place prior to the disaster.  Gotham and Greenburg (2008) 
found that fewer units were produced because of waivers of CDBG low-income housing 
requirements in favor of other economic interests.  
 Congress and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have often approved increases 
or advances in the amount of allocated tax credits to facilitate redevelopment of 
affordable housing.  The LIHTC program, Supplemental Tax Credits, and New Market 
Tax Credits were earmarked for affordable and low-income housing after Katrina 
encouraging the development of owner-occupied and rental housing.  As a result, the 
Gulf Opportunity Act of 2005 instituted the Gulf Opportunity Zone (GO Zone) tax 
program (GAO, 2010).  The Government Accountability Office study stated that 
homeowner allocations were quicker and easier to distribute.  Owners of rental properties 
were expected to access other programs, such as Small Business Administration (SBA) 
loans and tax credits (p. 19).  Small Rental Assistance programs created more barriers 
than access for investors and developers because of regulatory requirements.  
Environmental review assessments were required and were costly for investors and 
owners who had limited ability to increase rents, often the case with affordable and low-
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income housing (p. 19).  Multifamily owners and developers are also subject to capital 
markets and credit availability, and even when those markets are in balance, the 
feasibility of taking on additional debt can curtail development plans (p. 39).  Debt 
affects operating and development costs which have to be weighed against allowable 
rents.  Developers in general, including LIHTC developers, are unlikely to invest in 
projects that may pose greater financial risks, whether those risks are a result of location, 
funding, or operational costs.  Risks imposed by potential hurricanes in coastal counties 
would seem to impede affordable multifamily housing development.  However this study 
found no evidence that location imposes fewer LIHTC developed in coastal areas in spite 
of the greater risks associated with coastal hazards. 
 The research that is the subject of this work is a revelatory case study that seeks to 
understand the preferences of LIHTC developers during the recovery process.  This study 
examines the influence of risk perceptions that affect LIHTC developers’ decisions 
during disaster recovery by analyzing the outcomes of LIHTC multi-family housing 
production during disaster recovery.  For this study, developers include professionals 
involved in the production of LIHTC multifamily housing, including syndicators, 
bankers, builders, managers, and investors.  
 PURPOSE STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 This purpose of this research was to reveal how developer preference influences 
LIHTC multifamily housing production after disaster, and specifically, how risk 
perception influences development decisions during recovery.  This research examined 
how developers of LIHTC multi-family housing make investment decisions and 
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specifically, how risk perception influences those decisions.  This research was guided by 
the following questions: 
 How do LIHTC developers perceive disaster risk? What risk variables have the 
greatest influence on development decisions?  
 What are the differences in risk perception between for-profit and non-profit 
LIHTC providers? How do these differences affect the location of low-income 
multi-family housing within the LIHTC program? 
 Where are LIHTC developments located over the disaster recovery period? Do 
LIHTC developers avoid areas that experience the greatest impact from the 
disaster event? 
KEY CONCEPTS AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
There are a number of terms and constructs used in the context of this study that 
warrant further discussion in order to clarify meaning as they relate to this study.  
Defining Disaster 
 Car (1932) was the first to sequence disaster in relation to cultural protections by 
defining disaster in the context of consequences within an urban environment.  
Dombrowsky (1981) viewed disaster as a natural or man-made event that causes 
substantial negative effects.  These are the simplified understandings of the concept that 
others have expanded upon.    
The study of disaster began in earnest shortly after the end of World War II.  
Along with physical damage studies, scientists also sought to understand the affect of 
bombing on the human population in Europe and Japan.  During what Perry (2007) has 
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coined the Classical Period of disaster research, disaster was defined as a “catalyst for 
what would now be described as a failure of the social system to deliver reasonable 
conditions of life” (p. 8).   
 More than 50 years ago, Charles Fritz (1961), a major pioneer in disaster research, 
defined disaster as: 
“Actual or threatened accidental or uncontrollable events that are 
concentrated in time and space, in which society, or a relatively self-
sufficient subdivision of society undergoes severe damage, and incurs such 
losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure 
is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of 
the society, or its subdivision, is prevented” (p. 655).   
Fischer (2003), acknowledging Fritz’s earlier definition, pointed to sociologists that 
studied social change under disaster conditions, which is noted in the work of those who 
search for meaning and clarification in the social condition of disaster survivors (Cutter, 
1995; Enarson, 1998; Enarson, Fothergill, and Peek, 2006).  In the field of anthropology, 
disaster is defined as an event “involving a combination of potentially destructive 
agent(s) from the natural and/or technological environment and a population in a 
socially and technologically produced condition of environment vulnerability” (Oliver-
Smith, 1996, p. 305).   
 According to Comerio (1998) disaster in the urban environment is an unintended 
consequence of development in hazard-prone areas.  Hurricanes, floods, tsunamis and 
earthquakes that occur in non-populated areas are merely natural hazards (See Table 1-2).  
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Disasters occur when natural hazards take place in densely populated areas (Comerio, 
1998).  Fischer (1998) sought to differentiate between disaster and emergency and the 
associated degree of impact and response at federal, state and local levels.  For instance, 
the 1991 tornado that destroyed the homes of 1,000 households in Andover, one-fifth of 
the community, was declared a federal disaster area.  A year later, Hurricane Andrew 
devastated Homestead, Florida, a community of roughly 100 square miles.  Differences 
in the size and scope of disaster and disaster response have a direct bearing on the needs 
and resources allocated to a community.  These differences are consistent with Fritz’s 
earlier definition that identified the scope of disaster within the subdivision of a 
community as opposed to large scale disaster areas.  
 Fritz’s definition remains the most comprehensive definition among researchers 
and has mostly been adopted unchanged (Perry, 2007).  Nuances have been added to 
clarify specific studies while embracing the basic tenets of the original.  Buckle (2005, p. 
179) includes the “need for long term recovery” among the significant and irreversible 
losses characteristic of disaster.  Smith (2005, p. 301) added that disaster events cause 
“considerable social, political and economic disruptions” in the wake of death and 
destruction.  Stallings (1998, 2005) defined disaster as a disruption of nature that 




 Disasters have also been defined from a geological perspective, which Perry coins 
the Hazards-Disaster Tradition.  Within this system, a disaster is an extreme event that 
arises when the source, or agent, of disaster collides with a human social system (Perry, 
2007).  Shadowing the view of Comerio, without human systems in the way disaster 
would not occur.  Mileti (1999) pointed to an overlap between physical, built, and social 
environments as an encroachment on the natural landscape and subject to the inevitable 
impact of a disaster event.  Cutter (2005) emphasizes human vulnerability and resiliency 
more so than the disaster event itself.  
 In lieu of definitions found in the literature, emergency managers are guided by 
the technical definition contained in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, which reads: 
“Any natural catastrophe including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high 
water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought, or, regardless of 
cause, any fire, flood, or explosion in any part of the United States which 
in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity 










and magnitude  to warrant major disaster assistance to supplement the 
efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster 
relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering 
caused thereby.” 
 
 Communities faced with the consequences of disaster seek federal aid during the 
recovery and redevelopment process.  The federal definition is significant to this study 
because this definition establishes the qualifications a community must meet in order to 
qualify for federal disaster resources.  
 The disaster declaration process for federal assistance is initiated with a 
determination of damages by the state (See Figure 1.1).  Additional preliminary damage 
assessments are requested that involve a joint preliminary damage assessment (PDA) 
process between federal and state agencies.  When the PDA is complete, the state 
determines which counties require assistance and the type of assistance needed.  A 
request from the governor for a Presidential Declaration of Disaster (PDD) is submitted 
to the regional Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) who reviews and adds 
additional recommendations before forwarding the request to the national office.  The 




What is Disaster Recovery? 
Disaster life cycles are ongoing cyclical progressions that emergency managers 
distinguish in four to six phases.  Disaster recovery is but one phase of the cycle.  FEMA 
has identified four phases of the disaster cycle for emergency management purposes.  
 
 
Figure 1-1: Presidential Disaster Declaration Process 




These phases are mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.  Recovery is a unique 
experience for each community and is influenced by the economic base, extent of losses, 
and the types of disaster assistance available.  The multidisciplinary nature of disaster in 
academia and in practice poses challenges to the meaning of words and phrases.  This 
section explores the disaster life cycle in order to clarify the meaning of disaster recovery 
in the context of this study. 
The concept of disaster recovery has evolved from the linear process of the mid-
1970s to a dynamic phenomenon that responds to the characteristics of the impacted 
community.  The linear process described by Haas and colleagues (1977) posed a static 
four-stage model that identified the major activities in each stage of the post-disaster 
period.  Disaster is now recognized as a fluid process that is circular in nature. Each stage 
is also a dynamic course of action with decision-making processes that are related and 
interactive across stages (Mileti, 1999; Berke and Beatley, 1997; Berke et al, 1993; 
Rubin, 1985). 
Fischer (2008) describes a five phase life cycle of disaster: the pre-impact period, 
the impact period, the immediate post-impact period, the recovery period, and the long-
term reconstruction period.  The recovery period is defined as the period in which debris 
has been cleared, essential services are restored, insurance claims are filed and 
preliminary reconstruction plans are made.  The long-term reconstruction period can 
extend for years depending on the severity of the disaster event.  Long-term 
reconstruction includes the rebuilding period for housing needs.  Hurricane Hugo hit 
South Carolina in 1989 causing destruction or damage to 108,658 housing units (Rubin 
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and Popkin, 1990).  Nearly 17% of all housing units destroyed or damaged by Hugo were 
multifamily housing units.  After ten months, recovery and reconstruction was barely 
underway (Fischer, 1998).  The recovery process was noted as politically charged with 
competing interests and demands.  Recovery after Hugo was consistent with earlier 
reflections of Dynes and Quarantelli (1989) who suggested that recovery is often 
characterized by “conflicting priorities, by issues of equity and inattention” (p. 3).  
Another example of long-term reconstruction took place after Hurricane Andrew 
devastated Florida.  According to Fischer (1998), estimates for the timeframe to complete 
reconstruction after Hurricane Andrew ranged from ten to fifteen years.  
Keim (2011) studied disaster within the field of public health.  His research 
recognized the five phases of disaster within a pre-impact and post-impact cycle.  The 
pre-impact phase includes prevention, mitigation, and preparedness.  Post-impact actions 
include response and recovery.  Response and recovery were defined by Keim as 
“actions undertaken to minimize loss of life and damage to return to a pre-event status” 
(p. 143).  Others define recovery as a period of restoration and repair of the built 
environment within the short and long term phases of disaster (Rubin and Barbee, 1985; 
Schwab et al, 1998).  Nigg (1995) characterized recovery as a social process influenced 
by pre-disaster conditions and post-disaster response.  
 Smith and Wenger (2007) adopted a narrative that merged recovery and 
restoration as conceived by Fischer defining disaster recovery as “the differential process 
of restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the physical, social, economic, and natural 
environment through pre-event planning and post-event actions” (p. 238). This 
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conceptual definition accounts for the technical and social factors that shape disaster 
recovery (Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004; Nigg, 1995).  Recognizing the fluid nature of 
disaster recovery and reconstruction, the concept of recovery assumes that insurance and 
recovery funds are applied for and reconstruction is underway.  This, combined with 
Smith and Wenger, form the conceptual definition of disaster recovery that will be used 
in the context of this research.   
Affordable Housing 
 The most accepted definition of affordable housing comes from the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and is a reflection of the ability of a 
household to afford the cost of shelter, including rent or mortgage and utilities. 
According to HUD, housing is considered affordable if a household pays no more than 
thirty percent of its annual income toward housing costs (Nguyen, 2005).  The idea of 
rent affordability is straight forward and includes rent and utilities.  Affordability for 
homeowners is more difficult to ascertain because of mortgage interest deductions, real 
estate tax deductions, and capital gains (Schwartz, 2014).  This study focused on rental 
housing rather than home ownership except to point out programs that favor owners 
during recovery rather than supporting multifamily housing restoration and production 
 Other terms, such as below-market or low-income have been suggested as better 
alternatives to affordable housing, but these terms also have their limitations.  For 
example, Section 8 voucher recipients do not necessarily rent below-market housing 
units.  Their units tend to be rented at market and vouchers are used to subsidize rent 
based on the tenants’ income, usually capped at thirty percent.  Tenants pay the 
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difference between the voucher and the landlord’s market rent.  The term low-income is 
also problematic because it requires some sort of threshold or cutoff.  Some have argued 
for more sophisticated measurements of housing affordability, such as a sliding scale that 
accounts for the number of people in the household as well as their income (Stone 1993; 
Stone, 2006). 
Working definitions of affordable housing have been attempted by others 
(Freeman et al., 1997; Chaplin and Freeman, 1999) but there is no generally applicable 
definition since the term “affordable housing” might mean different things to different 
interests (Miles et al., 2000).  Affordability is typically defined by the relationship 
between a household’s expenditure for housing costs, including utilities, and income.  A 
large number of communities are experiencing a shortage of affordable housing, often as 
a result of the disinvestment in public housing or low income growth in the macro 
economy.  Lack of affordability becomes a larger problem for many communities even 
after disaster recovery and housing reinvestment.  The problems of affordability often 
escalate after disaster, becoming even more widespread during recovery as housing 
shortages develop (Comerio, 1998; Levine et al, 2007).  
Affordable housing can also be thought of as physically adequate housing that is 
made available to those who could not afford the rent for such housing without some 
special intervention by government or special arrangement by housing suppliers (Field, 
1997).  Special interventions include rent subsidies through Section 8 vouchers, sliding 
scale rents based on income, income and rent caps, such as with rental housing 
constructed using Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), or other arrangements that 
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subsidize or reduce conventional rents found in the marketplace.  In addition to subsidies 
provided to renters, developers can also apply for incentives to reduce construction costs.  
These incentives include creative financing, waivers of land use requirements, or special 
exceptions to building regulations.  Homeowners are also given special interventions 
such as favorable lending terms or financial assistance for reconstruction.  
The Center for Housing Policy found that 24.5% of renters and 18.6% of 
homeowners were severely cost burdened, meaning more than half of household income 
is spent on housing costs (Viveiros and Sturtevant, 2014).  A severe cost burden means 
that more than half of household income is committed to the cost of housing.  Cost 
burdened renters also have an affordability crisis.  Thirty-two percent of moderate 
income households are cost burdened, paying more than thirty percent of household 
income on housing (Hickey et al., 2012).  For the purposes of this study, affordable 
housing was defined using the standards most often cited in the literature and accepted by 
most government agencies.  Housing is considered affordable when rent and utilities are 
no greater than 30% of area median income (Salama and Alshuwaikhat, 2006; Somerville 
and Mayer, 2003). 
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
This study was specifically interested in how participants of LIHTC respond to 
risk during disaster recovery.  Participants include developers, financiers, managers, or 
others involved with the production of affordable housing under the program.  
Established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the LIHTC program has become the “single 
largest subsidy for the production of low-income rental housing” in the country 
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(Schwartz, 2014, p.135).  The program provides tax credits as an incentive for private 
investor participation in the production of low-income rental housing.  LIHTC is included 
in the tax code of the Internal Revenue Service and, as of 2011, has been directly 
responsible for more than 2.5 million housing units.  
Other programs exist that are also used for affordable housing production.  Funds 
allocated under the HOME Investments Partnership Program (HOME) and Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) are sometimes combined with LIHTC to make the 
developments economically feasible.  HOME and CDBG funding is provided to the state 
based on a Consolidated Plan (CP) required by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD).  The CP is a statewide five-year plan that guides general long term 
strategy to meet expected housing needs using a market centered, data driven framework.  
The goal of the CP is to identify housing priorities and is required by HUD when state 
housing authorities allocate CDBG and HOME funding.   
LIHTC relies on a Qualified Action Plan (QAP) to set out housing preferences of 
the state, usually through the state housing authority. The QAP often uses a scoring 
system or sets thresholds based on the priorities of the state specifically for LIHTC 
developments.  CDBG and HOME funds are not tied to LIHTC or the QAP, however the 
housing authority as the issuing agency may include provisions that allow for or 
encourage the use of CDBG and HOME funds.  During disaster recovery, additional 
funding sources may be offered at federal, state, and local levels to facilitate the recovery 




Tax credits are allocated to housing authorities by the IRS on a per capita basis. 
Housing needs are generally reflected in the QAP which informs housing producers of 
state priorities for LIHTC developments.  Points are used to score applications received 
developers who compete with others for tax credits during the annual application period.  
There are a limited number of tax credits available and the application process and 
paperwork requirements are expensive and time consuming.  In spite of the complexity of 
the annual application process, it is not uncommon for there to be more developers 
interested in the program than the available number of tax credits can accommodate.  For 
this reason, housing authorities are likely to award credits to developers that provide the 
greatest number of housing units meeting the priorities expressed in the QAP.  Some 
states incorporate flexibility in their decision-making while others make decisions based 




Investor Participation in LIHTC  
Tax credits are distributed annually by the IRS on a per capital basis (See Figure 
1-3).  State housing authorities award credits to LIHTC developers in a competitive 
environment.  Winning LIHTC developers offer the tax credits to investors either directly 
or through a syndicator who acts as a middle man to bring developer and investors 
together.  Most investors are corporations or entities that benefit from the tax advantages 
offered by tax credits.  A syndicator bundles tax credits into investment packages that 
provide equity to the developer.  Developers finance the remainder of the project from 
other housing programs and through traditional financing.  Investors can use tax credits to 
lower taxable income dollar for dollar however these benefits cannot proceed until the 
development is completed.  Tax benefits are applied over a 10 year period.  The 
developer and any subsequent must owner agree to monitor compliance for 15 years and 
since 1990, units must remain affordable for 30 years.  Investors of properties that are not 
in compliance during the 15 year reporting period face severe penalties, so the incentive 
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KEY STEPS AND ENTITIES 
IN THE LIHTC PROCESS 
 
Figure 1-2: LIHTC Funding Process 
Source:  Modified from a diagram prepared for Congressional testimony (see GAO/T-




Risk in Context 
The scholarly work in the field of risk is extensive and encompasses many fields.  
Early studies in the 1950s were developed from the concerns associated with early 
industrial technologies in engineering, chemicals, and nuclear power (Lofstedt and 
Boholm, 2009).  Initial risk research identified public perception of risk and has since 
evolved to the study of underlying issues that address equity, trust and power (Slovic, 
2000).  Risk literature comes from a wide range of fields including toxicology and health, 
public policy, and technology among others (Slovic, 2000).  The literature for this study 
focuses on risk in the context of natural hazards in the field of social science.  In the 
social sciences, Gilbert White initiated risk studies in the context of natural hazards with 
his 1945 study, Human Adjustment to Floods.  White argued that modifying human 
behavior is a more effective means of mitigating risk from disaster than engineering 
solutions (p.188).   
Risk is often studied in the context of hazards, and by default, disaster (Smith, 
2013).  Smith defines risk as “the actual exposure of something of human value to a 
hazard and is often measured as the product of probability and loss” (p. 11).  When a 
hazard, which Smith defines as “a potential threat to humans and their welfare arising 
from a dangerous phenomenon or substance that may cause loss of life, injury, property 
damage, and other community loss or damage,” is combined with risk, the definition 
becomes more precise.   A hazardous risk is defined as the “combination of the 
probability of a hazardous event and its negative consequences” ( p. 11).   
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The intent of this study was to understand how a segment of real estate 
developers, those participating in the LIHTC program, perceive risk associated with 
disaster recovery in coastal communities and how risk perception influences development 
decisions.  Variables of risk were identified in the literature and from a survey of 
multifamily housing professionals who participated in the LIHTC program in Florida 
between 2000 and 2010.  Perceived risks have been categorized and ranked according to 
stated preferences from the LIHTC developer community and are discussed more fully in 






Chapter 2  
CONNECTING HOUSING, DISASTER, AND POLICY 
 
WHY AFFORDABLE HOUSING?  
Current U.S. housing policy has failed to alleviate the housing cost burden faced 
by middle and low income households.  Failure on the part of the U.S. housing safety net 
often has severe consequences.   Within any given 24 hour period, over 610,000 people 
experience homelessness (Henry et al., 2013).  Households who struggle with rent 
experience more stress resulting in high blood pressure, depression, and anxiety.  Low-
income households often occupy low-quality housing exposing children and adults to 
potential allergens, lead paint, and unsafe conditions (Cohen, 2011).   
In 2013, the U.S. Census reported that 14.5% of the population lives at or below 
poverty (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor, 2014).  The federal government measures poverty 
using poverty thresholds and poverty guidelines.  Poverty thresholds are updated annually 
by the Census Bureau and are the original measure of poverty used mainly for statistical 
purposes.  Poverty guidelines are issued by the Department of Health and Human 
Services and are published annually in the Federal Register.  Poverty guidelines are a 
simplified analysis of poverty thresholds and are used to determine financial eligibility 
for federal programs, including housing subsidies.  Guidelines are calculated using the 
published weighted average poverty thresholds and the Consumer Price Index for All 
Urban Consumers (CPI-U).  Three sets of poverty guidelines are issued.  One set includes 
guidelines for each of the 48 contiguous states and Washington D.C., one set is issued for 
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Hawaii, and one set is issued for Alaska.  In the contiguous states and Washington D.C., 
2013 poverty guidelines indicate that a single adult earning $11,490 or less is considered 
to live in poverty.   An annual income of $23,550 is considered poverty for a family of 
four (HHS, 2013).  These figures are higher in Alaska and Hawaii.  In 2013, more than 
45 million people, or 14.5% of the population, lived below the poverty level.  Poverty has 
a direct effect on housing affordability and is linked to housing cost burdens causing 
distress for 13% of the population.   
Cost Burden and Housing Affordability 
Housing affordability is discussed in terms of housing cost burden.  A housing 
cost burden is defined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as 
paying more than 30% of household income on costs for shelter including utilities.  A 
severe cost burden occurs when households pay more than fifty percent of gross income 
on housing costs.  According to Schwartz (2015), housing affordability is a bigger 
problem than inadequate or overcrowded housing.   In the past, overcrowding and 
inadequate housing were a major concern.  Today, fewer than 2% of households reside in 
inadequate housing (Schwartz, 2015, p. 32).  Overcrowding accounts for less than four 
percent of households.  In contrast, more than 18% of households spend at least half of 
their income on the cost of housing (p. 32).  Thirty-five percent are renters and 27% of 





Multifamily Housing in the US 
Multi-family housing accounts for 26% of all housing units.  According to the 
National Multifamily Housing Council, a primary resource for multifamily insight, in 
2013 apartments encompassed 42% of all housing units providing shelter to over 16 
million households.  There were 3,375,747 apartments constructed between 1990 and 
2011.  Forty-two percent of the households in these newer properties have an annual 
income below $20,000 per year. 
The National Multifamily Housing Council estimates over 16 million apartments 
exist nationwide.  According to HUD, nearly two and a half million units have been built 
with LIHTC since 1987.  This accounts for between 12% and 15% of new and 
rehabilitated apartment units throughout the country1.  More than 12% of the U.S. 
population lives in multifamily housing.  The greatest percentage of apartment dwellers 
lives in the District of Columbia followed by New York.  In Florida, more than 12.4% of 
the population, or 2,380,131 residents, live in an apartment (NMHC, 2013).  Florida has 
the 13th highest number of residents living in multifamily housing.   
Understanding LIHTC 
The LIHTC program was created under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and has 
become the nation’s primary program for financing affordable rental housing (Wallace, 
1995).  The goal of the program is to provide an incentive for private investment in 
                                                 
 
1 Calculated from NMHC estimate of U.S. multifamily units and the number of LIHTC units placed in 
service between 1987 and 2011 stated by HUD. Joint Center for Housing Studies tabulations are based on 
the LIHTC database which reports fewer units than the number estimated by the NMHC 
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affordable housing intended for households earning less than 50% or 60% of area median 
income (AMI).  The program supplements existing appropriations for public housing and 
rental assistance programs that are administered by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD).  LIHTC is the only production program for affordable and 
low-income housing in the country.  Since its inception, the program has supported 
private funding for the construction of more than 2.4 million multifamily housing units 
(HUD, 2015).  Tax credits are purchased by investors at a reduced rate as an incentive to 
fund LIHTC development.  Tax credits can then be used to reduce annual income dollar-
for-dollar in an amount equal to the initial investment divided equally over a ten-year 
period.   
  To qualify for the tax credit, LIHTC owners commit to setting aside at least 20% 
of all units for households that earn 50% of area median income (AMI) or 40% of units 
are set aside for households earning 60% of AMI.  This is referred to as the 20/50 and 
40/60 rule.  Rents are targeted to not be more than 30% of household income however 
rent is based on AMI rather than household income.  Tenants often find that because rent 
is not income based, housing costs exceed the targeted percentage for affordability.  Units 
must continue to remain affordable for a 15 year compliance period, and since 1990, for 
an additional 15 years2 or investors will forfeit earned tax credits retroactively by 
recapture.  The penalty is intended to be severe in order to enforce compliance.   
                                                 
 
2 Properties must report compliance annually for the first 15 years.  After 15 years, owners are no longer 
subject to compliance reporting and under certain conditions, may opt out of the program.  If an owner 
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The LITHC program has been criticized by the private sector for its complexity 
and high transaction costs.  In the few years after the program was initiated, Clancy 
(1990) wrote the bureaucracy within the program was complicated with extensive 
reporting requirements and procedures for documenting compliance was cumbersome.  
Stegman (1992) initially complained that underwriting was unnecessarily complicated 
and burdensome but later pointed to the efficiency of the program because of the portion 
of credit dollars going to the bricks and mortar of development rather than the 
administrative costs of syndication and managing investor returns (Stegman, 1991).  
Postyn (1994) noted that few incentives existed for developers to participate in mixed-
income developments because of cumbersome regulatory requirements implying fewer 
affordable units available for low-income households. 
Recent studies have concentrated on cost burdens and the affordability of rent.  
Williamson (2011) examined 38,000 LIHTC households and found that 76.2% of LIHTC 
households were cost burdened and 15% were severely cost burdened.  Households using 
vouchers in conjunction with LIHTC were also cost burdened although to a lesser degree.  
More than 35% of LIHTC households using vouchers were found to experience housing 
cost burdens, paying more 30% of household income for rent.  These statistics 
demonstrate that LIHTC is not a guarantee of affordability and often fails to reach 
extremely low income households who often have the greatest need for affordable 
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housing.  The program does not specifically target households with extremely low 
incomes nor are rents assessed on a sliding scale according to income.   
Regan and Horn (2013) found most LIHTC households have higher incomes 
relative to other affordable housing programs, but 45% of tenants had extremely low 
incomes, meaning income is at or below the federal poverty guidelines or is 30% below 
AMI3, whichever is greater.  This number corroborated an earlier study by New York 
University that found 43% of LIHTC households had incomes below 30% AMI.  
According to Hollar (2014), over half of all LIHTC tenants pay less than 30% of their 
income on rent and three-fourths of tenants spent less than 40% of their income on rent.  
Severe cost burdens are experienced by 10% of LIHTC tenants who pay more than 50% 
of their income for rent.  Developers often apply for additional subsidy programs to 
reduce development costs in order to serve lower income households.  These efforts are 
credited for relieving cost burdens for 31% of extremely low income renters in the 
program (JCHS, 2013).   
Housing cost burdens for states are uneven.  Some states, such as Rhode Island 
and Washington, have more than 80% of LIHTC households who are not cost burdened 
at all.  On the other hand, 31.7% of LIHTC households in Oregon and 32.7% in Arizona 
pay more than 40% of income in rent.  Severe cost burdens for these two states are 18% 
and 20.4% respectively (Hollar, 2014).  In Florida, the subject of this study, 40.1% of 
                                                 
 
3 2013 AMI were found at the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Planning and Evaluation website.  The poverty guidelines are updated periodically in the Federal 
Register by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the authority of 42 U.S.C. 9902(2). 
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LIHTC households pay less than 30% of household income on rent and are not 
experiencing cost burdens.  There are 25.7% of households paying greater than 40% of 
income on rent.  More than ten percent of these are severely cost burdened paying greater 
than 50% of household income on housing costs (p. 27).    
As mentioned earlier, rents in LIHTC units are capped at thirty percent of either 
50% or 60% of AMI depending on the developer agreement.  Rents often fluctuate with 
market conditions.  Because rents do not fluctuate with tenant income, tenants who 
experience job loss or a reduction in income are obligated to pay the contract rent.  Even 
though LIHTC households earning 50% to 60% of AMI are better able to avoid cost 
burdens (Williamson, 2011), evidence suggests that LIHTC does not alleviate the cost 
burden associated with rental housing.    
While the LIHTC program does produce additional affordable units, affordable 
housing shortages persist in many communities.  According to the Institute for Children, 
Poverty, and Homelessness, the number of households living in poverty has increased 
while at the same time the number of affordable rental housing has declined.  Higher 
income households occupied nearly 42% of all affordable housing units, pushing over 
half of low and extremely low-income families into unaffordable rental units4.  The Joint 
Center for Housing Studies (2012) found that over the past decade, the gap between the 
supply and demand for low income rentals has widened over the past decade.  Since the 
                                                 
 
4 U. S. Census Bureau (2009), American Community Survey.  
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Great Recession of 2008, declining household income has increased demand for 
affordable rental housing for higher income tenants pushing the lowest income tenants 
into less desirable housing.   
AFFORDABLE HOUSING, LIHTC AND DISASTER RECOVERY 
The supply of low-income housing incurs additional production challenges in the 
face of disaster.  The effectiveness of housing programs as a solution for problems caused 
by disaster has been examined by others.  Gotham and Greenburg (2008) applied a 
comparative analysis of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) and local bonds 
after 9/11 and Katrina.  Their analysis revealed the overwhelming influence of business 
interests that dominated the political discourse, and ultimately influencing rule changes 
that eliminated the ‘public benefit’ language previously contained in the provisions.  
Green and Olshansky (2012) studied the Road Home Program (RHP), one of the largest 
disaster programs implemented during Katrina, highlighting program volatility and 
implementation challenges.  RHP was created in the wake of Katrina to provide aid to 
small rental properties and to offer homeowners a choice to sell out or rebuild.   
During the recovery period, redevelopment shadows economic development 
policies that currently encourage development of mixed use neighborhoods to dilute 
pockets of poverty associated with public housing.  Other policies attempting to alleviate 
poverty have also prescribed location or development priorities.  In the early 1990’s, the 
Moving to Opportunity program and the HOPE VI program were introduced in an effort 
to disperse public housing residents into other neighborhoods so that impoverished 
families could integrate into more middle-class communities (Goetz, 2004).   Efforts to 
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de-concentrate poverty was also attempted by combining LIHTC with other federal 
assistance such as HOPE VI5, HOME, vouchers, and other low-income housing programs 
(Graham, 2012; Schwartz, 2010).  According to Goetz (2004), HOPE VI was criticized 
for focusing on development for middle class families rather than housing low-income 
households.  The failure of HOPE VI became evident when the negative impact of de-
concentrated policy and construction of mixed use developments was criticized widely 
during recovery after Hurricane Katrina.  The City of New Orleans demolished over 
4,500 public housing units and replaced only a fraction of them using HOPE VI for 
mixed-use development.  More than 142,000 housing units were damaged or destroyed 
because of Hurricane Katrina, 79% of them considered to be affordable; by 2008, just 3 
years after the storm, only 8,900 affordable housing units had been funded (Dianis and 
Sinhha, 2008), well under the number needed to house displaced low-income households.   
  Much of the literature related to disaster recovery and housing examines the 
impact on those who either receive housing services or are displaced due to shortages of 
available housing (Mueller et al., 2011; Tierney, 2006).  Spangle (1991) primarily studied 
technical strategies for recovery, but recognized the disproportionate displacement of 
low-income households as a result of damaged housing and the subsequent increase in 
rents as a result of higher costs for code compliance during recovery.     
                                                 
 




The evidence of an overall reduction in the number of low-income rental housing 
units during disaster recovery has been well documented (McCarthy and Hanson, 2008; 
Unity, 2010), however Vuk (2008) suggests that this view is misleading.  His case study 
explored commentary from advocates of public housing preservation in the aftermath of 
Katrina.  Vuk (2008) found that low-income households in New Orleans were misled 
about available housing.  One of the reasons for his claim is the availability of vouchers.  
Housing choice vouchers are a demand subsidy provided to qualified households 
allowing them access to affordable housing from the private sector.  Privatization 
proponents have long called for vouchers as a more viable alternative to housing low-
income populations as opposed to government incentivized housing (Savas, 1987; Savas, 
2000).   
The experience of LIHTC housing providers participating in disaster recovery 
have not been given much attention.  Most studies and essays bemoan the failure of 
LIHTC, and other housing programs, to reach those most in need (Hooks and Miller, 
2006).  Still others have used geographic information systems (GIS) to analyze damages 
and losses of housing, including LIHTC, after Hurricane Katrina (Richardson and 
Renner; 2007).  This study specifically examines the preferences of LIHTC professionals 
and the Florida State Finance Corporation (FHFC), the state housing authority 
administering housing programs in the state.  Research on LIHTC multifamily housing 
development post-disaster fills a gap between the disaster experience of households and 




PREFERENCE THEORY, DECISION-MAKING, AND RISK   
As stated in Chapter 2, risk as a social science was first explored by Gilbert White 
(Lofstedt and Frewer, 1998).  White proposed a social construct that suggested modifying 
human behavior was a better solution to potential harm from natural disasters (White, 
1945).  Avoidance is one such measure.  Risk avoidance is most often shown in areas 
with proximity to hurricane hazards, such as Florida, when communities mandate 
evacuations or have a no-development policy on barrier islands.    
Bradbury (1989) identified two concepts of risk that propose solutions to different 
problems.  Technological risk uses a quantitative approach in risk analysis and presents 
facts from which decisions can be made.  Most attention to property development risk 
focuses on measurable processes, largely feasibility analysis and cash flow analysis 
(Byrne, 1996; Cadman and Topping, 1995).  Additional risk exposure for LIHTC projects 
(management risk, tax risk, and capital risk), are quantitative and fall within the 
technological risk category.  A second concept of risk forms a theoretical basis for policy 
design from a social constructivist perspective (Bradbury, 1989, p. 380).  It is from this 
perspective that societal decisions can be considered and cooperative decisions can be 
made.     
Plough and Krimsky recognized the significance of the political dimension of 
policy formation when ‘what the experts deem most important and what the public 
demands from government’ are in disaccord (1987, p. 7).  Often this is the case when 
disaster recovery is underway, yet social needs fail to be met.  Disaccord is highly visible 
in the affordable housing realm, not only because of a chronic undersupply in general, but 
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especially when disaster recovery fails to address the needs of the most vulnerable 
segments of the population—the elderly, disabled, and impoverished.  Bradbury (1989) 
includes an ethical dimension to consider ‘questions of values that inherently are 
embedded in judgments of the analyst’ (p. 382).  Risk judgments between laypersons and 
experts will naturally have differing viewpoints because each class has varying 
experiences and expectations that contribute to understanding.  Disagreements between 
experts and laypersons are not factually wrong per se but are from a different perspective 
(Fischcoff et al, 1983).  The literature on disaster recovery reflects this discord with the 
majority of research focusing on the effects disaster places on the displaced and the 
disenfranchised.  The conversation ultimately leads the charge for more assistance and 
more housing that is affordable for the poor and working classes, often to no avail.  
Research devoted to those who provide affordable housing fails to examine the problem 
from the producer’s perspective.  Developing an understanding from the perspective of 
one or another group provides the foundation for a two-way conversation that supports 
knowledge and mutual respect (Bradbury, 1989).  This study bridges the gap between the 
perspective of the developer and the multiple studies that advocate for increased access to 
affordable housing by vulnerable households.   
Slovic et al (1979) found in an earlier study on hazards related risks that people 
who had faulty perceptions were likely to err in their understanding.  That challenge is 
still prevalent today.  Understanding barriers to the development of affordable housing as 
heard from those that produce housing with LIHTC will hopefully contribute to the 
discourse in the literature and in public policy.   
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LOCATION PREFERENCE AND DEVELOPER RISK 
While some developers may consider the social benefits of their developments, 
for the most part, real estate developers are concerned with exposure to financial risk 
when making investment decisions.  Empirical evidence identifies real estate risks as 
illiquidity (the inability to turn real estate into cash quickly), optimal holding period, 
price risk (Cheng, Lin & Liu, 2008); interest rate risk (Archer, Elmer, Harrison & Ling, 
1998); credit and debt burden risks (Igan & Pinheiro, 2010); and risk associated with 
business cycles (Igan & Pinheiro, 2010). Traditional aspects of development risk, such as 
financing and interest rates, have been studied by Markham (2001) and Cameron (1990).  
Additional risks identified by Liu, Liu & Sun (2011) include policy risk, funding risk, 
operational risk, urban planning risk, technology risk, natural hazards risk, market supply 
and demand risk, and capital risk.   
Newell and Steglick (2006) identified property development risks in a survey of 
leading property developers in Australia.  The major categories of risk factors in this 
study were categorized by stages of construction and included risk factors such as costs, 
land, financial, infrastructure, management, time, changes, and environmental factors 
among others.  Their survey of property developers indicated that the pre-construction 
phase of development has the highest overall risk in the development process.  Risk 
factors for this stage include many of the same risk factors that would take place during 
post-disaster redevelopment: political risk, experience, funding, market risk, land 
acquisition, and government approvals.  Some of these same risk factors were verified by 
this Florida LIHTC case. 
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Risk factors were categorized in the course of this study.  Dullisear (2001) 
classified property development in four broad risk categories: commercial, construction, 
land, and social.   Hargitay and Yu (1993) identified two categorical types of risk as 
systematic and unsystematic. Systematic risk was defined as an external risk that cannot 
be controlled such as general economic changes, changes in government policies, market 
risk, and cyclical risks.  Unsystematic risks are specific risks that can be anticipated, for 
instance business risk, liquidity, location, construction, and financial risks.  Pidgeon et al 
(1992) studied risk perceptions through the dichotomy of objective and subjective, or 
perceived risk.  Objective risk is specific and measurable while subjective risk is what an 
individual perceives based on personal experience and expectations of an occurrence.   
Building on Morrison’s (2007) use of Social, Technological, Economical, 
Environmental, and Political (STEEP) analysis in real estate development, Khumpaisal 
and Ross (2007) used STEEP analysis for categorizing real estate development risks that 
are both quantitative and subjective.  STEEP analysis is a strategic decision-making tool 
that allows an organization to assess potential changes to the current macro environment.  
The method is also known as ETPS, STEP, PEST, PESTLE, and STEEPLE.  Various 
iterations of this business model consider other factors that influence decision-making, 
such as Legal (L), Political (P), Economic (E), Environmental (E), Technological (T), or 
Sociological (S).  This study used a modified STEEP analysis to isolate those factors 
specific to real estate development in the aftermath of disaster.  The categories chosen for 
this study were Social, Technical, Environmental, Economic, and Government (Table 2-




Table 2-1: STEEG Analysis Categories for Real Estate Development During 
Disaster Recovery Modified from Khumpaisal and Ross (2007) 
STEEG Analysis Categories for Real Estate Development  
During Disaster Recovery 
Social 
Social factors include community feedback for real estate 
development projects.  This feedback could be in the form of 
pushback based on existing bias towards a particular type of 
development or demand for a specific type of construction.  
Social factors are identified as external threats or external allies 
to a project. 
Technical 
Technical factors include factors that indicate financial 
feasibility for a project. This includes measurements of 
feasibility such as cap rates, internal rates of return, operations, 
and financial strength. 
Economic 
Economic factors involve the profit and loss of a given 
development and include available funding, incentives, 
subsidies, and application costs that have a positive or negative 
influence on profitability. 
Environmental 
Environmental factors include those elements that influence 
where a project will be developed in conjunction with known or 
perceived natural or human made hazards. 
Government 
Political factors are those governmental influences that are 
outside a single developer's influence.  These include the 
likelihood of existing policies to continue, funding based on a 
political agenda that could expire depending upon which group 





Identifying LIHTC Development Risk  
In addition to traditional real estate development risks, LIHTC in particular 
carries management and recapture risk due to complicated management and reporting 
requirements (Roberts, 2009).  Recapture risk occurs when the required number of low-
income units is not maintained, resulting in tax credit recapture from the investor back to 
the state.   
Reznick examined operating data for 16,356 tax credit properties and found that 
foreclosure risk among LIHTC is less than 1% even though cash flow margins were tight 
(2011).  Nearly 35% of properties surveyed were operating below the break-even point 
demonstrating the significant contribution of subsidies to project feasibility.  Only one 
study was found that analyzed the effects of disaster specifically on LIHTC properties.  
After Hurricane Sandy, the Furman Center at New York University conducted a count of 
housing damages by type, including LIHTC.  Of 178,000 affordable housing units 
damaged by storm surge, 248 buildings with 24,800 units were identified as LIHTC 
(2013).  Considering the low margins achieved by LIHTC, damages to units after disaster 
could increase the incidence of foreclosure if damaged units cannot be brought back 
online in a reasonable amount of time.  Cost risks can cause a negative impact on 
performance if rehabilitation falls below the break-even point for operations.  After 
disaster, the risk of recapture due to a brief noncompliance period from the down units is 
somewhat mitigated because the IRS typically waives compliance requirements, at least 
temporarily, during the response and restoration period.  When foreclosure occurs, IRS 
rules state that the extended compliance period is waived and recapture is mitigated under 
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the assumption that a subsequent owner will continue affordability status.  One of the 
limitations the earlier study is that LIHTC foreclosure rates could be understated because 
deeds in lieu and syndicate support of underperforming properties was not analyzed 
(Reznick, 2013). 
Melendez, Schwartz, and Montrichard (2008) found that LIHTC capital risk 
increases as LIHTC properties age and need rehabilitation.  Often, older developments 
that have completed the initial compliance period and the extended compliance period 
use LIHTC funds to upgrade properties and maintain affordability.  After disaster, 
rehabilitation creates risk because of the additional financing needed to restore and repair 
units after disaster.   
Strategies for managing private sector risk as a tool for mitigation have received 
some attention in the literature.  Harrington (2006) uses economic theory to propose 
catastrophic risk insurance while Kunreuther (2006) uses risk decision theory to argue for 
a comprehensive natural disaster insurance program.  Both of these ideas are likely to 
increase developer costs, becoming a barrier for participation because of the tight 
margins of profitability associated with LIHTC. 
 A list of objective and subjective risk variables was compiled from the real estate 
development literature and the reflections of this study’s survey respondents.  Risk 
variables were categorized using the modified STEEP analysis described previously (see 
Table 2-2).  Some elements of risk that directly affect hurricane prone areas, such as 
storm surge, coastal proximity, impact zone, or specific programs associated with 
housing and disaster recovery were included.  Phase II of this study asked developers 
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about elements of risk in order to identify those risk factors that affect decision-making.  
Developers contributed two additional funding sources to mitigate financial risk, Project 
Based Section 8 Rental Assistance and State Housing Trust Funds.  Respondents also 
ranked a series of risk variables that reflected perceived risks associated with hurricane 
disaster.  
 After disaster, risk perception could influence recovery decision-making, 
particularly if decision makers experienced significant losses.   Location and land 
availability are key factors for development decisions and both factors are significant 
barriers to development in high cost/high hazard coastal counties.  Land acquisition 
cannot be financed with LIHTC investment funds, so the developer either acquires land 
for a specific project, or has land readily available from previous investments (Nelson, 
2014).  The price of available land is basic to any investment decision.  Oftentimes the 
least expensive land is located in the most vulnerable of places (Khadduri, 2013).  Land 
in coastal communities often comes at a premium.  Higher rent and higher stabilized 
occupancy rates offset high land costs in these areas (Bin and Kruse, 2006).  Site 
decisions are also influenced by access and the available market, which increases value 
and cost.  After disaster, particularly those disasters that have devastating outcomes on 
resources, developers are especially cognizant of market rebound and future risk due to 
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households who need shelter temporarily as a response to disaster.  In this study, some 
developers expressed a preference for risk avoidance in the areas likely to be hardest hit 
based on perceived location hazards.  While no direct evidence exists, in the course of 
this study developers communicated the perceived risk of a slow rebound in some 
communities, if the area rebounds at all.  Lack of redevelopment after Katrina, 
particularly in some of the lower-income communities suggests that perceived risks 
associated with a slow rebound are well-founded.   
Developers of low-income housing often face NIMBYism (Not in My Back Yard) 
from communities resistant to the perceived risk of the decline of property values because 
of the proximity to low-income housing.  While this study found that advocacy was not 
exceedingly significant in development decision-making, developers suggested that local 
communities be better informed about the typical tenant occupying LIHTC in a 
rebranding attempt to reduce the stigma associated with affordable housing.  Excessive 
costs for insurance, code compliance, or proximity to hazards shape investment decisions 
from an opportunity cost or development cost basis.   
Location Preferences and the Public Agency  
 Statute requires that state housing authorities (HFA) develop annual Qualified 
Action Plans (QAP) to encourage a wide variety of stated preferences for LIHTC 
development.  The QAP is a federally required planning tool that HFA uses to explain 
how the LIHTC program will be administered, and to establish preferences and set-asides 
for tax credit awards (Hollar, 2014).  Allocation criteria is determined by the state, 
however the statute specifically requires certain criteria to be considered, including 
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location, which is the primary interest for this study.  Other required features and 
conditions are shown in Table 2-3.  Public policy preferences are communicated in QAPs 
in several ways.  Preferences in the form of extra points encourage developers to submit 
projects that favor specific populations, such as the elderly, disabled, or families; extra 
points may also be awarded to encourage projects in certain locations.  Others use 
thresholds and set asides.  Others, like Florida, use specific language, such as ‘targeted’. 
 This study specifically examined location preferences for areas affected by the 
2004 hurricane season.  That year, four hurricanes hit Florida causing some degree of 
damages in every county.  Hurricane Charley was the first to strike on Florida’s east coast 
beginning a 44 day onslaught of damaging winds, rain and storm surge.  Charley was 
followed by Hurricanes Frances, Ivan, and then Jeanne.  Some areas were hit by multiple 
hurricanes.  Other areas had damage associated with storm surge.  In the two years after 
the hurricanes, Florida QAPs responded with location preferences which will be 





 Set-asides are one means of communicating LIHTC preferences.  These can be 
established within the QAP reserving a dollar amount or a percentage of tax credit 
allocations for projects meeting specific guidelines, for populations served or location 
preferences for example.  Thresholds can also be established that require projects to meet 
minimum guidelines just to submit a proposal for LIHTC awards.   Gustafsen and Walker 
(2002) performed a content analysis of QAPs from 1990 to 2000 to determine how 
preferences and set-asides were used to guide development characteristics.  They found 
that set-asides and preferences were declared in eight categories: geographic location, 
housing needs, financing, residential characteristics, project type and activities, building 
characteristics, sponsorship and costs, and affordability.  Others have found that location 
Table 2-3: Allocation Criteria for Qualified Action Plans 
LIHTC Qualified Action Plan Criteria 
Project characteristics Lowest income populations 
Housing needs  Tenants with children 
Project location Qualified Census Tract 
Revitalization plan Participation non-profit organizations 
Sponsor characteristics Energy efficiency preferences 
Special needs tenants Historic properties 




requirements result in LIHTC developments often being supplied in low-income areas 
with housing already relatively easy to obtain using vouchers (Eriksen and Rosenthal, 
2010).  Some studies suggest LIHTC developments often act as a substitute for market 
housing that would have been constructed without tax credits or other subsidy (Eriksen 
and Rosenthal, 2010; Malpezzi and Vandell, 2002).  Given that developers are less likely 
to build LIHTC in areas with less demand, like extremely low-income communities, 
QAPs that award additional points or set-asides for these areas can result in LIHTC being 
developed in areas that already support low-income households considering that rents are 
relatively cheaper and landlords are likely more willing to accept vouchers (Baum-Snow 
and Marion, 2009).   
According to Khadduri (2013) developers actively communicate during the 
comment period for QAPs being commenced the following year to influence which 
projects will be fundable.  Preferred locations established in the QAP do not necessarily 
insure developers will bring properties into the LIHTC competition (Khadduri, 2013).  
For instance, threshold requirements may negate additional points awarded for location 
obstructing competitiveness of certain properties.  High land costs also impede developer 
activity in more desirable areas that are often experiencing a decline in affordable 
housing, again moving affordable housing to areas already being served by the voucher 
program.   
Khadduri (2013) suggests that LIHTC is superior to vouchers when it lends itself 
to neighborhood revitalization.  During the disaster recovery period, LIHTC can improve 
the quality of housing stock in areas affected by the storm.  In addition, new LIHTC 
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constructed as a result of disaster can mitigate future damages because of improved 
construction standards (p.2).  Khadduri found little research comparing how LIHTC 
construction performs in high hazard areas, nor were studies found that analyze how 
often existing LIHTC in coastal communities withstood multiple hurricane hazards.  This 
research opens the door to that analysis by studying the location preferences delineated in 
QAPs after a major hurricane disaster and location preferences of developers based on 
stated and revealed preferences.   
Revealed Preference Theory 
 The disaster cycle provides a unique opportunity for effected communities to 
engage in redevelopment with the intent of creating a modern community along with 
services and a landscape that enhances the lives and property of its inhabitants.  Yet 
disaster recovery is a difficult process with limited funds available to bring an affected 
community or region back to normalcy.  Housing is but a small segment of the recovery 
process, albeit one of the most essential, particularly when a large portion of existing 
housing is damaged.  The reality of having limited resources available to assist 
communities in recovery efforts lends itself well to the theory of preference. 
 Pioneered by Paul Samuelson, revealed preference theory is a means of analyzing 
choice by observing behavior.  Revealed preference theory arose from theories of choice 
and utility rooted from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries pioneered by Georg 
Cantor and Ragnar Frisch.  Revealed preference was proposed by Samuelson as an 
alternative to ordinal utility theory (Samuelson, 1950) and promoted the idea that any 
good or service is preferred over an alternative choice.  Samuelson (1948) initially 
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studied individual preferences using an indifference map based on observations.  This 
study analyses the stated and revealed preferences of stakeholders of LIHTC in the 
context of disaster recovery. 
Bockstael and McConnell (2007) studied behavior for valuing environmental 
amenities using revealed preference techniques.  The authors recognized the economic 
impact inherent in disaster, particularly how impact analysis measured by economic 
activity does not equate to social welfare.  
 
“A major hurricane will increase local expenditures dramatically 
both in terms of expenditures made to protect property a priori and 
expenditures made ex post for replacements and repairs.  These 
show up as increase[s] in revenues to construction and materials 
supply firms. Yet no one would agree that social welfare is enhanced 
by a hurricane.” (p. 3) 
 
Stated preference identifies preferences with interviews or surveys.  This study 
used a survey to illicit stated preferences from LIHTC developers to understand how 
disaster recovery policies influence decision-making.  Stated preferences of the Florida 
Housing Finance Corporation (FHFC), representing the public agency, were identified 
with a content analysis of Qualified Action Plans.  The value of stated preferences was 
demonstrated in a study of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  Carson et al (2003) conducted 
interviews for a large scale contingent valuation study that identified stated willingness-
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to-pay by households to assess the harm associated with the disaster.  Stated preferences 
were also used when attempting to value the damages associated with the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill.  The researchers used direct interviews as opposed to observations of behavior 
because revealed preferences were difficult to obtain and indecisive (Bockstael and 
McConnell, 2007).       
Others studies have combined stated and revealed preference methods as a 
means of comparison.  Valuing environmental amenities was the subject of a 
study that compared revealed and stated preference models (Adamowicz et al., 
1994).  The stated preference model is a direct method for valuing environmental 
amenities.  In this model, a stated choice was acquired from respondents using 
hypothetical choice sets.  Revealed preference, an indirect method of value used 
to observe choices, was used to compare results.  This study used a survey to 
illicit stated choices from LIHTC professionals and content analysis to determine 
the states choices of the public agency.  Revealed preferences were garnered 
using geographic information systems (GIS) to isolate demonstrated development 
patterns for comparison of location preferences in the aftermath of hurricane 
disaster. 
During disaster recovery, choices are made to allocate a limited amount of 
funding to critical projects, such as infrastructure, housing and economic development.  
Policies formed before disaster strikes can guide leaders in their funding allocation 
preferences.  Disaster management plans are unable to predict every nuance of housing 
redevelopment needs or developer risks that inhibit affordable housing development 
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when expedient housing recovery is needed.  This study compares the stated preferences 
of LIHTC community and FHFC by observing revealed preferences using Geographic 
Information Services (GIS).  The study also ranks risk variables in a modified STEEP 
model based on responses by survey participants to identify the level of perceived risk 
and willingness to develop during disaster recovery.     
DISASTER THEORY 
According to Smith and Wenger (2007), the recovery phase of disaster is little 
understood among researchers and practitioners.  Communities are challenged to rebuild 
basic services, infrastructure, and the local economy.  Individuals are faced with 
rebuilding homes and lives.  Business owners are faced with determining the feasibility 
of whether to restore or not.  Housing providers, within the context of a business model, 
have to factor in risk and financial constraints to determine if, where, and when 
rebuilding and restoration will occur.  Policy makers focus on reconstructing a 
sustainable community using limited resources.  Decisions are made about who will be 
winners and losers when available funding is weighed against social, economic, and 
environmental needs; needs which far outweigh available resources.  In addition to basic 
economic realities, stakeholders and decision-makers are faced with contradictory 
policies, complex interconnections between participants, and limited understanding of 
how all of these complexities impact the effectiveness of public and private systems for 
supplying a sufficient number of affordable housing units.     
The community leans toward the restoration of a familiar place while at the same 
time striving to reconstruct a safer and more equitable society (Kates et al., 2006, p. 
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14656).  New sustainable development potentially replaces old and run-down buildings, 
depending on political will and the struggle between available resources and competing 
interests of who benefits from recovery and restoration (p. 14656).  This paradox was 
seen in action after Hurricane Katrina nearly devastated the Lower Ninth Ward in 
Orleans Parish, Bernard Parish and Jefferson Parish.  Over 51% of white-occupied homes 
and 67% of black occupied homes were damaged or destroyed in these areas.  Yet 
redevelopment was criticized for being inefficient and for straining public services 
(Simunovich, 2008).  Urban redevelopment programs were heavily criticized for failing 
to house low-income households while building a new community that highlighted the 
economic revitalization of the area, leaving many lifelong residents behind.  Ultimately, 
disaster planning requires that stakeholders participate in a dialogue that guides 
redevelopment during recovery.  LIHTC developers, as the primary provider of 
affordable multifamily housing, can contribute expertise to housing recovery policy by 
identifying the programs most effective for affordable housing production during disaster 
recovery. 
Researchers from many disciplines have studied disaster in the context of their 
fields, but ultimately there are five bodies of theory in the literature on the disaster 
recovery process. These are the social, institutional, environmental, economic, and 
physical theories of study.  These areas contribute to disaster theory through the construct 
of competing choices.  What these bodies of knowledge reveal about disaster recovery is 
that the process is circuitous and complex.  Multiple sectors of society have a role in the 
recovery effort but lack understanding of how each sector affects outcomes (Alesch, 
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2005).  Quick decision-making is undertaken under political and social pressures which 
inhibits the process of integrating and learning from past experiences.  These are the 
realities that converge in the emerging theory of disaster recovery (Alesch, 2005).  It is a 
goal of this research to contribute to that emerging theory. 
THE THEORETICAL DOMAIN OF DISASTER RECOVERY 
Much of the literature emphasizes the social outcomes of disaster recovery, 
particularly for low income and disadvantaged populations.  Homeowners and economic 
redevelopment receive the bulk of disaster aid in the form of grants and low-interest 
loans.  Renters and low-income families face being permanently displaced from the 
community.  During disaster recovery, LIHTC multi-family housing developers are at a 
disadvantage.  LIHTC developers face additional risks that influence decisions to produce 
affordable housing during recovery. This study was interested in the perceived risks that 
influence LIHTC development during recovery. The goal of this research is to compare 
stated preferences and revealed preferences to isolate risks for LIHTC production in 
Florida. Understanding LIHTC risk informs policy makers of the expert assessment of 
the programs most likely to facilitate a robust affordable housing recovery. 
There are several theories that emerge in the literature that encompass various 
disciplines in the study of housing and disaster recovery.  Much of the research 
surrounding disaster recovery and low-income housing is grounded in the theories of 
environmental justice and social justice from the legal and sociological disciplines 
respectively.  The plight of disadvantaged populations fits well within these areas of 
focus because of the concern for human rights and the social functions of society.  
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Privatization evolves from economic theory and seeks to implement market mechanisms 
to improve efficiency in government programs through public/private partnerships, tax 
credits, and vouchers (Savas, 2000).  The public housing model has coalesced into a 
modified public-private partnership model where private developers are incentivized 
through tax breaks or subsidies to provide low-income housing to those in need.  During 
disaster, incentives and government aid is expected to expedite recovery so a sense of 
normalcy and economic activity can return, ideally to a better than pre-disaster condition, 
even if the poor are excluded.  The provision of low-income housing during recovery also 
has roots in public choice theory attributable to public discourse and political response.  
Public choice theory was developed by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) in an effort to 
explain how decisions are made in the political arena.  Supply side programs, such as 
LIHTC, are among existing housing programs driven by government policies.  Policies 
are often modified during disaster recovery to facilitate redevelopment of affordable 
housing by the private sector (Figure 2-1).  An understanding of associated risk variables 





Figure 2-1: Public Choice Theory and Post Disaster Housing Recovery 
 
The perception of risk in hazardous areas may influence the development 
decision-making process.  In economic literature, risk is typically conceptualized as 
uncertainty over future outcomes (Bodie, Kane and Markus, 1993).  Knight (1921) 
defined risk as measurable as opposed to uncertainty which is “not susceptible to 
measurement.” This study identifies risk and uncertainty, merging the two into what is 
conceptualized as perceived risk.  For the purpose of this study, perceived risk is defined 
as the stated actions and motivations that stem from social, economic, environmental, and 
political experiences.  Expectations of risk, whether perceived or quantified, should 
influence decisions about where LIHTC projects will ultimately be developed.   
For this study, temporal changes in demonstrated location preferences were 
expected as the disaster event became a distant memory.  Temporal changes were 
examined in the course of this study to compare revealed preferences with stated 
preferences.  This analysis sought to extract variables of risk from a comparison of stated 
and revealed preferences.  The study also sought to make note of variations in site 
choices over time.   
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An embedded revelatory case study approach was used to determine the 
reasonableness of the variables developed from the literature.  A survey of LIHTC 
professionals ranked each of the variables by order of preferences.  In the analysis, 
variables presented were interpreted in terms of risk.  The case study method was chosen 
as an empirical study of LIHTC production in Florida after hurricanes Charley, Jeanne, 
Frances and Ivan hit the state over a six-week period in 2004.  The study begins with the 
proposition that affordable housing production is driven by housing need based on 
population, but in the case of disaster, housing damages often drive public policy.     
The Hurricane Housing Working Group (HWG), convened by the Governor Jeb 
Bush, stated recommendations for housing recovery.  Location preferences of the public 
agency were communicated in the Qualified Action Plans (QAP), published annually by 
the Florida Housing Finance Corporation (FHFC).  Evidence of HWG recommendations 
were also communicated in the 2005 and 2006 QAPs.  Geographic information systems 
(GIS) technology was embedded in the case study to analyze demonstrated LIHTC 
development patterns during the analysis period.  Using GIS as a method of analysis 
provided a geographic study of development patterns in conjunction with Sea, Lake, and 
Overland Surges (SLOSH) models to analyze LIHTC developments located in the 
boundary of storm surge.  There is no evidence in the literature to suggest that a 
comprehensive storm surge analysis has ever been completed for Florida LIHTC.  Figure 









Chapter 3  
FLORIDA AND THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 A revelatory case study design was used to complete a location and risk analysis 
of LIHTC in the aftermath of the 2004 hurricane season in Florida.  The case study also 
developed risk variables that were ranked by participants, which was discussed in the 
previous chapter.  This chapter spotlights a brief history of housing assistance and the 
LIHTC program in general.  LIHTC in Florida is further described in relation to the 2004 
hurricane season to analyze the suitability of Florida LIHTC and Disaster Recovery as a 
case study. 
HOUSING ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
 The U.S. Congress has played a role in housing since it funded research to study 
slums in American cities in 1892.  Federal aid was first proposed by President Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1908 when he established a Housing Commission to study housing for low 
income households.  It was not until 1918 that Congress authorized $100 million to 
finance projects for the United States Ship Building Corporation for housing workers 
during World War I.   In 1922, then Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, promoted 
home ownership with the Own Your Home campaign.  Hoover continued to tout the 
virtues of homeownership through the decade until the Great Depression.  
 The Great Depression saw a wave of foreclosures as mortgages became 
unaffordable and families were forced from their homes.   Unemployment climbed to 
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twenty-five percent.  Incomes fell by forty percent.  In 1932, the Federal Home Loan 
Bank System was established by Congress in response to the work of the White House 
Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, convened by President Herbert 
Hoover in 1931 to gain a better understanding of the barriers that were holding back 
homeownership (Hoover, 1931).  Hoover signed the Emergency Relief and Construction 
Act into law on July 21, 1932, which authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
to make loans for public service projects, including slum clearance and low-income 
housing construction.  According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
actions taken in 1932 were the first significant housing activities undertaken by the 
federal government.    
 When Roosevelt took office in 1933, he immediately took steps to provide relief 
for homeowners by establishing the Home Owners Loan Corporation.  He continued to 
fund grants and slum clearance through the Public Works Administration and the Public 
Works Emergency Housing Corporation.  By 1934, nearly half of all residential loans 
were delinquent and homelessness continued to increase.  At the height of the Great 
Depression, millions were homeless, living with relatives, finding shelter in vacant 
buildings, or existing in organic shanty towns.  The National Housing Act of 1934 was a 
pivotal piece of housing legislation that set in motion policies that established public 
housing in the U.S.  Initially, the Act created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
to insure single-family homes as a means to spur home construction for ownership.  It 
was not until 1937 that the United States Public Housing Authority was created under the 
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National Housing Act to authorize loans and subsidies for public housing (Quigley, 
2000).  
The Evolution of Housing Policy for the Poor 
 Housing policies have rarely been about just housing in isolation (Schwartz, 2015; 
Edson, 2011).  When the United States Public Housing Authority was enacted, the 
declaration stated the purpose of the act was to help States ease unemployment first, and 
then to improve housing for low income families.  In 1940, the Lanham Act allowed 
federal funds to be used to produce public housing as a part of the war effort to house 
defense industry workers.  This was followed by legislation to exercise rent control under 
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 to curtail rent inflation after the war.  Katz et al 
(2003) analyzed seventy years of housing policies at the state and local level and found 
only two that directly addressed affordable and decent housing.  
 It was not until 1949, under President Harry Truman, that the Housing Act 
authorized the construction of a large number of public housing units.  While 810,000 
units were authorized to be built by 1955, only 125,000 were actually constructed.  Urban 
renewal and slum clearance projects undertaken under the act actually destroyed more 
housing than was replaced (Thomas, 1997; Rusk, 1999; Teaford, 2000), a charge that 
would be repeated during the recovery phase of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Campanella, 
2006).  
 The 1950s and 1960s ushered in programs to assist the elderly and disabled in 
obtaining housing.  The Housing Act of 1956 authorized housing agencies to increase 
spending for elderly housing and expanded eligibility for single elderly households to 
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obtain public housing.  The Housing Act of 1959 authorized Section 202, a program that 
allowed non-profit organizations to develop housing projects for the elderly.  The 
reauthorization of the Housing Act in 1961 continued support of the elderly by 
authorizing rental subsidies to this segment of the population in addition to providing 
government insured loans for low-income housing construction.   
 President Lyndon Johnson took office in 1963 and ushered in his ideas for the 
Great Society with the goal of eliminating poverty and racial injustice.  During the 
Johnson administration, Congress established the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development as a cabinet-level agency and created the Model Cities Program as one 
component of Johnson’s war on poverty.  The Model Cities Program was replaced by the 
Community Development Block Grant (CBDG) program in 1974; CDBG is still a key 
element of housing policy today.  Various mortgage subsidies were also launched from 
the Kennedy administration in 1961 through the early 1980s when Ronald Reagan took 
office to encourage the private sector to produce low-income rental housing for the poor, 
elderly and disabled.  Other than Section 515, which subsidizes rural housing 
development, the grants and programs from this period did not produce additional public 
housing but relied on existing stock or the private sector.  According to the Section 8 
contract database that is maintained and publicly available through hud.gov, as of 2012, 
the Section 8 program provided rent subsidies for 1,034,445 households.  These units 
were constructed over a 20 year period between the early 1960s and the early 1980s and 
are for profit entities owned by private parties or non-profit organizations (Schwartz, 
2015).   
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 By 1969, housing subsidies for tenants became tied to income.  Initially set at 
twenty-five percent of household income, the threshold is currently capped at 30% even 
though many households are paying considerably more of their income for housing.  In 
1970, the Experimental Housing Allowance Program demonstrated the feasibility of rent 
subsidies in privately owned buildings, becoming the precursor to Section 8 multifamily 
housing.   
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 consolidated many 
housing grant programs under the CDBG program and created the Section 8 voucher 
program to subsidize rent for low income households living in privately owned housing.  
Vouchers were proposed as early as 1937 but did not become a matter of policy until 
1970 with the Experimental Housing Allowance Program.  The Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974 created the first permanent voucher program and was managed 
by local housing authorities nationwide (Schwartz, 2015).  In 1983, Reagan introduced 
the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act to provide more flexibility for tenants using 
vouchers.  Like other programs and statutes, the voucher program has been modified and 
renamed through the years, but it is still the largest demand-side housing subsidy program 
for low-income households. 
 The Low Income Housing Tax Credit was established in 1986 and provides 
roughly $5 billion in annual tax credits to developers in exchange for capping rents at 
either 50 percent or 60 percent of area median income (AMI).  Housing must remain 
affordable for a minimum of 15 years or investors risk significant financial penalties.  
Some argue that developers collect rents at the same rate as would be collected if there 
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were no subsidy at all (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2008).  The LITHC program is described in 
greater detail in a separate section of this chapter.  Housing for the homeless was 
addressed in 1987 with the advent of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act.   
 The HOME Investment Partnership (HOME) was created through the 1990 
National Affordable Housing Act.  HOME is a block grant program that focuses 
specifically on low- and moderate-income households.  The difference between CDBG 
and HOME is that the latter is limited to housing while the former provides flexibility for 
a wide range of community development projects.  State and local governments can 
choose how HOME funds are spent as long as projects are spent on housing programs for 
low-income households (Schwartz, 2015).  Funding is divided between state and local 
government at 40 percent and 60 percent respectively.  Congress requires that at least 15 
percent of HOME funds be allocated to community based nonprofit organizations known 
as Community Housing Development Organizations.  HOME funds must also be 
matched with other funding sources, and can be used in conjunction with LIHTC.  As of 
November 2012, the HOME program was instrumental in assisting 1.3 million renters 
and homeowners with housing (Schwartz, 2015).  Roughly half of all HOME funds have 
been allocated for rental housing.  HOME-funded projects often serve a different 
population from LIHTC because assistance must be targeted to households with incomes 
at 80 percent or less of AMI for owners or no more than 50 to 65 percent of AMI for 
renters.  Like LIHTC, HOME-funded rental housing must maintain affordability for a 
minimum of 15 years.  
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 Several programs were initiated in 1993 that contributed to a new round of urban 
redevelopment, including the creation of empowerment zones by Congress which was 
intended to encourage development in distressed areas.  The Urban Revitalization 
Demonstration Program, or HOPE VI, was also authorized the same year.  The goal of 
HOPE VI was to demolish and redevelop distressed public housing following 
recommendations of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing.  
The program funded the demolition of distressed public housing units but has been 
criticized for replacing them with less than 55 percent of equivalent public housing units 
necessary to support households with very low incomes (Schwartz, 2015; Kingsley, 
2009; Popkin et al, 2004).  Kingsley (2009) asserts that the percentage of replacement 
public housing is closer to 81% because as much as a third of public housing units 
scheduled for demolition through HOPE VI were vacant units.  This view is discounts the 
“prolonged” pre-demolition period in which neglected maintenance and upkeep forced 
households to move out while management allowed units to remain vacant (Goetz, 2013, 
p. 91).  
 As this brief history points out, housing assistance in the United States falls into 
three categories:  
 Tenant-Based: subsidies given to individual households including Section 
8 vouchers.  
 Public Housing: Housing typically owned and managed by local 
government, usually a state or local housing authority. 
 Project Based: subsidies given to the owner of housing units which must 
then be rented to lower income households at affordable rates.  Privately 
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owned Section 8 Multifamily Housing and the Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit Program both fall into this category. 
 
This study centered on the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program in the 
context of disaster recovery.  The next section begins with a brief overview of LIHTC, 
how the program works, and how it is used in Florida to produce affordable housing.  The 
chapter closes with a description of the 2004 hurricane season in the State of Florida with 
an overview of housing damages around the state.  
THE LOW INCOME TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 
 The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program was established under 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in an effort to incentivize private development of low-
income rental housing.  The program is a supply side housing program administered by 
the Internal Revenue Service and is the single largest subsidy for low-income rental 
housing production (Schwartz, 2015, p. 135).  The incentive for investors to participate in 
the program is the tax credit that reduces federal income taxes dollar for dollar.  The 
program has funded more than 2.5 million affordable housing units since its inception 
and accounted for as much as half of the multi-family rental housing constructed through 
2010 (Khadduri, Climarco, and Burnett, 2012). 
 According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), state 
and local housing authorities are awarded tax credits totaling nearly $8 billion annually.  
Housing authorities are authorized to issue credits for the acquisition, rehabilitation, or 
new construction of rental housing for low-income households.  HUD maintains a 
national database on the size, unit mix, location, and contact information for individual 
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projects.  Each year, states are required to adopt a Qualified Action Plan (QAP) that 
establishes the priorities and scoring methods that will be used to allocate tax credits.  
Developers compete for tax credits based on the criteria established in the QAP.  
Financing for LIHTC developments go through the same stages as a typical development: 
pre-construction loan, construction loans, and permanent financing.  The acquisition of 
financing begins at conception and can be complicated because multiple layers of grants, 
bonds, tax credits and local programs are often used to reduce the developer’s equity 
requirement and maintain project feasibility.  Tax credits are used to reduce an investor’s 
tax liability dollar for dollar over a 10-year period beginning at occupancy.  The LIHTC 
property must remain affordable for an initial 15-year compliance period and an extended 
15 year non reporting period with an agreed upon proportion of units to be occupied by 
low-income tenants under the 20/50 or 40/60 rule.  Proper management is critical to 
maintaining compliance throughout the 15 year period because severe penalties are 
applied to investors should the property fail to meet affordability requirements.  Good 
management is also essential to maintain profitability amid tight profit margins.  LIHTC 
has been noted for being complicated because of the layered financing structures needed 
for feasibility and compliance (O’Regan and Quigley, 2013; Schwartz, 2010).  The 
following sections discuss each aspect of the LIHTC program in more detail.  
Understanding the Qualified Action Plan 
 The Qualified Action Plan (QAP) is mandated by the federal government and is 
created by state and local housing authorities on an annual basis to explain how tax 
credits will be allocated.  The QAP sets the criteria for competition for 9% tax credits, 
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which are fixed annual quotas received by state and local housing authorities.  Nine 
percent tax credits are allocated for new construction.  Four percent tax credits are used 
for rehabilitation and new construction completed with tax exempt bonds.  This study 
does not differentiate between 9% or 4% credits, but analyzes disaster recovery 
preferences of the LIHTC program overall.   
 Federal criteria and standards that are required to be included in the QAP are 
project location, characteristics of housing needs, sponsor characteristics, and tenant 
populations (i.e. the elderly, disabled, and families with children).  Additional allocation 
requirements can be established at the state and local level depending on need and often 
include additional requirements for housing the lowest income households, projects that 
commit to longer term affordability, location in qualified census tracts (QCT) or difficult 
to develop areas (DDA), and participation of local non-profit organizations.  After 
disaster recovery, state and local housing authorities may set preferences for impacted 
areas.  Developers and stakeholders have the opportunity to comment on proposed 
requirements during the QAP development phase for the following year’s allocation. 
 Each state has a unique approach to the QAP.  Provisions are often rated using 
point systems, thresholds, and set-asides, although some states use alternative language to 
communicate preferences.  QAPs in Florida do not reference a point system, but instead 
uses language such as “targeted” to express preferences within the QAP.  Florida 
universal applications use points in a limited basis as a tie-breaker in general areas of 
development design or for certain physical features not specified or required within the 
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QAP.  Analysis of universal applications was not a part of this study but could contribute 
additional context to public preferences established by the state housing authority.   
Basis boosts and policy statements can be just as influential in project selection 
(Shelburne 2008; Gustafson and Walker 2002).  Some states award tax credits based 
strictly on point scores while others maintain some flexibility and award credits by more 
subjective means.  Thresholds establish minimum standards and result in some projects 
being excluded entirely from the process.  Set-asides are pools of tax credits that are 
designated for specific targets or categories, such as a particular area, or with specific 
features, that are competed for among all properties that qualify for the set-aside.  The 
development community that wishes to compete for tax credits must be willing to invest 
in a property within the bracketed characteristics established in the QAP.  Rather than a 
strict point system, Florida’s use of targeted language and limited use of points in the 
universal application indicates some flexibility for choosing which projects are awarded 
credits.   
The Ownership Structure of LIHTC 
 Ownership in LIHTC includes multiple parties that have a stake in the success of 
the project (See Figure 3-2).  Developers, local government, investors, partnerships, 
stakeholders, and property management play important roles in developing and 
maintaining compliance and feasibility of the project through the compliance period, 
which is at minimum 15 years, plus an extended 15 years based on the criteria established 
by the state and local housing authorities.  
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 Developers generally specialize in affordable housing, but often participate in 
other types of development.  In either case, the development of a LITHC property follows 
the same rules as any other real estate project, minimization of risks and maximization of 
profits.  The developer is compensated with entrepreneurial profits at each stage of the 
development process and is shielded from liability through a limited partnership 
corporate structure according to state laws.  
 The owner operates as a separate entity from the developer for tax purposes.  
Ownership often consists of corporate owners and partnerships that are brought together 
under a limited partnership.  A general partner interest holds 0.01 percent while the 
limited partner holds the remaining 99.99 percent interest.  Limited partners do not 
participate in direct management.   
 Tax credit investors are often corporate entities or investment groups that 
participate in LIHTC to offset other income.  Investments are priced as a function of 
demand which is fueled by the need to offset taxes.  This became a problem between 
2007 and 2009 because of fallout from the Great Recession of 2008 (Schwarts, p. 157, 
2014).  Corporations no longer needed to purchase tax credits because income was 
virtually non-existent as the country reeled from the financial collapse (Edson, 2011).  To 
mitigate the effects felt by LIHTC, Congress adopted the Tax Credit Assistance Program 
(TCAP) through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  The LIHTC 
database reports funding categories that are used in conjunction with LIHTC for each 
development.  At the time of this study, TCAP was not included.  At the same time that 
TCAP was adopted, Congress created a credit exchange program which allowed 
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administering agencies in the state to exchange tax credits for cash grants to developers.  
Properties developed with tax credits issued through TCAP were required to be placed in 
service by 2012.  TCAP was in place between October 1, 2006 and September 30, 2009 
and was used to fund LIHTC in conjunction with programs developed for disaster areas, 
including the Gulf Opportunity Zone and Midwestern Disaster Area Housing Credits.  
These programs are not reported in the LIHTC database. 
 Tax credits cannot be used for land acquisition, and as is generally recognized, 
location is instrumental to a successful real estate development.  Often the developer will 
either purchase land for development or will develop land from their portfolio.  In either 
case local government must agree to, and sign off in writing on, any LIHTC development 
before tax credits can be awarded.  State and local governments may have funds for land 
acquisition in the form of block grants, loans, or trust funds that developers can apply for.  
Local government has jurisdiction over land use and the regulatory requirements for 
development, such as zoning restrictions.  Additional support can be given for the project 
with variances for land use, property tax deferrals or abatements, or waivers of permitting 
fees.  In return the local government may require that additional conditions be met in the 
form of amenities, population served, or any other conditions that are needed to solve 
problems in the community.   
 An allocating agency exists in each state and for certain larger municipalities 
within the state.  The allocating agency is usually the state housing authority and local 
housing authorities who receive tax credits annually per capita from the U.S. Treasury.  
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The housing authorities in turn issue the tax credits to developers on a competitive basis 
under the conditions outlined in the annual QAP.  
 Community partners and stakeholders can make or break a project.  The most 
obvious community partner is the housing authority itself, which has set priorities for 
housing needs in the state.  Neighborhood associations and landowners around a 
proposed site can express support or deny support based on any number of factors 
including impact to surrounding properties, or more notably, the Not in My Back Yard 
(NIMBY) phenomena.  This study does not expressly examine NIMBY and LIHTC 
directly, but the survey of LIHTC professionals suggested that those who oppose LIHTC 
based on the principle of NIMBYism are unaware of the favorable tenant mix of low and 
median income households and the physical appeal of newly constructed LIHTC 
properties.  Community Development Corporations (CDC) are local nonprofit 
community-based organizations that typically focus on revitalization of low-income 
neighborhoods.  CDCs play a critical role as a LIHTC stakeholder because their support 
can lend credibility to a proposed project among other stakeholders and local agencies.  
 Project lenders are involved in the LIHTC development from pre-construction 
through the permanent loan.  Each phase may involve the same lender or not.  Land 
acquisition requires predevelopment funding and often involves a bridge loan.  A 
construction loan provides the funding when the project construction begins and is 
dispersed at agreed upon phases during construction.  The construction loan will take out 
the land acquisition loan.  Finally, when the project is complete, a permanent loan is put 




 A syndicator brings the LIHTC finance package together and pools funds from 
multiple investors.  The syndicator usually arranges the limited partnership where 
multiple investors pool resources and share in a proportional share of the net income from 
LIHTC operations.  Management is left to the general partner.  In effect, the syndicator is 
the intermediary between the developer and the investors.  Some syndicators provide a 
turnkey package that includes lender financing from land acquisition to the permanent 
loan.   
 The investment instrument works in much the same way as an investment fund 
where the investors have little knowledge or interest in the details of day-to-day 
operations, but as in the case of LIHTC, are more interested in the tax benefits.  The 
syndicator works closely with the development team and management company to insure 
the project remains compliant for the 15 year minimum period so investors are not 
penalized.  The penalty for noncompliance is severe.  If a LIHTC does not maintain the 
number of agreed upon affordable units, the investor faces potential recapture of all the 
tax credits awarded retroactively.   
Maintaining Affordability 
 As stated previously, LIHTC allows investors to reduce their federal incomes 
taxes each year for ten years, dollar for dollar, as long as the development stays in 
compliance.  Two types of LIHTC are available for investors, the 4% credit and the 9% 
credit.  A 4% credit is typically taken for rehabilitation or new construction supplemented 
with tax-exempt bonds. The credit is taken in annual installments over a ten-year period 
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(Table 3-1).  A 4% credit is intended to deliver 30% of the qualified basis for a LIHTC 
project.  The 9% credit works the same way only it is intended to deliver 70% of the 
qualified basis for the project.  Projects that do not use any other federal subsidies are 
supported with the 9% tax credit.  Both the 4% and 9% credits fluctuate because they are 
tied to market interest rates.  According to the US Department of Revenue, the 9% rate 
has historically ranged from as low as 7.35% to 9.27%.   The 4% rate has fluctuated from 
3.15% to 3.97%.   
Table 3-1: Calculating the Annual LIHTC Credit for Investors 
Project Cost: 15,000,000$ Project Cost: 15,000,000$ 
Land 3,000,000$    Land 3,000,000$    
Subsidies -$                Subsidies (Tax-exempt financing) 900,000$       
Eligible Basis $12,000,000 Eligible Basis 11,100,000$ 
Qualfied Basis 100% Qualfied Basis 100%
Total Basis 12,000,000$ Total Basis 11,100,000$ 
Tax Credit 9% Tax Credit 4%
Annual Credit $1,080,000 Annual Credit $444,000
Credit to Investors over 10 Years $10,800,000 Credit to Investors over 10 Years $4,440,000
Rents are set at 30% of the median
CBA Apartments
100 units - all intended for low-income families
Eligible for 60% of area median rents
Rents are set at 30% of the median
Anatomy of the 4% and 9% Tax Credit
ABC Apartments
100 units - all intended for low-income families
Eligible for 60% of area median rents
 
Source: Modified from Schwartz, 2015 
 
 A development remains in compliance as long as a specific number of units 
remain affordable for low-income households for a period of 15 years plus an additional 
15 year period.  Compliance is closely monitored during the initial period.  Tax credits 
are assigned to specific housing developments and are attached to the units instead of 
tenant household income.  Developments are eligible for tax credits if at least 20% of 
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units are affordable to households earning up to 50% of area median income (AMI) or if 
40% of units are affordable to households earning up to 60% of AMI.  For instance, if a 
development is 100% occupied, and a low-income household vacates a unit, then that 
unit must be rented to another low-income household.  Most developers opt to designate 
most of their units for low-income occupancy to maximize the amount of credit they 
receive, having the effect of reducing their equity investment and making the project 
more feasible.  According to Schwartz (2015), more than 70% of all developments 
constructed with LIHTC designate 100% of units for low-income households.  In 
addition, evidence suggests that most developments target families with lower incomes.  
A study of 12,228 LIHTC developments around the country found that over half of the 
total units had tenants with incomes at or below 40% of AMI.  This seems to correlate 
with earlier studies that found average annual incomes of LIHTC tenants to be between 
45% and 50% of AMI (Schwartz referencing E&Y Kenneth Leventhal Real Estate 










Figure 3-1:  Investment Structure of LIHTC Development 
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Administration of LIHTC in Florida 
 Florida has 67 counties that accept and administer funds for housing needs 
throughout the state.  Several agencies, including 115 public housing agencies and 17 
regional housing finance authorities manage smaller housing programs throughout the 
state.  However the bulk of housing resources are managed by the Florida Housing 
Finance Corporation (FHFC), including the LIHTC program.  FHFC works with local 
governments, non-profits, elected officials and others to complete its mission of 
providing affordable housing throughout the state.  Programs that support multifamily 
housing in the state include Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bonds, Florida Affordable 
Guarantee Program, HOME Investment Partnerships, Elderly Housing Community Loan, 
and the Low Income Housing Program (LIHTC).  Florida also has special programs that 
support the predevelopment phase of affordable housing development.  The 
Predevelopment Loan Program (PLP) is limited to eligible non-profits or community 
based organizations, public housing authorities, and local governments and can be used to 
support a wide range of predevelopment expenses from title searches to feasibility 
studies.   
 Florida LIHTC can be used in conjunction with the HOME Investment 
Partnerships program, PLP, the State Apartment Incentive Loan program, or the 
Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bonds program.  A percentage of units must be set aside 
for low-income or very low income households for a minimum of 30 years with an option 
to revert to market rates in the 14th year.  Otherwise, Florida requirements are consistent 
with 20/50 and 40/60 LIHTC.  As required by law, housing needs are assessed annually.  
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FHFC conducts market studies and solicits input from the public to determine housing 
needs throughout the state.  Funds are targeted by county according to need and can be 
reserved based on geographic area or demographics.  The demographic needs identified 
from QAPs in this study include commercial fishing workers, farmers, and the elderly.  
Geographic locations included the Florida Keys, urban infill, Front Porch Communities, 
rural areas, and counties impacted by the 2004 hurricane season.  According to FHFC, 
the tax credit program has allocated over $201 million in credits for more than 53,000 
units since its inception. 
THE FLORIDA 2004 HURRICANE SEASON 
 The majority of tropical storms occur in the mid-Atlantic, Caribbean, and Gulf of 
Mexico from mid-August through October (Landsea et al., 1999).  Between 2003 and 
2005, the peak of the hurricane season for Florida arrived in September (Virmani and 
Weisberg, 2006).  In 2004, Florida experienced an onslaught of hurricane activity in a 
short six week period.  The first hurricane hit Port Charlotte on August 13 as a Category 
4.  Hurricane Charley had sustained winds of 150 miles per hour.  In spite of wind 
speeds, Charley was a small hurricane with storm surges limited to within 6 to 7 miles 
from the center (Pasch, Brown, and Blake, 2011).  Storm surges were relatively small, 
not exceeding 7 feet.  Charley caused damages estimated at $15 billion, making it the 
second costliest hurricane in U.S. history. 
 Hurricane Frances was the next hurricane to hit the Florida coast that year.  On 
September 4th, Frances hit both Palm Beach and Martin counties as a Category 2 storm 
with winds of 105 miles per hour.  Rains were so heavy that a portion of Interstate 95 
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collapsed.  The state citrus crop was destroyed and major flooding occurred in counties 
directly hit by the storm.  Storm surge was 6 feet along the east coast where Frances hit.  
Space facilities at Cape Canaveral reported damages in excess of $100 billion.  The 
American Insurances Service Group estimated that $4.11 billion in damages occurred 
statewide.  Total damages for Hurricane Frances were estimated at $9.507 billion, 90% of 
which occurred in Florida.  As of 2011, Frances was the eighth costliest hurricane in the 
U.S. (Beven, 2014, p. 4). 
 The next hurricane to strike the Florida coast hit the panhandle on September 16 
as a Category 3 hurricane.  Winds reach 120 miles per hour and the storm surge ranged 
from 10 to 15 feet, inundating towns along the coast.  Grand Cayman Island was 
completely washed over by storm surge, damaging or destroying 95 percent of all 
buildings on the island.  As with Frances just twelve days earlier, Hurricane Ivan caused 
part of Interstate 10 to collapse under the weight of storm surge and wave action.  
Thousands of homes were destroyed in Baldwin, Escambia, and Santa Rosa counties.  
Ivan was the most destructive hurricane to hit Florida in over 100 years.  Damages were 
estimated at $18.82 billion and earned Hurricane Ivan 3rd place on the list of costliest 
U.S. hurricanes (Stewart, 2011, p. 6). 
 Hurricane Jeanne made landfall just ten days after Ivan, following nearly the 
identical path as Hurricane Frances just twenty-two days earlier.  On September 26, 
Frances crossed Palm Beach and Martin counties, which were still reeling from the 
damages caused by Ivan.  Frances was a stronger Category 3 storm with maximum winds 
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of 120 miles per hour.  Storm surges were measured from 3.5 feet to 6 feet along the east 
coast.  As of 2011, damages were estimated at $7.66 billion (Lawrence and Cobb, 2014). 
 According to the Hurricane Housing Work Group (HWG) convened by Governor 
Jeb Bush, all 67 Florida counties were affected by the four hurricanes in some way, some 
of them more than once.  More than 700,000 homes were damaged or destroyed with 
losses expected to exceed $213 billion (HWG, 2005).  This estimate does not include 
those who were working exclusively with insurance companies or did not apply for 
assistance for other reasons.  In the aftermath of the storm, 1.2 million households 
registered with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  More than 148,800 
households applied for rental assistance and 116,000 households received structural 
housing assistance for repairs.  Disaster loans were made available through the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) for rebuilding homes and businesses.  Special assistance 
was made available to the five counties hardest hit by Charley and Ivan: Charlotte, De 
Soto, Hardee, Escambia, and Santa Rosa.   
 The HWG was unable to assess accurate rental damages.  Owners of rental 
properties were referred to the SBA for assistance making it likely that rental damages 
were underestimated (HWG, 2005).  Over 28% of households were renters in the hardest 
hit areas, but only 15% registered with FEMA for housing assistance (p. 9).   What is 
known is that 100,000 renter households were approved for FEMA assistance in the 
months after the storms, but according to HWG, this number does not correlate with the 
rental stock that sustained substantial damage.  Multifamily damages were categorized 












Most Severe; this group had inadequate 
insurance and did not qualify for SBA 
disaster recovery loans. 
3,247                
2 Non-Structural 20.7
The households did not receive 
structural housing assistance but did 
receive rental assistance.  The marjority 
of this group (68.8%) were renters.
38,882             
3 Ineligible 62.8
This group was found to have adequate 
insurance to repair their homes; 
however, FEMA did not determine 
ability to pay or finance deductibles.
10,787             
FEMA Housing Assistance by Group
 
Source: Hurricane Housing Working Group, 2005 
 
damage and encompassed 16.5% of households seeking assistance.  Households that had 
structural damages but did not get assistance received short-term rental assistance.  Other 
households had adequate insurance and received no assistance from FEMA.  Households 
occupying 52,916 multi-family housing units registered with FEMA for housing 
assistance representing 2.6% of damaged housing in Florida. 
 Effects from the hurricanes were felt around the state, but the greatest damages 
occurred in the impact areas.  Table 3-3 shows the multifamily housing stock damaged in 
each county.  Damaged units are compared to existing supply.  For instance, De Soto 
County had 350 multifamily units damaged in 2004, representing nearly 30% of its 
multifamily housing.  Considering the average household size is 2.61 in the State, De 
Soto had over 900 in need of some form of rental assistance.  Palm Beach County had 
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11,715 multifamily units damaged representing just 5.9% of the total population 
representing over 30,500 potentially entering the rental market simultaneously.  The 
known total damages of multifamily units provided a basis for comparing developer 
location preferences revealed in the GIS analysis completed in Phase III of this study.  
Housing damages in counties that were preference for location in the QAPs following the 
2004 hurricane season are shown in Figure 3-2.  In some instances, a number was not 
provided.  If fewer than ten households experienced damage, then a number was not 
disclosed.   
After the hurricanes, pledges for recovery and assistance came from federal, state 
and local organizations, including providers of utilities, power companies, in-state and 
out of state law enforcement.  However, housing assistance during the recovery and 
response effort primarily benefited homeowners (HWG, 2005).  Rent vouchers were 
distributed as needed for emergency housing, and a Disaster Housing Resources website 
was launched by the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) to help victims find 
temporary rental housing.  As many as 15,000 travel trailers and manufactured homes 
were set up; FEMA provided rental assistance to 148,803 households; and Structural 
Housing Assistance was provided to 116,000 households.  These numbers indicate that 
more than 250,000 households flooded the rental market.  This equates to potentially 







Table 3-3: Comparison of Total Units to Estimated Damages by Housing Type from 
2004 Hurricane Season 
# of Units 
Damaged
% of Total 
Units 
County










# of Units 
Damaged
% of Total 
Units 
County
Monroe 25             0.1% 19             0.1% * 0.0% * 0.0%
Collier 334           0.3% 254           0.4% 20             0.0% 59                 0.7%
Glades 505           11.6% 204           10.8% * 1.6% 297               13.1%
Hendry 1,317        11.3% 632           11.1% 34             3.6% 650               13.0%
Hardee 5,570        64.1% 3,741        61.7% 193           36.5% 1,626            77.4%
Broward 6,932        1.0% 5,251        1.4% 985           0.3% 408               1.9%
De Soto 7,506        64.3% 4,314        65.1% 350           29.1% 2,829            72.8%
Okeechobee 7,668        53.4% 3,946        57.2% 136           17.5% 3,570            53.5%
Miami-Dade 9,481        1.1% 6,289        1.4% 2,458        0.7% 488               3.6%
Martin 19,343      32.1% 14,018      37.3% 1,510        9.4% 3,519            56.6%
Lee 20,761      9.4% 16,577      12.5% 1,179        1.9% 2,951            10.8%
Santo Rosa 23,196      46.9% 18,518      50.5% 879           19.9% 3,409            40.6%
Indian River 29,460      53.5% 22,804      62.5% 2,749        21.5% 3,660            63.1%
Charlotte 34,077      48.0% 27,918      53.0% 2,384        23.6% 3,673            44.8%
Polk 49,809      23.4% 34,346      26.9% 2,850        9.1% 12,465          23.4%
St. Lucie 51,627      60.4% 39,930      64.8% 4,666        30.6% 6,647            76.9%
Escambia 51,876      2.7% 41,922      48.2% 4,024        17.2% 5,077            45.5%
Brevard 56,698      26.0% 43,127      28.6% 3,921        8.4% 8,492            40.9%
Palm Beach 84,001      16.3% 60,351      20.1% 11,715      5.9% 7,794            45.3%
County
Total Single Family Multi-Family Manufactured Housing
 






Figure 3-2: HWG Report for Estimated Housing Damages (HWG, 2005) 
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SBA provides disaster loans to businesses for rebuilding, or for replacing 
multifamily homes.  LIHTC rents are capped to area median income.  Additional loan 
obligations cannot be supported over the long term when income is capped.  Even so, 
HWG noted that additional rental stock would be needed to replace destroyed rental and 
homeowner housing.  The most cost effective way to meet the expected demand was with 
development of multifamily housing (HWG, 2005).  The group recommended that a 
Hurricane Housing Recovery Program be implemented.  HWG also recommended that 
subordinate financing be provided by the state to induce private developers to build rental 
housing units in areas of greatest need.  It was recommended that rental housing target 
extremely low income groups in addition to “low income households more commonly 
served by existing programs” (p. 17).  
Resources are rarely, if ever, enough to meet disaster recovery needs.  HWG 
developed a formula for allocating available funds.  The formula ranked counties based 
on four factors:  1) total percentage of damaged non-seasonal housing units in a county, 
2) total destroyed units in a county, 3) percentage of households sustaining damage 
earning less than $30,000 per year, 4) and number of households displaced and requiring 
FEMA temporary housing.  Each county was categorized and ranked into one of four tier 
categories (see Table 3-4).  Future research might include comparisons between the 
recommendations of HWG and the LIHTC placed in service to glean further insight. This 
study compares stated and revealed preferences between the Florida Housing Finance 




The counties targeted for location in the 2005 and 2006 QAPs were scattered among each 
of the tiers with 58% of them were in the Tier IV category.  Counties in Tiers II and III 
were less preferred by the public agency.  These counties represented 25% of counties in 
these tiers that were given preference in the 2006 QAP.  Tiers II, III and IV were given 
no preference in 2005 QAPs.  Tier I counties were 16% of the total counties preferred  
(See Table 3-5). 






Counties with the most sever housing damages in number and percentages.  Counties in this tier were 
most likely in the impact area or were hit by multiple storms.  16% of counties are in this group.
These counties had heavy damages with either a large number of damaged units and/or a high percentage 
of damaged units, 9% of counties are in this group.
Counties in this category had moderate damages either a high number of units damaged or a high 
percentage of damaged units, 16% of counties are in this group.
Minor damages occurred in these counties and are expected to address housing recovery through existing 
programs; the majority of counties, 58%, fall in this group.  






 From the health benefits of slum clearance to the economic benefits of urban 
renewal, housing policy is often a solution for a related underlying problem.  Housing 
was once undertaken to support manufacturing, evidenced by small mill towns that that 
housed workers for the benefit of the mill owner.  Real estate has been a driver of the 
American economy, and home ownership has been engrained in the American dream.  
For owners and renters alike, the greatest concern for housing today is affordability.  
During disaster recovery, affordability is amplified, particularly when housing damages 
are significant.  This study provides a stepping stone to understand how LIHTC 




% of Total 
# Damaged 
Units 
I 11 16% 336,830 
II 6 9% 249,694 
III 11 16% 58,090 
IV 39 58% 63,747 
Total 67 100% 708,361 
               Source: HWG, 2005 
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preferences are established and how developers answer the market demand for affordable 
housing under the LIHTC program during disaster.  Those who produce and fund 
affordable housing weigh the public demand for affordable housing against risk and 
uncertainty associated with disaster.  This research starts a dialogue comparing stated 
preferences of each leg of the public and private partnership that is LIHTC to ask how 
programs and incentives encourage LIHTC construction in hazardous places.  The study 
also compares revealed preferences to understand how LIHTC development patterns 
compare with the stated preferences of public and private stakeholders.  Several tools 
were applied within an embedded revelatory case study design to compare stated 
preferences with revealed preferences to determine how risk influences LIHTC 
production. The next chapter explains the methodology and research design and explains 




Chapter 4  
LIHTC RISK AND DISASTER RECOVERY:   
A CASE STUDY APPOACH 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This study used an embedded revelatory single case study design.  According to 
Yin (2009), an embedded single case study design is often initiated with theory 
development and a proposition, which was demonstrated in previous chapters.  This case 
study design is bounded by LIHTC developers operating within Florida after it was hit 
with four hurricanes in 2004.  Each hurricane elicited a Presidentially-declared disaster 
area response.  Florida is a coastal state surrounded on three sides by the Gulf and 
Atlantic coast.  The state experienced significant losses of affordable housing as a result 
of the 2004 hurricane disasters.  The goal of this case study was to identify risk variables 
that influence LIHTC developers’ decision-making within the constraints of public policy 
preferences stated in Qualified Action Plans filed between 2004 and 2010.  Location 
analysis revealed preferences for sites of LIHTC multi-family developments post-
disaster. 
WHY LIHTC AND DISASTER RECOVERY?  
 Risk drives investment and disinvestment in real estate development decision 
making.  The LIHTC development literature identifies additional risks associated with the 
program, and much of the LITHC and disaster literature addresses how disaster policies 
can provide temporary relief for rental demand.  This study opens a dialogue toward 
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better policy that recognizes the limitations of LIHTC production during disaster 
recovery.  This research will serve three purposes:  
1) To develop an understanding of risk in development patterns demonstrated by 
preferences of LIHTC developers in disaster recovery decisions; 
2) To inform public and private stakeholders of barriers to LIHTC production so that 
effective policies and programs can be developed to distribute limited resources 
while encouraging development of affordable housing. 
3) To contribute to the emerging development of Disaster Recovery Theory by 
informing the disaster community of the risks that influence LIHTC development 
decisions during the recovery period. 
METHODOLOGY 
 This study was formulated within the paradigm of social constructivism which 
seeks “understanding of the world in which (we) live and work” (Creswell, 2007, p. 21).  
One of the goals of this study was to share the views of LIHTC housing developers that 
operate in an area that is susceptible to hurricane disasters.  Florida was chosen for this 
research because of its geographic location and susceptibility to the effects of hurricanes.  
Future studies will compare other states with similar hazards for common variables based 
on disaster type, severity, types of programs and policy preferences influencing recovery.   
 Disaster recovery policies that reshape the community are often driven by 
economic development.  The literature is replete with evidence that demonstrate how 
renters suffer displacement to a higher degree than homeowners.  Developers of 
multifamily housing experience a similar degree of disparity during recovery.  
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Multifamily developers are less likely to have access to disaster recovery assistance as 
compared to homeowners and other community business interests (Comerio et al., 1994; 
Quarentelli, 1999; Wu and Lindell, 2003; Mueller et al., 2011).  Small business loans and 
additional leveraging tools are often not feasible considering the income generated from 
an existing project, making recovery efforts more difficult for the developer (Wu and 
Lindell, 2003; Galster et al., 2004; GAO, 2010).  The degree of perceived risk is related 
to the tools and leverage options available to LIHTC developers.  Development 
challenges exist as a result of disaster recovery policies that inhibit the ability of LIHTC 
developers to add unexpected disaster recovery costs to already tight budgets.  A LIHTC 
developer’s ability to produce sufficient new affordable rental housing stock to the 
community during recovery is also difficult due to a lack of funding options that support 
capped rents and recoverable expenses.  Other areas of risk that affect LIHTC decision-
making are found in the dynamic forces of community in the form of advocacy and 
NIMBYism.  These are anecdotal experiences from which risk variables were 
established.  Additional risk variables were derived from the development literature 
discussed in Chapter 2.   
 The study was organized in three phases intended to identify how post-disaster 
location policy preferences influence development during recovery.  This case study uses 
content analysis, geographic information systems (GIS), and a survey of LIHTC 
developers within the bounded case study area of Florida after the 2004 hurricane season.    
 Phase I examined Qualified Action Plans (QAP) using content analysis to 
determine location preferences of the Housing Authority of the State of Florida as 
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established within the QAP.  This phase uncovers the stated preferences of the public 
agency.  For this study, the public agency was represented by the Florida Housing 
Finance Corporation (FHFC).  
 In Phase II, a survey was launched to ask LIHTC professionals to identify the 
significance of a set of variables associated with perceived risk during the recovery 
process.  The survey was composed of closed-ended questions using a combination of a 
10-point sliding scale or a 7-point Likert scale.  An open-ended question provided LIHTC 
professionals an opportunity to share opinions about the state of affordable housing 
production and actions that could improve existing programs to reduce risk. 
 Phase III analyzed location preferences using GIS technology with a data layer 
created from the LIHTC database maintained and publicly available through the U.S 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  Additional data layers were 
created using a storm surge model created by the Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from 
Hurricanes (SLOSH) model software.  The SLOSH model was created by the National 
Weather Service (NWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) to estimated storm surge heights.  A composite approach was taken using the 
Maximum Envelopes of Water (MEOWs) because this approach is recommended by the 
National Hurricane Center as the best way to account for vulnerability and uncertainty for 
an area.  MEOWs and Maximum of MEOWs (MOMs) form the basis for evacuation 
planning and are integral to the field of emergency management.   The SLOSH model is 
subdivided into 32 regions that are applied to coastlines along the U.S. Atlantic, Gulf of 
Mexico, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Bahamas.   
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 This case study focused on LIHTC development in Florida.  Eleven Florida water 
basins were applied to SLOSH models for potential storm surges experienced during a 
Category 3 storm at mean tide (C3M) and a Category 5 storm at high tide (C5H).  
Shapefiles were created from SLOSH model runs for each category.  The LIHTC 
database was added as a .dbf file.  A Florida base map was obtained from TIGER/Files.  
Data layers of hurricane paths for Charley, Ivan, Jeanne, and Frances were created and 
LIHTC location was analyzed for developments placed in service from 2004 to 2010.  
Risk was indicated by proximity to the coast and proximity to storm surge boundaries.  
Phase III analyzed the number of housing units susceptible to storm surge during C3M 
and C5H hurricane scenarios.  Development patterns were analyzed over the seven year 
period between 2004 and 2010 to determine if stated risk influenced development 
outcomes.   
 Results from the three phases of the study were compared to gain insight to 
perceived risk of LIHTC developers and revealed development patterns.  The research 
exposed strengths and weaknesses in the interrelationships between location preferences 
of public policy, developer risk perceptions, and demonstrated development patterns of 
LIHTC.  
A CASE STUDY APPROACH 
The depth of inquiry in a case study can capture the essence of a phenomena and 
its associated context (Yin, 2009).  Comparing relationships between policy, perceived 
risks, and actual patterns of development in the state of Florida after a hurricane disaster 
is an initial step toward understanding the effectiveness of disaster policy and recovery 
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programs.  According to Creswell (2007), case studies are “an exploration of a ‘bounded 
system’ of a case or multiple cases over time through detailed, in depth data collection 
involving multiple sources of information rich in context.”  In this study, a single case 
was chosen to establish a baseline of comparison for future research of LIHTC 
susceptible to hurricane disaster in other coastal states.  Secondary data sources used in 
the study were acquired from HUD’s LIHTC database and SLOSH models.  Original data 
was also collected from a survey of LIHTC developers.  Previous chapters described the 
historical context of the effect of the four storms on housing and the policy response.  
Stake (2000) defined a case study as an “interest in individual cases, not by the methods 
of inquiry used.”  The methods used in this case study are specific to the state of Florida.  
Future case studies that emulate this research using the same tools will be reliant on the 
distinct policies and preferences of the state that interact with existing federal programs 
and the uniqueness of the disaster event.  This is the first study in a series that could lead 
to an opportunity for comparative analysis of responses to programs initiated for disaster 
recovery and housing redevelopment in multiple states.  
Case Study Proposition 
The case study proposition “directs attention to something that should be 
examined within the scope of the study” (Yin, 2009, p. 28).  A search of the literature 
failed to reveal existing studies of risk specifically associated with LIHTC developers and 
disaster.      
The proposition of this study recognized that affordable housing developers 
prioritize investment returns as a component of their investment decision making, 
 
99 
however LIHTC developers consider additional risk factors that are not being fully 
addressed by available housing and disaster programs intended to facilitate recovery.  
LIHTC housing developers that fail to fully participate in the post-disaster housing 
market, particularly in the impact zone, theoretically are responding to an array of 
perceived risks.   
Variables of risk were identified in the literature and validated in an earlier pilot 
study.   Each variable was categorized into a modified STEEP analysis for LIHTC 
development in the context of disaster recovery.  The five categories comprising the 
STEEP analysis are social, technical, economic, environmental, and political. Technical 
and economic risks are measurable in a business analysis.  Technical risks are the 
measurable factors that define project feasibility and success, such as the internal rate of 
return (IRR), profit or loss.  Economic risks are associated with external funding 
opportunities that potentially improve feasibility.  However, perceived risks are 
subjective and are not readily measured in the context of project feasibility.  For this 
study, those subjective risks are categorized under social, environmental and technical 
categories.  It is well understood that financial incentives drive development behavior.  
When the funding and costs are in balance, the community benefits from additional 
affordable housing, in spite of potential disaster risk.  The financial community benefits 
from LIHTC because the typical working class tenant can participate in the established 
economy.  The developer benefits because the affordable housing project gets funded.     
In this study, elements of risk perception derived from the development literature 
provided the basis for the proposition.  Risk was measured by comparing stated 
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preferences of the public agency and LIHTC professionals stated and revealed 
preferences identified in a survey and by post-disaster development patterns.  GIS was 
used to analyze development patterns of post-disaster LIHTC development.  These 
development patterns were compared with the stated preferences of LIHTC developers to 
identify variables of risk that influence LIHTC development during disaster recovery.   
Case Study Design  
 The case study was designed using a single case study of a state impacted by 
hurricane disasters.  Significant damage to affordable housing was also a factor required 
for case selection.  Figure 4.1 provides a summary of the criteria that was used to guide 
the case study selection.  Florida was chosen because of its vulnerability to hurricane 
hazards.  More than 500 storms have hit the state since hurricanes were first recorded.  
Over 10% of these storms have been recorded in this century.  The strongest hurricane to 
hit Florida since 2000 was Hurricane Charley which struck the Florida coast as a category 
4 storm in August of 2004.  Hurricanes Jeanne and Ivan followed, both as category 3 
hurricanes.  Hurricane Frances as a category 2 storm ended the forty-four day onslaught 
of hurricanes.  President George W. Bush declared all of Florida a disaster area.  
Flooding, hurricane force winds, and storm surge damaged housing and infrastructure in 
multiple counties.  Housing damages were well documented in a report filed by the 
Hurricane Housing Working Group, which was convened by Governor Jeb Bush to 
provide recommendations for housing recovery (HWG, 2005).  The work completed by 






A Sampling Frame for Case Selection 
 A purposive sampling technique was employed in the case selection process.  The 
goal of case study selection using this technique was to focus on specific characteristics 
of interest that will best help answer the question of how risk perception influences 
LIHTC development during disaster recovery.  According to Maxwell (2005), purposive 
sampling is when, ‘‘particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for  
 for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other 
choices’’ (p. 87).  Teddlie and Yu (2007) further categorize purposive sampling into four 
goal areas:  a) representativeness or comparability; b) special or unique cases; c) 
sequential sampling; and d) multiple purposive techniques.  For this research, purposive 
sampling was used to pick a revelatory case that would yield the most information about 
a phenomenon of interest.  The population of potential case study areas included states 
bordering the Gulf and/or Atlantic coasts that have experienced multiple hurricanes 
resulting in the declaration of a Presidentially-declared disaster area for impacted 
counties or parishes.  Housing losses, particularly affordable housing, was also a 
significant case study criteria.  Developers of LIHTC multi-family housing, both non-




             Table 4-1: Case Study Selection Criteria 
Case Study Criteria 
1. Study area must be on the Atlantic and/or Gulf coast with coastal 
counties that are vulnerable to hurricanes. 
2. Study area must have been a Presidentially Declared Disaster area 
as a result of a past hurricane event. 
3. Study area must have been subject to floods, hurricane force winds, 
and storm surge. 
4. The hurricane event must have occurred between 2004 and 2008. 
5. The hurricane event must have been classified as a Category 2, 3, 4, 
or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson Wind Scale. 
6. 
Multiple coastal counties within the state must have had a loss of 







Table 4-2 lists the Atlantic and Gulf coast states that experienced hurricanes 
between 2004 and 2008 resulting in presidentially declared disasters that met the criteria 
for the case study protocol.  Each of the states affected were potential case study areas.  
 Florida was chosen because of the sheer impact of Hurricanes Charley, Frances, 
Ivan and Jeanne across the state.  In 2004, four hurricanes struck Florida within a period 
of six weeks.  Based on the extent of housing damages experienced in the aftermath, and 
the evidence of multi-family housing damage found in reports and in the literature, 
Florida was considered a good fit for this case study.  Future research of other states 
impacted by Hurricanes Katrina or Sandy could reveal a relationship in development 
patterns identifying the paradox of risks identified in the survey and revealed preferences 
from location analysis in GIS.  Future cross comparisons may also reveal patterns of 
growth that show how LIHTC development decisions evolve from an increasing 
knowledge of potential hazards.  This revelatory case study is prepared as a baseline of 
LIHTC development patterns in Florida which can be adapted to analyze LIHTC in other 
coastal states. 
Unit of Analysis   
The unit of analysis in a case study is not always simple to define.  The questions 
and proposition helped narrow the scope of this case study from the overall context of the 
impact of Hurricanes Charley, Ivan, Frances and Jeanne on the state.  This study also 
analyzed risk from the perspective of LIHTC professionals during disaster recovery.  
Development patterns of LIHTC sites were analyzed using GIS, but development patterns 





household units, or a small development can have as few as 20 household units.  Risk 
was measured by the number of units developed in hazardous locations.  The LIHTC 
household unit was an appropriate unit of analysis to identify exposed risk and was the 
primary unit of analysis for this study.  A secondary unit of analysis is the development 
itself.  The development consists of multiple units and is analyzed in the context of 
location within a storm surge along with the total number of units.  Stated preferences for 
hypothetical barriers or incentives to development were analyzed to reveal other risk 








Damages Storm Surge Flooding Housing Losses
2004 Frances 2 FL
$9.5 billion(1); 90% of 
damages occurred in 
Florida
< 6 feet Yes
2004 Jeanne 3 FL $7.6 billion 6 feet Yes
2004 Charley 4 FL $15 billion < 7 feet Yes
Smith and McCarty (2011) 
found that Hurricane 
Charley caused the most 
damage to housing units 
during the 2004 hurricane 
season
2004 Ivan 3 FL $18.8 billion 10-15 feet Yes
In 2004, the Insurance 
Information Institute 
estimated that 1/5th of 
homes in Florida were 
destroyed or significantly 
damaged by the Florida 
2004 hurricane season.(2)
2005 Dennis 3 AL; *FL $2.5 billion in the U.S. 5 feet Yes
Most housing damage 
occurred in the Carribean
2005 Wilma 3 FL $21 billion 7 feet Yes
2005 Katrina 3 FL, LA, MS $108 billion 25-28 feet Yes
More than 1,000,000 
housing units along the Gulf 
Coast were damaged
2005 Rita 3 LA; TX $12 billion 10-15 feet Yes
Over 33,000 homes were 
damaged in Louisiana and 
Texas
2008 Ike 2 TX; LA $29.5 billion 10-20 feet Yes
$3.4 billion in estimated 
housing damages
2008 Gustav 2 LA $4.6 billion
(1) Beven, J. L. (2014) Tropical Cycle Report, Hurricane Frances, National Hurricane Center
Potential Case Study Areas
700,000 damaged units with 
400,000 households having 
incomes under $30k 
(combined with Hurricane 
Jeanne) (Beven, 2014)
(2) Dumm, R.E., Sirmans, G. S., and Smersh, G. (2009) The Capitalization of Stricter Building Codes in Miami, Florida House 




 The volume of data collected in a case study requires a general analytic strategy 
that can be formed around theoretical propositions, developing case descriptions, using 
both qualitative and quantitative data, and examining rival explanations (Yin, 2009).  For 
this study, data was collected and organized around the proposition and specific research 
questions.  The goal of the study was to explore revealed preferences which were used to 
identify variables of risk that influence LIHTC investment and location decision-making 
during disaster recovery.  Yin (2009) outlines a series of iterations that lead to 
explanations as follows: 
 An initial proposition is made about the behavior. 
 Compare findings against the proposition 
 Revise the proposition 
 Compare other details of the case against the proposition 
 Repeat as often as needed 
Case Study Protocol  
 The case study includes three methods of analysis organized in three phases.  
Phase I consists of the content analysis of Qualified Action Plans from 2004 to 2010.   
Phase II was a survey of LIHTC professionals identified as being active in a LIHTC 
development in Florida from 2000 to 2010.  Phase III compared the findings of Phases I 
and II using GIS to perform location analysis.  Each research method is explained in 




Table 4-3: Case Study Protocol 
Type of Evidence 
Collected 
Data Collection Instruments Method 
Baseline location data for 
LIHTC housing prior to a 
disaster event 




Baseline storm surge data 
for project proximity to 
hazard areas 
Historical storm surge maps 




Qualified Action Plans 
Analyzed to determine annual 
Location priorities of the 
public agency 
Content Analysis 
Temporal analysis of 
LIHTC locations from 
2004 to 2010 
















Comparison of Phases  
The data from Phase I identified the stated preferences of the QAPs published 
from 2004 to 2010 by the Florida Housing and Finance Corporation.  In Phase II, 
developers identified stated variables that were analyzed to determine risk perception.  
Location risks identified in the survey were compared to the locations stated in the Phase 
I content analysis.  In Phase III, revealed preferences were identified using geographic 
information systems (GIS) to calculate the number of LIHTC units constructed during the 
study period.  The GIS analysis also identified LIHTC units in areas subject to storm 
surge from both Category 3 and Category 5 hurricanes.  Comparisons were made against 
the variables identified in the survey with the location of LIHTC developments in relation 
to storm surge and hurricane impact areas.  Location priorities in annual QAPs were 
analyzed to identify public policy preferences.  Findings from the GIS location analyses 
were analyzed against policy preferences and stated developer preferences.    
Threats to Validity and Reliability 
Internal Validity  
 Establishing causal relationships is a test of internal validity (Yin, 2009).  This 
study expected to identify certain risks associated with investment or disinvestment 
decisions by producers of affordable housing.  However, inferences to relationships 
identified within the statistical analysis may be associated or related, but not causal.  The 
sampling frame was the LIHTC database.  The survey population was limited to 
professionals in the Florida LIHTC community chosen from the contact data in the HUD 
LIHTC database.  The LIHTC program was legislated into existence in 1986.  The pilot 
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study identified participants of LIHTC in South Carolina using counties impacted by 
Hurricane Hugo as the case study area.  During the pilot, it was determined that early 
developers in the program were often no longer active in the profession due to retirement, 
a change in profession, and in at least one occasion, was deceased.   For this study, the 
sample population was chosen from those professionals who were active in the profession 
from 2000 to 2011.  The LIHTC database is the most comprehensive collection of 
LIHTC projects available.  Data collection for the database has evolved but data is 
incomplete, usually because states leave fields blank or some data unknown.   Updates 
are completed annually by HUD who provides statistics for general reliability of the 
database.  Between 2004 and 2010, approximately 8.7% to 15.1% of projects placed in 
service had missing addresses.  This was overcome by manually inputting an address 
found by an independent Internet search to verify location.  Only one Florida property in 
Palm Beach County was discovered to have an erroneous address in the course of this 
study.  Owner contact records were missing in 7.5% to 12.1% of the time, however many 
participants are included multiple times in the database.  Typically LIHTC participants 
are involved with multiple properties therefore missing contact information was easily 
identified from other entries in the database.  The “number of units” fields were missing 
data 6.4% to 14.1% of the time.   
 The LIHTC database includes projects that may no longer be bound by LIHTC 
restrictions.  The first wave of LIHTC eligible to leave the program was constructed 
between 1987 and 1994.  This study made no attempt to determine which LIHTC were no 
longer in compliance.  Khadduri, Climaco, and Burnett (2012) studied LIHTC properties 
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that were eligible to leave the program and found that most continue to be affordable 
after the compliance period ends.  The majority of owners recapitalize with new tax 
credits for rehabilitation.  Others reposition themselves with market rate leases.  
Repositioning was found to occur most often when housing markets are strong.  Since 
1990, federal law requires a 15-year compliance period and an additional 15 year 
affordability period.  While rental housing markets have improved since 2008, the 
number of LIHTC eligible to leave the program is unlikely to threaten the validity of this 
study.  
 The GIS analysis could overstate or understate the number of total developments 
units because of properties that have dropped out of the program or because of missing 
data.  This study provides general data derived from the database in order to allow the 
reader to understand the scope of the problem.  The primary focus of GIS analysis was to 
reveal location preferences for LIHTC development after the 2004 hurricane season.  
Non-compliant properties should not affect these results since developments coming out 
of compliance in 2004 were placed in service at the beginning of the program, and 
regulatory changes in 1990 insured the majority of LIHTC will remain compliant until 
2020.   
 General data regarding the number of LIHTC located in the boundaries of 
potential storm surge could vary depending on a number of variables including wind 
direction, wind speed, and intensity.  This study used preset MEOWs developed in the 




External Validity  
 The greatest threat to external validity is in establishing a way for findings to be 
generalized.  Generalization for case studies is analytical in nature and developed in 
theory with which to compare empirical results (Rowley, 2002).  Replication can be 
claimed when theory is supported by two or more cases.  In a single case study such as 
this, generalization is less certain because of the unique characteristics of the case.  In the 
course of this research, state programs and the impact of disaster vary with each incident 
and with each state.  This study aims to create a baseline of perceived risk and 
development patterns post-disaster with the expectation that comparisons could be made 
from future case studies.   
Reliability 
 According to Yin (2009), case study reliability requires that data collection 
procedures and a chain of evidence be documented and maintained.  Record-keeping has 
been organized and is maintained in a case-study database.  Hard copies of field notes are 
maintained and all documentation is being catalogued for easy access within the case 
study database.  Reliability was also considered in the conduct of the survey.  During the 
pilot study, it was discovered that earlier participants in LIHTC had left the business.  It 
was also realized that many participants are involved with multiple developments each 
year.  The selection process for identifying the sample of survey participants was changed 
to reflect these circumstances.  The population was chosen from active participants in 
LIHTC from 2000 to 2010.  Duplicate entries were removed.  Potential respondents were 
then verified through web research to insure that they were still active in the LIHTC 
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industry.  Phone calls were made to potential respondents to request participation and 
validate an email address so a link to the survey could be sent.  Multiple emails were sent 
to respondents to further boost participation.  When a GIS analysis was conducted of 
C5H storm surge, it was discovered that some properties were duplicated based on the 
varying degree of storm surge affecting a single development.  Storm surge was classified 
in equally divided segments based on the total range of feet.  One development could be 
impacted by storm surge in two ranges.  In each case, multiple entries were randomly 
assigned one representative for that development.  This eliminated duplicate counts of 
units for that development and avoided overstating damage estimates. 
Construct Validity  
 This study identified risks associated with LIHTC development during disaster 
recovery.  Risk was measured by ranking variables chosen by survey respondents when 
given a set of options from the STEEP categories.  High preference variables represented 
high risk if that preferred variable was taken away.  Variables with low preference scores 
indicated the variable represented less risk.  Risk variables were identified and ranked in 
order of preference using a mean score.  Risk was also measured and ranked using the 
total number of LIHTC units placed in high hazard areas placed in service annually 
between 2004 and 2010 within Category 3 and Category 5 storm surges. Location was 
analyzed using measurements of storm surge risk in feet and location based on the 
number of LIHTC units located within potential storm surge using the SLOSH model.  
Estimated damages were applied in U.S. dollars.  Development patterns in non-coastal 
counties and along the paths of the 2004 hurricanes were also analyzed.  
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METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
 The case study was divided into three distinct methods of analysis conducted in 
three phases.  Each phase uses one of three methods to identify preference.   Content 
analysis and a survey were used to obtain stated risks from the public agency and from 
the socially constructed influences of the developer.  Revealed preferences were analyzed 
using geographic information systems. 
PHASE I: CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Documentation relating to a specific disaster can be prolific because government 
agencies and others organize and monitor the phases of disaster from response to 
recovery.  This research focused on documents that influence LIHTC developer decision-
making.  The document most relevant to the research questions, and targeted to the 
LIHTC industry, is the Qualified Action Plan (QAP).  This document sets the protocol for 
State housing needs and dictates how federal tax credits will be prioritized.  QAPs 
examined during the South Carolina pilot study had points and thresholds that identified 
preferences.  This language communicated location preferences by establishing 
quantitative measures to gauge priority.  During disaster recovery, supplemental QAPs 
may also be issued to encourage housing recovery efforts.    During Hurricane Katrina, 
Louisiana issued multiple QAP supplements as policy changes and additional housing 
recovery strategies were implemented.  However this was not the case in Florida which 
issued a single QAP each year through the study period.  Florida QAPs differed from 
those issued during Katrina and those analyzed during the pilot study.  Preferences were 
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communicated using the words targeted, threshold or set-aside rather than a quantifiable 
scoring method.  Florida QAPs were collected and analyzed from 2004 to 2010. 
Phase one of this study examined Qualified Action Plans (QAP) from 2003 to 
2010 using content analysis to determine location preferences of the Housing Authority 
in the State of Florida as established within the QAP.   The QAP for 2003 was examined 
as a baseline to understand the language of the Florida QAP layout prior to the 2004 
hurricane season.  States generally create QAPs using a template that is revised each year.  
Any deviation in language for location preferences from the 2003 QAP was easily 
identified.   
 The initial review of QAPs included a search for points, set-asides, or thresholds 
that gave preferences for location.  Some states use a point system to establish 
preferences within the QAP.  Such was the case of South Carolina during the pilot study.  
Florida does not use this system.  In Florida, points were applied in the Universal 
Application (UA) for LIHTC, and while this study did not examine UAs, a preliminary 
review of several UAs was completed and findings indicated that points were most often 
applied to design features of units or property amenities as opposed to geographical 
preferences.   Geographic set-asides were also distributed between large, medium, and 
small counties based on the state’s most recent market study.  Market studies are 
completed in conjunction with a Consolidated Plan required by HUD for the allocation of 
HOME funds or CDBG.  While not required for LIHTC allocations per se, the 
Consolidated Plan is often instrumental in the creation of Qualified Action Plans so that 
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available sources of funding can be directed to the most pressing housing needs within 
the state.    
Set-asides are “pools of tax-credit funds within which applicants compete only 
against other properties qualifying for the set-aside” (Khadduri, 2013).  Geographic set-
asides were established for Florida Keys communities, Rural Development, and Front 
Porch Florida Communities.   Set-asides in the QAPs examined for this study were not 
applied to locations specifically impacted by the 2004 hurricanes.   
 Thresholds are another means of stating public preferences in the QAP.  
Thresholds establish a minimum baseline that can have the effect of excluding properties 
from the bidding process altogether (Khadduri, 2013).  Thresholds were not explicitly 
established in the documents examined for this study, but were referred to as minimums 
to be met in accordance with the UA.  For instance, threshold requirements for Rural 
Development, Florida Keys, and Front Porch Communities were geographical threshold 
requirements ranked in the UA, however specific points were not applied making it 
difficult to determine the priority of a specific location.  Thresholds were also noted for 
developments that received additional funding through tax-exempt bonds.  Future studies 
are needed to dissect scoring and threshold priorities of Florida UAs as they relate to 
hurricane prone properties.  Since points are not applied for every category of the UA, 
selection appears to be subjective.  Given the subjective nature of the UA, future studies 
would also benefit from interviews with a representative of the public housing authority 
to understand how scoring and LIHTC selection are accomplished in Florida.   
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 Location preferences are stated in the QAP and are the most direct 
communication of public preferences for LIHTC allocations.  All Florida QAPs 
examined included a heading for location under Section I of the Selection Criteria.  In 
every document analyzed for this study, selection criteria was scored and ranked in the 
UA according to priorities established under Section II, Priorities of the QAP.  Section I, 
defined how those priorities would be targeted.   
 Florida QAPs revealed specific language used to communicate preferences for 
preferred characteristics of LIHTC developments.  Keywords were identified to further 
analyze each document in order to determine if specific counties impacted by the 2004 
hurricanes were targeted.  Each document was imported to software that enabled a 
searchable format. Keywords were entered and a search was completed to determine 
location preferences established within the QAP. The keywords used for the content 
analysis were targeted, gives preference, set-aside, threshold, and location.  Using these 
keywords, location priorities for counties impacted by the 2004 hurricanes were found in 
QAPs for years 2005 and 2006.   
PHASE II:  SURVEY ANALYSIS 
 A web-based survey was conducted using Qualtrics and included both closed- and 
open-ended questions. The survey included questions designed to identify and rank 
preferences measured as risk for LIHTC during disaster recovery.   
Survey Population 
 The study population is LIHTC developers identified in the HUD LIHTC 
database and were limited to those that at minimum operated within Florida, but this 
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group may also participate in LIHTC development in multiple states.  Project contacts are 
included in the database by name, company, and phone number. In the course of the Pilot 
study, it was found that the database includes professionals that work in LIHTC as 
syndicators, developers, investors, management, or finance.  This case study focused on 
LIHTC in Florida, therefore a random sample was drawn from the population of Florida 
LIHTC.  The formula for sample size was based on Dillman et al. (2011) which considers 
the total population and a conservative estimate of the proportion of the population that 
would provide varying answers to a two response category with a 90 percent confidence 
interval and a margin of error of ± 5 percent.  One hundred forty three contacts were 
randomly chosen to participate in the survey.  The survey asked questions along three 
general categories: demographic, location, and funding.   
Rationale for Selection of Survey Method 
 The purpose of using a survey was to get a sense of how decision-makers in the 
industry view disaster risk.  Under the paradigm of social constructivism, LIHTC 
professionals were expected to draw from personal and professional experiences to 
identify preferences for LIHTC development during disaster recovery.  The survey 
developed for this study included a series of hypothetical statements to establish a 
perceived level of risk under five general categories: social, technical, economic, 
environmental, and government.  The survey used here was an exploratory tool that 
attempted to analyze an initial set of variables of perceived risk associated with disaster 
recovery within the sample population.  The goal of the survey was to reveal variables of 
perceived risk that relate to development decisions in the aftermath of disaster.  The 
 
118 
survey was conducted on a random sample of all LIHTC developers who were associated 
with any of the completed projects within the case study area regardless of their 
participation in recovery efforts. 
Procedures for Administering Survey 
 The survey was administered online using Qualtrics, an online survey platform.  
According to Dillman et al (2011) web based surveys are especially useful in business 
settings where most participants have access to Internet services.  The participants email 
addresses were acquired either by telephone or through an online search of company 
contact information.  Participants were contacted by phone to confirm email and provide 
details about the study.  Participants were emailed a link to the survey and were given 
thirty days to complete the questionnaire.  A weekly reminder was sent to each 
respondent with a final reminder sent two days before the final deadline.  There is no 
evidence that the length of time given for the survey affected the response rate. 
Measuring Risk 
 For this study, preference is measured using either a seven point Likert scale or a  
ten point sliding scale.  Risk is derived by measuring a mean and standard deviation from  
risk statements.  Categories of risk include social, technical, economic, environmental, 





Funding risk was measured using a 7-point Likert scale.  Respondents were asked which 
funding source was most likely to incentivize LIHTC development in an impact zone.  A 
program that was likely to encourage development was identified as a low risk whereas a 
funding source that was very unlikely to incentivize development was considered high 
risk.  In addition to the mean, which was calculated throughout the survey, this question 
was analyzed further using inferential statistics to test the significance of the mean.  This 
same inferential analysis could be applied to other questions in the survey to gain a more 
comprehensive interpretation of the results. 
 A second question also focused on funding sources that could be combined with 
LIHTC during disaster recovery.  Respondents were asked which funding sources were 
critical to participation in the LIHTC program (Table 4-5).  A program that was not 
critical to development represented a high risk.  A critical program indicated low risk.  
                       Table 4-4: Measuring Categories of Risk 
Variable 
 Low Risk High Risk 
Go No Go 
Social 0 10 
Technical 0 10 
Environmental 0 10 
Economic 0 10 




On a ten point sliding scale, non-critical programs had a low score of 0, meaning the 
program had no influence on affordable housing production.  A high score of 10 was an 
indicator that a program that was extremely critical to LIHTC development during 
disaster recovery, meaning the program was significant in reducing risk for the developer. 
 
 
      Table 4-5:  Measuring Funding Risk 
Program High Risk Low Risk
CDBG 0 10
HOME Funds 0 10
Supplemental LIHTC 0 10
Disaster Bonds 0 10
Mitigation Grants 0 10
Federal Disaster Loans 0 10
SBA Loans 0 10
Traditional Financing 0 10
Physical Disaster Business Loans 0 10
Federal Disaster Grants 0 10
Private Insurance 0 10
Road Home Small Rental Property 0 10








Location risk was measured with a 10-point sliding scale that identified a potential site as 




   Table 4-6:  Measuring Location Risks 
Low Risk High Risk
Adjacent to a previously flooded site 10 0
Upcoming election may change disaster recovery priorities 10 0
Site is in a coastal county 10 0
Site is not in a coastal county 10 0
Site is 1 to 5 miles from the coast 10 0
Site is 5 to 10 miles from the coast 10 0
Site is > 10 miles from the coast 10 0
Site is > 25 miles from the coast 10 0
Site is not within a storm surge boundary 10 0
Site is within a Storm Surge boundary 10 0
Site could flood during a hurricane 10 0







     
 A final set of close-ended questions attempted to measure externality risks under 
the broader terms of social, political, and economic interests.  An externality is a cost or 
benefit that accrues to an owner or producer over which they have no control, such as 
insurance costs or regulations.  These questions were asked using a 10-point sliding scale 
with 0 being an unwillingness to participate, indicating greater risk, and 10 being willing 





There are some limitations to the survey.  Inferring cause-and-effect relationships is an 
interpretive matter in survey research (Singleton and Straits, 2005). The standardized 
nature of a survey questionnaire represents only surface details of the developer’s 
experiences.  The survey questionnaire was used to identify and rank stated preferences 
of perceived risk by LIHTC developers operating in the state of Florida during disaster 
recovery.  
 The LIHTC database includes data collected since the program began.  Data 
collection processes have evolved over that time resulting in some missing and erroneous 
Table 4-7:  Measuring Externalities 
Financing the project has unfavorable terms 10 0
Insurance costs are higher in a coastal area 10 0
Construction costs are rising in the recovery zones 10 0
Land costs are higher along the coast 10 0
More regulations are imposed in coastal counties 10 0
A local neighborhood group is against low-income housing 10 0
Public sentiment is against low-income housing 10 0
A for-profit organization is willing to partner in developing the project 10 0
A non-profit organization is willing to partner in developing the project 10 0
More flexible regulations in a non-coastal county 10 0
Construction costs are stable in the recovery zones 10 0
Additional incentives are available to build in coastal counties 10 0
Insurance costs are lower in counties that are not along the coast 10 0
An advocacy group supports low-income housing in a specific community 10 0
Land costs are lower in areas away from the coast 10 0
Disaster relief programs are available for low-income multifamily housing 10 0
Financing the project with favorable terms 10 0
Supplemental tax credits are available 10 0




data.  When obvious errors were encountered, such as incomplete addresses or phone 
number errors, duplicates were compared within the database itself.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
 An attempt to contact the developer by phone was the initially preferred means of 
engagement with the LIHTC professional.  During the pilot study, it was discovered that 
contact phones numbers often were no longer in service or linked to the contact by a 
company cell phone that was no longer in use. Many contacts were associated with 
multiple companies as a result of job changes, company structure, or company changes.  
Online sources such as LinkedIn and company websites were used to update phone 
numbers.  An attempt was made to contact each participant by phone to explain the 
research and get an email address.  Others not reached by phone were sent a link by email 
with an explanation.  Of 143 randomly selected records, a link to the web-based survey 
was emailed to a sample population (n=112).   Thirty three participants completed the 
survey indicating a response rate of 29%.  
Response Rate 
The survey for this study was administered to business professionals who often 
report low response rates (White and Luo, 2005).  In an effort to boost response rates, 
White and Luo tested the use of monetary incentives and a long versus short form survey.  
According to Dillman (2000), monetary incentives are useful in improving mailed 
surveys, second only to multiple contacts.  White and Luo found that rewards of $10 and 
$20 improved response rates for paper-based business surveys.  For this survey, 
incentives were not provided, however multiple reminders were sent.  Short form surveys 
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were found to illicit a higher response rate at the expense of a loss of detail in the data 
received.  These results concur with Greer et al. (2000) who found that questionnaires 
with fewer pages resulted in higher return rates.  Others have found no significant 
difference in return rates between longer or shorter surveys (Hager et al., 2003).   
In one of the earlier studies examining online survey response rates, Cobanoglu, 
Warde, and Moreo (2001) tested response rates on surveys given to professors 
specializing in the hospitality industry and found response rates were highest for online 
surveys at above forty-four percent.  Faxed surveys elicited a 17% response rate and a 
27% was found for mailed surveys.   
 While financial incentives can improve response rates (White and Luo, 2005; 
Nulty, 2008), others have found that network associations are beneficial for boosting 
responses (Bartholomew and Smith, 2006).  An association with organizations that 
specialize and promote LIHTC in the housing industry, such as the National Association 
of State and Local Equity Funds or Novogradac & Company, may have boosted response 
rates for this study.  However, this study was limited in scope focusing specifically on 
LIHTC participants with experience in the State of Florida where hurricane hazards are a 
predominant disaster risk.  Therefore a decision was made to personally contact 
professionals who have demonstrated participation with LIHTC on the Florida coast. 
Statistical Analysis 
 Respondents were given a list of funding incentives and were asked “Given the 
following incentives, how likely would your company be willing to build a LIHTC 
multifamily development in an impact zone that has sustained severe damage from a 
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hurricane disaster?”  Using a 7-point Likert scale with 1 being very unlikely (meaning 
greater risk and 7 being very likely (meaning less risk), descriptive statistics were 
analyzed for the mean and standard deviation.  Inferential statistics were conducted using 
SPSS to test the means and standard deviation followed by multivariate analysis to 
determine correlation between variables6.   
 A similar analysis was conducted on a question that asks “When thinking about 
disasters, please rate the location preference for each of the following for a potential 
LIHTC development.”  A sliding 10 point scale was given to the respondent with 0 being 
least preferred, indicating a site with greater risk, to 10 being the most preferred site, 
indicating less risk.  Like the previous question, inferential statistics were conducted 
using SPSS to test the means and standard deviation.  Multivariate analysis was 
conducted to determine if any correlation exists between variables. 
PHASE III:  GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS  
 Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte (1999) define archival data and secondary 
data as qualitative and quantitative data “collected and stored for research, service, and 
other official and unofficial purposes by researchers, service organizations, and others.”  
This type of data generally falls into three categories: public data sets, private data sets, 
and private records.  This study used public data sets that included historical SLOSH 
                                                 
 
6 Note that cross tabulations were proposed for this study to analyze the differences between For-profit 
and Non-profit business models.  However, given the small sample size and insufficient responses within 
cells, cross tabulations were inappropriate for this study.  Implementing this or a similar survey to a larger 
LIHTC sample population could result in a greater response rate sufficient to derive meaning from an 
analysis of cross tabulations. 
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model storm surge data and the HUD LIHTC database.  The pilot study needed to 
account for only one Universal Trans Mecator (UTM) Zone.  Florida is divided in two 
UTM Zones: NAD83/UTM 16 and NAD83/UTM 17.  Zone 16 consists of 15 counties in 
the northwestern quadrant of the state.  The remaining counties are located in UTM Zone 
17.  The majority of data was analyzed using GIS spatial analysis projected to 
NAD_1982_UTM_Zone17N (Table 4-8).    
Table 4-8: GIS Datasets and Limitations 
 
  
 Using descriptive statistical analysis, the number of LIHTC placed in service 
(PIS) was calculated by unit for each year of the study period.  A storm surge analysis 
was completed for each Florida basin except the Okeechobee basin located inland at the 
southeast quadrant of the state west of Palm Beach.    
 This study used the SLOSH model to identify the number of LIHTC 
developments and units located in potential storm surge from a Category 3 storm with a 
mean tide (C3M) and a Category 5 storm at high tide (C5H) to identify an average and 
From To
SLOSH Model National Weather Service
Storm surge SLOSH models are 
subject to error; access to 
storm surge risk maps and raw 
data may not be available
GCS_North_American_1927 NAD_1982_UTM_ZONE_17N
LIHTC Database
To analyze locations of LIHTC 
projects in relation to 
proximity to hazard areas 
identified by FEMA and 
Storm Surge data before and 
after a disaster event.
Subject to input error and 
missing data
GCS_North_American_1983 NAD_1982_UTM_ZONE_17N






worst case scenario for hurricane damages.  Basins were constructed within the SLOSH 
model and exported to shapefiles for ArcGIS (ESRI, 2013).  Storm runs were created 
using the Maximum Envelope of Wind (MEOW) with the highest wind speed available 
for each category of storm.  During the pilot, a select number of counties were analyzed 
and compared for the number of LIHTC located in storm surge and flood zone areas.  At 
the time of this study, flood zone maps were being recalculated by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency and were incomplete for analysis.  Counties across the 
country monitor flood zones and often have ordinances and codes that limit or discourage 
development in these areas.  In Florida, the high cost of flood insurance is well 
understood to be a factor in development decisions for all property types (Anderson, 
2015).  What is less understood is the impact on LIHTC development in storm surge 
areas.  Estimates of economic impacts were not included in the pilot study.  In this study, 
GIS identified those LIHTC properties in storm surge areas and estimated the economic 
impact of a C3M or C5H storm surge.   
Rationale for Use of Archival Records 
 The HUD LIHTC database is the most comprehensive collection of LIHTC 
development.  States collect comprehensive annual data for every LIHTC development in 
the country.  The data is subject to error.  Errors were corrected when noted.  In spite of 
any relatively minor shortfalls, the database is the most reliable public source of LIHTC 
available to researchers.  The SLOSH model was developed by NWS and NOAA and is 
often used by emergency managers to monitor and predict storm surge potential (Glahn et 
al, 2009).  TIGER/Line files are often relied upon for analysis in GIS.  These three data 
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sources were used to observe development patterns before and after the 2004 hurricane 
season. Proximity of LIHTC projects to historical storm surge boundaries for a C3M 
storm surge and a C5H storm surge were also analyzed.  
General Limitations 
 Archival records are typically produced for a specific purpose.  LIHTC files are 
collected and made accessible for public access and general research purposes.  As stated 
before, accuracy is not guaranteed and limits the study.  The LIHTC database is 
maintained by HUD based on submissions from each state.  It is very unlikely that 
missing data had a significant impact on findings.   
 O’Looney (2000) identified five categories of data quality for GIS applications: 
positional accuracy, attribute accuracy, completeness, logical consistency, and lineage. 
Each of these categories are discussed in terms of general limitations for this study. 
1. Positional accuracy is defined as “the degree of horizontal and vertical control in 
the coordinate system” (p. 45).  Florida is divided into two UTM coordinate 
systems.  This study recognized both systems and analyzed units in storm surge 
hazards according to the appropriate UTM. 
2. Attribute accuracy is the “degree of error associated with way thematic data is 
categorized” (p.45).  In this study, longitude and latitude coordinates in the 
LIHTC database were relied upon.  Field visits and engineering surveys are likely 
needed to measure the level of accuracy between the storm surge boundary and 
the number of units actually within those boundaries.  Category 5 storm surges 
estimated for this study resulted in some LIHTC developments being counted 
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twice.  Further investigation revealed that more than one range of depth for storm 
surge was being applied.  For this study, duplicate counts were removed to avoid 
double counting of units.  
3. Completeness is the degree of missing data and missing data is treated.  The 
LIHTC database does have some missing fields, and others fields that have entries 
and blank fields.  This was especially apparent during the pilot study when 
attempting to identify funding sources and non-profit participants.  GIS analysis 
for funding sources and non-profit participants is limited to those records that 
were available with the understanding that data is incomplete.  When recognized, 
incomplete data has been pointed out in the findings and considered in the 
analysis. 
4. Logistical consistency looks for contradictions within a database.  The LIHTC 
database contains LIHTC locations based on input from states.  Logical 
consistency infers that one entry may be based on duplicate factors.  Logical 
consistency is not a limitation for this study.  
5. Lineage is the chronology of data and estimates used for processing data.  The 
LIHTC database has consistent fields with content supplied by each state.  Some 
states may not report all fields which would create inconsistency in a multi-state 
study.  This case study focused on a single state and it is expected that data 
collection has been consistent except in those areas identified in the findings.  
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The next chapter discusses each phase of this case study.  The findings and analysis for 
each phase are presented and analyzed to determine how risk influences LIHTC 
development.   
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Chapter 5  
AN ANALYSIS OF RISK  
 
 The purpose of this revelatory case study was to understand how LIHTC 
developers perceive risk and identify variables of risk that influence decisions during 
disaster recovery.  Phase I of this study identified the stated preferences of the Florida 
Housing and Finance Corporation (FHFC) acting as the public agency.  Location 
preferences for areas with housing damages were found in Qualified Action Plans for 
2005 and 2006.  Phase II of this study asked LIHTC professionals to state preferences in 
a series of competing choices.  Respondents were asked to rank variables that were most 
likely to incentivize development.  Open ended questions provided an opportunity to 
contribute ideas for encouraging development of affordable housing during recovery 
which contributed to an understanding of risk perception.  Phase III applied descriptive 
statistics using geographic information systems (GIS) to identify revealed preferences of 
developers using location analysis of LIHTC placed in service.  There are two dates 
associated with LIHTC.  The first is the allocation date.  The allocation date is the year 
the tax credits were assigned to the project.  The second date is the year ‘placed in 
service’, which is the year the development was completed and occupancy was verified.  
A development is typically placed in service (PIS) within one to two years of the 
allocation.  PIS is the date relied on in Phase III of the study. 
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PHASE I:  STATED PREFERENCES OF THE PUBLIC AGENCY 
Qualified Action Plans (QAP)are created in a collaborative process with input 
from stakeholders in the months prior to its publication.  Stakeholders include non-profit 
organizations, local housing authorities, private developers, and advocates for affordable 
housing.  The 2004 QAP was introduced to the public months before the hurricane season 
and funding was likely underway or complete by the time the storms hit.  There would 
have been ample time, however, to modify the 2005 QAP to accommodate housing needs 
resulting from the storms. 
 In this analysis, the public agency refers to FHFC, the state housing agency 
responsible for allocating tax credits. The QAP is a compilation of preferences 
established by federal, state and local governments through policy statements, and 
regulations.  After the 2004 hurricanes, Governor Jeb Bush convened the Hurricane 
Housing Working Group (HWG) to gather data and recommend action to facilitate 
affordable housing recovery.  The recommendations of the HWG were discussed in 
Chapter 3 and were compared to QAPs to analyze policy statement influences.  The 2005 
and 2006 QAPs incorporated many HWG recommendations for allocating resources.  In 
2005, the QAP preferred all locations identified by HWG as a Tier I priority likely as a 
result of damages more so than policy statements.  The 2006 QAP incorporated 
additional locations from Tiers II, III and IV and eliminated some Tier I counties.   
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The Hurricane Housing Working Group  
States often retain some flexibility that will allow LIHTC awards to be given 
based on non-numerical priorities.  The State of Florida is no exception.  Priorities were 
established in the months immediately following the 2004 hurricanes by targeting 
counties most impacted by the storms.  Four priority tiers were established by the 
Hurricane Housing Working Group (HWG) based on severity of damages that occurred 
by county.  HWG also factored in the total number of housing losses when prioritizing 
housing needs (HWG, 2005).  These statistics formed the basis of policy priorities 
recommended to the governor and state legislature. 
In 2005, the year immediately following the storms, the HWG analysis was 
incomplete.  As a result FHFC was unable to incorporate the findings even though the 
2005 QAP ultimately concurred with HWG recommendations.  Location priorities for 
2005 were established for eleven counties impacted by the storm.  These counties were 
identified as: Brevard, Charlotte, De Soto, Escambia, Hardee, Indian River, Martin, 
Okeechobee, Polk, St. Lucie, and Santa Rosa (Figure 5-1).  Each was a Presidentially 
Declared Disaster Area and received emergency assistance and access to needed disaster 
relief.  All eleven counties were included in the Tier I group (See Table 5-1).  Seven were 
coastal counties and four were inland.  DeSoto, Hardee, and Okeechobee counties are 
considered small, rural inland counties, meaning the population is less than 100,000 and 
density is less than 100 individuals per square mile.  Charlotte, Escambia, Indian River, 
Martin, Santa Rosa, and St. Lucie are considered medium counties with a population of 
between 100,000 and 500,000.  These counties are located on the coast.  Brevard and 
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Polk counties are large counties with populations of greater than 500,000.  Polk is an 




Figure 5-1: 2005 QAP Preferences 
 
In 2006, only five counties in Tier I were given priority in the QAP (Figure 5-2).  
Four of these were coastal counties.  Hardest hit counties were excluded from the 2006 
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QAP even though allocations for LIHTC in one or more hardest hit counties continued 
through 2009.  The 2006 QAP also included preferences for seven additional counties 
located in the remaining tiers.  Tier III included two non-coastal counties and Tiers II and 
IV included only coastal counties.  No other location preferences relating to the 2004 
storms were established in QAPs between 2004 and 2010. 
 




Table 5-1:  Comparison of HWG Report with 2005 and 2006 Qualified Actions 
Plans 
 






Hardee x  x
DeSoto x x
Okeechobee x x x
Martin x x x
Santa Rosa x x
Indian River x x x
Charlotte x x
Polk x x
St. Lucie x x x
Escambia x x
Brevard x x x
Tier II
Lee x x








Total 11 12 13 6
Tier I 11 5 8 4
Tier II 0 2 2 0
Tier III 0 2 0 2
Tier IV 0 3 3 0  
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The Hurricane Housing Working Group reported that Tier I counties experienced 
over 47% of total housing damages.  Housing was categorized by single-family, multi-
family, and manufactured housing.   Multifamily housing (MFH) was only 3% of total 
damages in all Tier I counties combined.  However, on a per county basis, most Tier I 
counties had significant damage in their multifamily housing stock, especially Hardee 
with 36.5% and St. Lucie with 30.6% of total MFH damaged.  De Soto County had the 
next highest percentage of damages with 29.1% of its MFH stock followed by Charlotte, 
Indian River, Santa Rosa, and Okeechobee counties (Table 5-2).  Brevard, Polk, and 
Martin counties had less than 10% of MFH stock damage or destroyed.   
Table 5-2: Housing Damages  






# of Units 
Damaged
% of Total 
Units 
County






# of Units 
Damaged




Hardee 5,570         64.1% 3,741        61.7% 193           36.5% 1,626         77.4% I
De Soto 7,506         64.3% 4,314        65.1% 350           29.1% 2,829         72.8% I
Okeechobee 7,668         53.4% 3,946        57.2% 136           17.5% 3,570         53.5% I
Martin 19,343       32.1% 14,018      37.3% 1,510        9.4% 3,519         56.6% I
Santa Rosa 23,196       46.9% 18,518      50.5% 879           19.9% 3,409         40.6% I
Indian River 29,460       53.5% 22,804      62.5% 2,749        21.5% 3,660         63.1% I
Charlotte 34,077       48.0% 27,918      53.0% 2,384        23.6% 3,673         44.8% I
Polk 49,809       23.4% 34,346      26.9% 2,850        9.1% 12,465       23.4% I
St. Lucie 51,627       60.4% 39,930      64.8% 4,666        30.6% 6,647         76.9% I
Escambia 51,876       2.7% 41,922      48.2% 4,024        17.2% 5,077         45.5% I
Brevard 56,698       26.0% 43,127      28.6% 3,921        8.4% 8,492         40.9% I
Tier I Total 336,830     47.6% 254,584    35.9% 23,662      3.3% 54,967       7.8%
State Total 708,361     
County
Total Single Family Multi-Family Manufactured Housing
 
Source:  Hurricane Housing Working Group, 2005; Shimberg Center for 




Tier II counties were classified as having either large numbers of housing 
damages, or a large percentage of housing damages compared with the total statewide.  
Two Tier II counties were included in the 2006 QAP.  Lee County reported 20,761 
housing units damaged from the storms (Table 5-3).  This was 9.4% of total damages 
reported in the state.  Less than two percent of these were MFH.  There were 1,179 
damaged or destroyed MFH units in Lee County.  Compare this to Palm Beach County 
with 16.3% of the state total, or 84,001 total housing units.  The greatest numbers of 
damaged multifamily units were located in Palm Beach County with just under 6% of the 
state, or 11,715 units damaged. 
Glades and Hendry counties were Tier III counties and together had slightly more 
than five percent of total MFH housing.  Hendry counted 34 damaged MFH units, or 
slightly above three and a half percent of the total.  Glades had less than ten.  When ten or 
fewer units were damaged, exact numbers were not published in order to protect privacy.  
Together, Hendry and Glades accounted for more than 11% of the total housing damaged 
or destroyed as a result of the 2004 hurricanes.  These two counties represent 18% of the 
total number of counties included in Tier III.   
Monroe, Collier, Broward, and Miami-Dade had less than two percent of 
damaged housing in the state and were included in the Tier IV category.  These four 
counties represented just 10% of all counties in Tier IV.  The greatest number of MFH 






PHASE 1: Findings and Analysis 
 Every county in Florida was affected by the 2004 hurricanes (HWG, 2005).  
Comerio (1998) noted that most disaster relief is dispersed to owners of single-family 
homes, “even when losses are predominantly in multi-family structures” (p. 21).  LIHTC 
development is a significant source of multifamily housing production, especially during 
recovery.  Vacant LIHTC units are often used to shelter others during the transition 
between response and recovery.  After disaster, policies often relax recapture rules so 
vacant units can be rented to those who would not normally qualify under income 
restrictions.  Damaged LIHTC units are also given an extended period of time to be 
repaired without risk of recapture.   Policies also begin to develop to address inevitable 
Table 5-3:  2006 QAP - Tiers I, II, III & IV 






# of Units 
Damaged
% of Total 
Units 
County






# of Units 
Damaged




Monroe 25              0.1% 19             0.1% * 0.0% * 0.0% IV
Collier 334            0.3% 254           0.4% 20             0.0% 59              0.7% IV
Glades 505            11.6% 204           10.8% * 1.6% 297            13.1% III
Hendry 1,317         11.3% 632           11.1% 34             3.6% 650            13.0% III
Broward 6,932         1.0% 5,251        1.4% 985           0.3% 408            1.9% IV
Okeechobee 7,668         53.4% 3,946        57.2% 136           17.5% 3,570         53.5% I
Miami-Dade 9,481         1.1% 6,289        1.4% 2,458        0.7% 488            3.6% IV
Martin 19,343       32.1% 14,018      37.3% 1,510        9.4% 3,519         56.6% I
Lee 20,761       9.4% 16,577      12.5% 1,179        1.9% 2,951         10.8% II
Indian River 29,460       53.5% 22,804      62.5% 2,749        21.5% 3,660         63.1% I
St. Lucie 51,627       60.4% 39,930      64.8% 4,666        30.6% 6,647         76.9% I
Brevard 56,698       26.0% 43,127      28.6% 3,921        8.4% 8,492         40.9% I
Palm Beach 84,001       16.3% 60,351      20.1% 11,715      5.9% 7,794         45.3% II
Total 287,793     40.6% 213,129    30.1% 29,353      4.1% 38,476       5.4%
State Total 708,361     
County
Total Single Family Multi-Family Manufactured Housing
 
Source:   Hurricane Housing Working Group, 2005; Shimberg Center for 




shortages of affordable housing, shortages that were likely exacerbated as a result of the 
disaster event. 
 Qualified Action Plans provide evidence of the preferences guided by public 
policy.  It was assumed that the public agency sought location preferences in counties 
that indicated a serious need for additional affordable housing units and that all the usual 
means of determining location needs took place in a collaborative way among 
stakeholders.  It is also assumed that state preferences recommended by HWG played a 
role in the public agency’s decision making.   
 The analysis of QAPs indicated a preference for counties that experienced the 
greatest impact from the four hurricanes.  This is especially the case for location 
preferences stated in the 2005 Florida QAP.  While the HWG was still convened and 
analyzing damages, the FHFC was proactive by including the counties directly hit by one 
or more hurricanes.    St. Lucie was hit by Hurricanes Jeanne and Frances, resulting in the 
most severe housing damage.  Indian River and Brevard counties also experienced 
extensive housing damage, reportedly from storm surge (HWG, 2005).  Indian River, 
Brevard, and Polk Counties were affected by three of the four hurricanes.  Ivan had the 
greatest impact to the south damaging housing in Miami-Dade, Broward, and Collier 
counties.  Hurricane Ivan traversed northward across the Gulf of Mexico landing near 
Santa Rosa and Escambia counties causing even more damage.  Santa Rosa County took 
a major hit and reported 46.9% of housing damages.  Over 19% of those damages were to 
multi-family housing units.  These counties were ultimately categorized as Tier 1 
counties by HWG. 
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 In 2006, the Florida Housing and Finance Corporation incorporated HWG 
recommendations and spread location preferences across a wider range of counties 
affected by the storms.  While Tier I counties were the largest subset of counties 
preferred in the QAP, a few counties in the remaining tiers were given preference as well. 
Factors influencing the inclusion of Tiers II, III, and IV counties could be a result of 
preferences for small, medium and large counties, Florida Keys (Monroe County), or 
number of damaged housing in these counties.  As a percentage of housing losses, 
Monroe, Collier, Broward and Miami-Dade are Tier IV counties were minimally 
impacted by Hurricane Ivan but were included in the 2006 QAP.  The initial number of 
MFH damages between the four counties was estimated to be at least 3,4637 (HWG, 
2005).  Lee, Hendry, Glades, and Palm Beach are Tier II and III counties located south of 
the path taken by Charley, Frances and Jeanne, and north of the southerly path of 
Hurricane Ivan.  In other words, none of these counties sustained a direct hit from any of 
the four hurricanes.  Yet all four counties were given preferences in the 2006 QAP, likely 
because of the total number of damaged units in these counties.  Lee County had 20,761 
total housing units damaged.  Of these, 1,179 were multifamily housing.  Hendry County 
had fewer units damaged, but of the 1,317 units represented 11.3% of total housing 
damages.  Nearly half were manufactured housing units.  Glades also had a small number 
of housing units damaged, but a significant 11.6% of total housing stock was affected 
                                                 
 
7 Monroe County had fewer than 10 apartments damaged, so the exact number was not provided in order to 
protect the privacy of the tenants and owners. 
 
142 
with over 13% in manufactured housing units.  Multifamily housing production is a safe 
and effective means of replacement housing for these types of units.  Palm Beach County 
sustained damages to over 84,000 housing units and 11,715 of those were multifamily.  
The four of counties had more than 9.4% of housing damages with the greatest being 
16.3% in Palm Beach County.  This is a testament to the extent of devastation the four 
hurricanes caused across the state.   
Nineteen of 67 Florida counties were given preferences in QAPs in 2005 and 
2006.  All QAPs examined gave geographic preferences for the Florida Keys, Front 
Porch Communities and Rural Development each year, but other than 2005 and 2006, no 
other preferences were stated for specific counties.  That means that 48 counties that 
experienced some effect of the hurricanes were not given any preference.  Comerio 
(1998) points out that the scope of housing losses relative to local conditions may 
indicate that some areas may not experience losses to the same degree.  For instance, 
Hurricane Ivan damaged fewer numbers of housing units than the other three storms, but 
had a significant impact on agriculture and forestry.  Comerio also found that “housing 
and property decisions made within two years of a hurricane or earthquake bear a 
relationship to the disaster that forced such decisions” (p. 246).  After two years, 
decisions are governed by market conditions and personal choice (Comerio, 1998).  The 
State of Florida established housing recovery preferences from recommendations made 
by HWG.  The 2005 QAP was a reaction to the devastation of the storms from the 
previous year and included those counties that experienced the most extensive housing 
damages.  In 2006, FHFC incorporated many HWG recommendations but greater 
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attention was given to coastal counties regardless of tier.  The preferred counties stated in 
the 2005 and 2006 QAPs were in direct response to the impact that Hurricanes Charley, 
Jeanne, Frances, and Ivan had on housing damages.  Based on the findings of the QAPS, 
it was assumed developers might propose LIHTC development in locations preferred in 
the 2005 and 2006 Qualified Action Plans, regardless of risk.  
 Ultimately, the 2005 QAP showed preferences for eleven counties, seven of 
which were coastal counties.  Four were located inland.  In 2006, twelve counties from 
Tiers I, II, III, and IV were given location preferences.  Eight of these were coastal 
counties.  The response in 2005 correlated with large percentages of housing damages 
overall with the exception of Escambia County.  Escambia had a small percentage of 
housing losses, but the large numbers of housing losses were significant.  Polk County 
had a lower percentage of housing damages. 
 In 2006, counties in Tiers II, III and IV were added to the QAP along with the 
five Tier I counties with a large percentage housing units damaged.  Tier II, III, and IV 
counties also had large numbers of damaged housing except for Monroe County, which 
had fewer than 25 damaged housing units.  Monroe County is a coastal county that 
encompasses land area on the Florida mainland and includes the Florida Keys.  HWG 
recommended Tier II, III and IV to receive priority in sequential order after Tier I.  Since 
the 2005 QAP included all Tier I counties, the 2006 QAP would be expected to include 
counties from each of the other tiers because of HWG recommendations to address 
housing needs in these tiers.  An additional recommendation from HWG was that 
preferences for Tier IV counties should be given to those that border Tier I counties.  Tier 
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IV counties preferred in the 2006 QAP did not adjoin Tier I counties and did not 
experience significant housing damages.  One county was small and rural (Monroe) and 
another was a medium county (Collier).  Broward and Miami-Dade are both coastal and 
heavily populated.  Preference for these counties is likely a response to affordable 
housing needs within the Tier IV counties rather than a reaction to the effect of the 
hurricanes since both counties had less than 1% of housing units damaged compared to 
the state total.  Each year, the public agency indicated a preference for coastal counties 
above inland counties.  Rising coastal population is an indicator of affordable housing 
needs and likely influenced preferences.  A thorough analysis of population, income and 
housing trends would provide a better indication of housing needs for Florida counties 
that could further explain the preferences of the public agency established in the 2005 and 
2006 QAPs. 
PHASE II:  STATED PREFERENCES OF LIHTC DEVELOPERS  
 A random sample was drawn from the LIHTC database and participants were 
contacted by telephone or email prior to implementation of the survey.  A total of 112 
participants were emailed a link to the survey and were given a four week time frame to 
complete the questionnaire (Table 5-4).  Reminders were emailed after week one and 
week three, and again two days before the deadline.  Two participants opened the survey 













Response to closed-ended survey questions were analyzed using descriptive and 
inferential statistics.  An open ended question was also included.  This section discusses 
the results.  The survey instrument is found in the appendix.    
Business Model and Experience 
The first four questions gave an overview of the general demographics and 
experience of respondents.  LIHTC is a complex program, and professionals with 
experience are more likely to fully understand the nature of development under the 
program.  Experienced LIHTC respondents are also likely to be more aware of the 
barriers imposed by the program during disaster recovery.  The industry is composed of 
for-profit and non-profit participants.  For-profit developers dominate the LIHTC 
industry by more than sixty percent nationally and eighty-seven percent in Florida.  The 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has provided informal, nonbinding guidance for non-
profits who wish to participate in the LIHTC program (Mittereder, 2013).  The state, 
however, often includes preferences in the QAPs for developers who work with non-
profit organizations.  Survey respondents averaged 17 years of experience in the LIHTC 
industry.  Six respondents were employed in the industry for six years or less.  Private, 
for-profit industries were represented by 66% of respondents and 34% were non-profit 
organizations (Figure 5-3).  Of the non-profits represented, 28% were 501(c)3 
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organizations.  Sixty percent of non-profits were Community Development Corporations 
(CDC).  A CDC is a nonprofit, community-based organization that focuses on a number 
of initiatives promoting community development, including affordable housing.  CDCs 
typically support or participate in projects at the local level.   
 
 




Questions 5 through 9 sought to understand the geographic scope of respondent 
experience and whether experience included other development projects in addition to 
LIHTC.  These questions also asked about respondents experience with coastal 
development specifically and experience with disasters in the context of LIHTC 
development.  Most respondents, 65.5%, participated in LIHTC development in multiple 
states.  Slightly more than 20% developed LIHTC in a single county, and 13.8% operated 
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in multiple counties within the state.  Over 82% of participants indicated involvement 
with projects other than LIHTC.  The same percentage, 82%, owned LIHTC in coastal 
counties.  More than 39% of respondents had experienced damages to LIHTC units as a 
result of a hurricane, and of those, all of them had more than 20 units damaged as a 
result.  This study was not specifically interested in the numbers of units damaged as a 
result of a hurricane but was interested in the preferences associated with development.  
It is obvious from the number of respondents selecting the highest category available for 
damaged units that in future surveys, twenty units or above should be in the lower range 
of categories for understanding the extent of damages.   
Ranking Preferences 
The next few questions asked respondents to rank a series of preferences.  The 
first question asked respondents to rank the importance of five general categories of risk 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Risk categories were identified in the development literature and 
included risk variables like credit, debt burdens, interest rates, policy, funding, and 
hazards.  These variables were categorized based on a modified STEEP analysis for real 
estate development built from the work of Khumpaisal and Ross (2007) and Morrison 
(2007).   The categories were social, technical, economic, environmental, and 
government (Figure 5-4).  Social factors included public sentiment and advocacy.  
Environmental factors included proximity to the coast, impact areas, and events related to 
hurricanes.  Both of these categories had the least influence on development decisions.  
The technical categories most significant to development include financial factors 
associated with real estate development, including cap rates, internal rates of return, and 
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other project oriented factors.  Economics included externalities that included 
government funding and land acquisition.  Government priorities were a function of 
program changes associated with political change and volatility.  
 
 
             Figure 5-4:  Risk Categories 
 
 
Respondents were asked to rank each category from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating low 
risk and 10 indicating high risk.  Technical, economic, and government categories each 
scored above seven.  Economic factors presented the greatest risks that were most likely 
to derail an affordable housing project.  These elements included sources needed to fund 
development.  Social factors, such as the level of community support for development, 
were least likely to influence the decision to develop.  All categories scored greater than 
neutral significance for influencing a development decision except the Social category.  
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Development decisions were most influenced by economic forces, government and 
political influences, and the technical requirements needed for project profitability. 
Funding Preferences 
Government funding was the primary factor in the economic category.  Funding 
from government sources is often essential for feasibility of affordable housing 
production.  Developers rely on funding assistance during the recovery and 
redevelopment phase of disaster because of the limitations and constraints on rent 
increases.  The LIHTC database revealed very little about project funding.  Most of the 
fields for HOME and CDBG funds were blank.  Only five percent of projects in the 
database received HOME funding and even fewer, no more than one percent, included 
CDBG funds (Table 5-5).  The data means little considering that nearly 80% of LIHTC 
fields for two programs were blank.  Tax exempt bonds, typically state sponsored disaster 
bond programs such as Liberty Bonds, or Go Zone, were used in 31% of Florida LIHTC 
with only 21% of fields being reported as blank.  Future research regarding the efficacy 
of subsidies is contingent on accuracy and completeness of fields within the LITHC 
database.   
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Table 5-5: Analysis of CDBG and HOME Programs in Existing LIHTC 
 
Ratio Ratio
Total LIHTC Developments 17,047             459                 
Total LIHTC Units/Avg Per Project 1,098,605       64.45 148,287         323.07
Non-Profit Developments % of Total Developments % of Total
Yes 2973 17% 59 13%
No 10557 62% 400 87%
Blank 3518 21% 0 0%
HOME 855,302,105$         18,869,100$         
Yes 1231 7% 24 5%
No 7111 42% 83 18%
Blank 8705 51% 352 77%
CDBG 131,330,414$         2,130,691$           
Yes 337 2% 4 1%
No 7448 44% 82 18%
Blank 9262 54% 373 81%
*Tax Exempt Bonds
Yes 2136 13% 143 31%
No 12576 74% 219 48%
Blank 2335 14% 97 21%
LIHTC Database Analysis - 1987 to 2012
United States Florida





The survey ranked thirteen funding programs used for development during 
disaster recovery (Figure 5-5).  Respondents were also asked to consider the importance 
of incentives given to develop in an impact zone, which is an area directly hit by a 
hurricane.  Impact zones often withstand the greatest degree of physical damage.  The 
HWG report grouped counties that were in the impact zone of one or more hurricanes in 
the Tier I group.   
 Supplemental LIHTC was most preferred program for development in an impact 
zone.  Supplemental LIHTC ranked 6.2 on a scale of 1 to 7 with a standard deviation of 
0.88, indicating the program was the most significant for mitigated risk among 
respondents.   The HOME program is often used in conjunction with LIHTC and has 
many of the same restrictions.  HOME funds were the second most important funding 
source according the respondents.  Loan programs of all types were predictably less 
attractive.  Federal disaster loans outranked traditional financing, likely because of 
traditionally lower interest rates for this type of funding.  Grants were the next category 
of funding preferences with Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) 
outweighing Federal Disaster Grants.  Mitigation Grants were the least preferred in the 
Grant category.  Other funding options that were not included in funding options were 
contributed by one or more respondents.  These included state housing trust funds, 
forgivable debt, and Project Based Section 8 Rental Assistance, a voucher program that 





  Figure 5-5: LIHTC Preferred Funding Preferences 
 
Respondents were also asked to rank programs from 0 to 10 that are critical for 
participation in the LIHTC program during disaster recovery with 0 being not critical, 
indicating that the program does not mitigate developer risk.  A score of ten indicates that 
the program is critical for addressing risk when development decisions are made.  As in 
the previous question, Supplemental LIHTC was the most favored response with a mean 
score of 7.63 (Figure 5-6).  This was followed by HOME funds and Federal Disaster 
Grants.  Funding sources that added debt fell below the median indicating a high risk.  
State Housing Trust Funds and Project Based Section 8 Rental Assistance were included 





Figure 5-6:  Identifying LIHTC Subsidy Risks 
 
Location Preferences 
 Respondents were asked to rank preferences specifically in terms of location.  
This section also asked respondents to rank non-financial incentives that influenced 
development decision-making.  Respondents were given twelve potential location 
characteristics or potential hazards related to a site.  Responses were ranked on a sliding 
scale with 0 being the most preferred, meaning less risk, to 10 being the least preferred, 
or the greatest risk (Figure 5-7).  The least preferred site, ranking below 3.6, had some 
 
154 
potential for storm surge damage during a hurricane.  The most preferred site with the 
least risk was located more than 25 miles from the coast.   
 
 
Figure 5-7: Location Risks 
 
Respondents were also asked to rank political and social influences on 
development decisions.  These influences are considered externalities over which LIHTC 
producers have no control.  Respondents stated a willingness to participate in 
development if land costs were lower and if support from advocacy groups were 
favorable for a specific community.  Higher land costs and more regulations would have 
a negative influence on a willingness to participate more than lack of local support.  High 
insurance costs were as risky to development activity as rising construction costs and 
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higher land costs.  These three factors could negatively affect profitability.  Other than 
Supplemental Tax Credits and favorable financing, the most significant factors reducing 
risk for LIHTC development during disaster recovery were found in six areas:  disaster 
relief programs, lower land costs, advocacy in favor, lower insurance costs, more 
incentives to build in coastal areas, and flexible regulations (Figure 5-8).  Incentives to 
build in coastal areas could arguably increase risk without attention to site location during 
the pre-development phase.  The most significant barriers for development after 
unfavorable financing were high costs for insurance, construction, and land as well as 
regulations and public sentiment against an affordable housing project.    
 





Funding preferences and location preferences were further analyzed using 
statistical analysis.  As stated earlier, an impact zone is an area that withstands the 
greatest degree of physical damage, and in the case of coastal hurricanes, is most likely to 
be in a coastal county.   The statistical analysis conducted for this study did not indicate 
causality, but there was correlation between some variables.  
Phase I revealed that the public agency, or housing authorities, had a preference 
for coastal areas subject to hurricane impact or to areas directly hit by one or more of four 
hurricanes in 2004.   Descriptive statistical analysis revealed that Supplemental LIHTC 
was the most preferred funding program when compared to the mean of all other 
programs.  The initial phase of statistical analysis looked at the mean between two 
groups, the for-profit developer and the non-profit developer.  The mean of combined 
for-profit and non-profit developers was 6.19 on a scale of 1 to 7.   Federal Disaster 
Grants, HOME and CDBG programs were the next highest ranking programs with mean 
scores of 5.06, 5.06, and 5.10 respectively.  On the surface, the results suggest that 
Supplemental LIHTC is preferred over all other funding sources used in conjunction with 
LIHTC.   
Location risk between the combined for-profit and non-profit groups indicated a 
preference for site locations greater than 10 miles from the coast.  A mean score of 7.6 
among respondents show a greater preference for sites more than 25 miles from the coast.  
Respondents had a mean score of 7.3 for sites not within a storm surge boundary.  A site 
not in a coastal county had a mean score of 7.0.  In contrast, the least preferred sites, with 
 
157 
mean score of between 3.3 and 3.6, included sites with some potential for storm surge, 
sites within storm surge boundaries, and sites adjacent to previously flooded sites.  
Two Independent Samples T-Test   
 To assess the difference between preferences of for-profit and non-profit LIHTC 
developers, an independent two-tailed t-test was conducted using the company structure 
(non-profit and for-profit) as the independent variables and the funding programs as 
dependent variables.  A test for homogeneity of variances between the two groups was 
conducted for each funding source.  The hypothesis assumes that variances are not 
significantly different regardless of business structure (for-profit vs. non-profit).  Using 
the probability level of .05, if the Sig value for Levene’s test is < .05, the conclusion is 
that the variances were significantly different and the t-test is invalid.  If Levene’s was > 
.05, variances are not significantly different and the t-test is valid.  Levene’s test for 
equality was not violated for any of the variables with one exception.  HOME funding 
had a significance of 0.044 (See Table 5-6).   The differences between the mean for the 




Table 5-6:  T-test of Means by Group for Funding Preferences 






(n = 21) 
Non-Profit 
(n = 10) 
  Variable                                           M SD M SD t(29) Two-tailed 
Adj. (Sig) 
CDBG 5.00    2.000 5.30 1.252 .433 < .668 
HOME 4.81 2.064 5.60 1.075 1.401 < .172 
Suppl LIHTC 6.38 0.805 5.60 1.075 -2.041 < .031* 
Disaster Bonds 4.67 1.798 3.67 1.581 -1.443 < .160 
Mitigation Grants 5.24 1.814 4.50 1.581 -1.101 < .280 
Federal Disaster Loans 4.86 1.711 4.80 1.317 -.093 < .927 
SBA Loans 3.10 1.921 3.40 1.265 .455 < .653 
Traditional Financing 4.62 1.431 4.00 1.155 -1.192 < .243 
Physical Disaster Business Loan 
3.81 1.662 3.22 1.481 -.914 <.368 
Federal Disaster Grant 5.05 1.830 5.10 1.729 .076 <.940 
Private Insurance 4.71 1.707 4.50 1.841 -.319 <.752 
Road Home Small Rental 2.76 1.947 3.70 1.829 1.278 <.212 
New Market Tax Credits 3.52 1.940 4.40 1.713 1.218 <.233 
Note. n = sample size within group.  
 
 
This test was repeated to assess the difference between for-profit and non-profit 
LIHTC developers for location preferences.  Levene’s test for equality was not violated 
for any of the variables indicating no statistical difference in the variances between the 
two groups (Table 5-7). 
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Table 5-7: T-test of Means by Group for Location Preferences 
Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Group 
Variable                                          M SD M t (24)
Two-tailed 
Adj. (Sig)
In a coastal county 4.93 1.87 2.67 0.214 < .833
Not in a coastal county 7.17 2.27 3.07 -0.377 < .710
Within a storm surge boundary 3.43 2.85 3.19 0.281 < .781
Not within a storm surge boundary 7.53 1.87 3.23 -0.644 < .526
Site is subject to flooding 4.82 2.60 2.55 -0.968 < .343










(n  = 16)
Non-Profit




 Pearson’s Correlation was calculated to determine if there was a linear 
relationship between the thirteen funding variables.  P-values < .05 indicate some kind of 
relationship between programs.  Some correlation exists between both loan and grant 
programs associated with disaster with significance at the .01 level and the .05 level, 
indicating some relationship between funding types.  According to Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007), the correlation matrix should be examined for correlation coefficients greater than 
0.30.  There were 27 pairs of variables with correlations between .30 and .763 indicating 




Table 5-8: Correlation Coefficient between Funding Subsidies 

























Pearson Correlation 0.193 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.297
N 31 31
Pearson Correlation 0.384 0.262 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.033 0.154
N 31 31 31
Pearson Correlation -0.351 0.139 -0.120 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.057 0.463 0.529
N 30 30 30 30
Pearson Correlation -0.214 0.323 -0.08 0.645** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 247 0.076 0.671 0.000
N 31 31 31 30 31
Pearson Correlation -0.352 0.387 * -0.074 0.668** 0.763** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.052 0.031 0.691 0.000 0.000
N 31 31 31 30 31 31
Pearson Correlation -0.104 0.198 -0.157 0.392* 0.166 0.357 * 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.576 0.287 0.398 0.032 0.372 0.049
N 31 31 31 30 31 31 31
Pearson Correlation 0.203 -0.199 0.187 -0.006 -0.042 -0.170 0.249 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.273 0.283 0.313 0.976 0.823 0.361 0.177
N 31 31 31 30 31 31 31 31
Pearson Correlation -0.257 0.240 -0.207 0.545** 0.470** 0.552** 0.718** 0.270 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.17 0.202 0.272 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.000 0.148
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Pearson Correlation -0.076 0.360 -0.005 0.529** 0.581** 0.723** .357 * -0.136 0.543** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.683 0.047 0.978 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.049 0.465 0.002
N 31 31 31 30 31 31 31 31 30 31
Pearson Correlation 0.208 -0.056 0.332 -0.083 -0.166 -0.083 0.260 0.293 0.066 -0.058 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.263 0.764 0.068 0.663 0.373 0.656 0.158 0.110 0.728 0.757
N 31 31 31 30 31 31 31 31 30 31 31
Pearson Correlation -0.089 0.16 -0.383 * 0.448* 0.118 0.421 * 0.748** 0.230 0.679** .389 * 0.207 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.633 0.391 0.033 0.013 0.526 0.018 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.031 0.263
N 31 31 31 30 31 31 31 31 30 31 31 31
Pearson Correlation 0.065 0.246 -0.281 0.321 0.151 0.382 * 0.710** 0.175 0.653** 0.513** 0.081 0.671** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.727 0.183 0.126 0.083 0.417 0.034 0.000 0.345 0.000 0.003 0.666 0.000
N 31 31 31 30 31 31 31 31 30 31 31 31 31
* Correlation is signficant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)






















Correlations are significant at the 0.01 level between the various disaster programs.  As 
preferences for Disaster Bonds increases, preferences for Federal Disaster Grants, 
Physical Disaster Loans, and Mitigation Grants increases. Supplemental LIHTC is 
significant at the .05 level with Community Development Block Grants (CDBG).  
Developers who prefer CDBG also preferred Supplemental LIHTC.  CDBG is often used 
in conjunction with LIHTC.  Developers often use multiple subsidies to fund LIHTC 
development.  During disaster recovery, developers will combine available disaster 
related programs to fund new development or to rehabilitate damaged units. 
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Pearson’s Correlation was also calculated to determine if there was a linear 
relationship between six location preferences.  P-values < .05 indicate some kind of 
relationship between programs.  The results indicate that correlation exists between 
locations with significance at the .01 level.    There were 11 pairs of variables with 
correlations between .545 and .714 indicating a high correlation between location 
variables (Table 5-9).   There was a significant positive correlation (.703) between a site 
located in a coastal county and a site located in a non-coastal county.  These opposing 
variables would be expected to have a negative correlation, meaning when preferences 
for coastal counties increases, preferences for non-coastal counties decrease.  However 
this was not the case.  The results suggest that sites in coastal counties positively correlate 
with sites in non-coastal counties.  One explanation could be that the wording of 
statement choices could have resulted in confusion among the respondents.  The question 
intentionally had elements of contrast that could have created confusion in the 
interpretation of results.  For instance, a response choice stating a preferred site would be 
in a storm surge boundary was followed by a response choice stating a preferred site was 
not in a storm surge boundary.  Predictably, flooding and damages from storm surge were 
not significantly correlated with sites not located within storm surge boundaries.   
The findings do suggest that location in coastal counties and inland counties is 
highly correlated with the perception of risk associated with storm surge and flooding 
hazards as opposed to strictly being in a coastal county or not highlighting an awareness 
of risk associated with proximity to flooding and storm surge events, particularly when 
adjacent sites have experienced damages from these hazards.  High positive correlations 
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between sites within a storm surge boundary, flooding or with potential for storm surge 
damages reflect the risk of proximity to previous flooding or storm surge events.  
  






Not in a 
Coastal 
County
In a Storm 
Surge 
Boundary













Pearson Correlation .703** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 22 26
Pearson Correlation .706** 0.42 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.052
N 21 22 22
Pearson Correlation .601** .639** 0.098 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 0.001 0.673
N 21 24 21 25
Pearson Correlation .707** .668** .611** 0.339 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.098
N 21 24 21 25 25
Pearson Correlation .714** .545** .667* 0.380 .583** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0.006 0.001 0.067 0.003
N 21 24 21 24 24 24
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
In a Coastal 
County
Not in a 
Coastal 
County
In a Storm 
Surge 
Boundary










Respondents were also asked to what degree a series of hypothetical situations would 
inhibit their willingness to participate in disaster recovery.  Pearson’s Correlation was 
calculated to determine linear correlations between these statements resulting in a high 
correlation of 30 pairs of variables with significance at the .01 level (Table 5-10).  
Additional incentives had a high correlation with disaster recovery programs and higher 
construction costs associated with redevelopment.  Developers facing new or 
reconstruction during recovery efforts would likely seek out additional subsidies 
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available for participation in an effort to reduce financing costs.  The impact of public 
sentiment against a LIHTC development is highly correlated unfavorable financing, 
stricter regulations, and high insurance costs suggesting these higher costs coupled with 
negative public sentiment could impact development decisions.  Correlations are not an 
indication of causality, but could suggest some of the relationships that have the greatest 
impact on development decisions during disaster recovery8.   
 
                                                 
 
8 Cross tabulations is another way of analyzing relationships between two or more variables.  The pilot 
study analyzed a survey among real estate students and LIHTC stakeholders using this method.  Crosstabs 
developed during the pilot were analyzed at the county level in relation to storm surge and flood zone.  
The final survey was more comprehensive and asked respondents as series of questions relating to 
preferences for subsidies and development decision-making.  Cross tabulations were extracted with data 
that included funding and location variables on either a 7-point Likert scale or a 10-point sliding scale.  For 
each data set the expected cell count was <5 signaling that the statistic was not valid.  For instance, 
crosstabs on funding preferences and location by company type (for-profit/non-profit) resulted in 18 cells 
that had expected counts that are <5 indicating no relationship between non-profit and for-profit groups. 
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Table 5-10: Correlation Coefficient for Development Participation 
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Pearson Correlation .520** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.006
N 26 26
Pearson Correlation .532** .543** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.006 0.005
N 25 25 25
Pearson Correlation .510** .417* .559** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.009 0.038 0.004
N 25 25 25 25
Pearson Correlation 0.225 .593** .466* 0.310 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.269 0.001 0.019 0.131
N 26 26 25 25 26
Pearson Correlation .521** .435* .471* .623** .607** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.008 0.03 0.018 0.001 0.001
N 25 25 25 25 25 25
Pearson Correlation 0.146 0.256 0.222 0.246 0.337 0.123 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.487 0.216 0.296 0.247 0.100 0.568
N 25 25 24 24 25 24 25
Pearson Correlation .432* 0.291 .440* 0.244 0.335 0.388 .643** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.028 0.149 0.028 0.239 0.094 0.056 0.001
N 26 26 25 25 26 25 25 26
Pearson Correlation 0.159 0.131 0.315 0.288 0.209 0.129 .876** .673** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.437 0.525 0.125 0.162 0.306 0.538 0.000 0.000
N 26 26 25 25 26 25 25 26 26
Pearson Correlation 0.151 .482* 0.372 0.15 .500** 0.299 .631** .503** .525** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.461 0.013 0.067 0.475 0.009 0.147 0.001 0.009 0.006
N 26 26 25 25 26 25 25 26 26 26
Pearson Correlation -0.144 0.374 0.170 -0.181 .560** 0.076 .538** 0.285 0.263 .769** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.483 0.060 0.416 0.386 0.003 0.717 0.006 0.159 0.195 0.000
N 26 26 25 25 26 25 25 26 26 26 26
Pearson Correlation -0.017 0.25 0.197 -0.040 .603** 0.235 0.243 .402* 0.292 .496** .577** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.936 0.229 0.356 0.853 0.001 0.269 0.253 0.046 0.157 0.012 0.003
N 25 25 24 24 25 24 24 25 25 25 25 25
Pearson Correlation 0.160 0.114 0.224 0.388 0.154 0.014 0.338 .412* .427** 0.121 -0.055 0.238 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.435 0.58 0.281 0.056 0.453 0.946 0.098 0.036 0.03 0.555 0.789 0.253
N 26 26 25 25 26 25 25 26 26 26 26 25 26
Pearson Correlation 0.060 .498** 0.339 0.352 0.388 0.052 .426* 0.260 0.223 .522** .415* 0.161 .498** 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.769 0.010 0.098 0.085 0.050 0.806 0.034 0.200 0.274 0.006 0.035 0.441 0.010
N 26 26 25 25 26 25 25 26 26 26 26 25 26 26
Pearson Correlation .577* .731** 0.357 0.291 .433* .497* 0.301 0.286 0.167 .493* 0.333 0.311 -0.136 0.200 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.002 0.000 0.080 0.158 0.027 0.012 0.144 0.156 0.414 0.011 0.097 0.130 0.508 0.328
N 26 26 25 25 26 25 25 26 26 26 26 25 26 26 26
Pearson Correlation -0.272 0.276 0.06 0.133 .625** 0.153 0.16 -0.004 -0.007 .401* .552** .456* 0.04 .475* 0.234 1
Sig (2-tailed) 0.180 0.172 0.776 0.526 0.001 0.464 0.446 0.986 0.971 0.042 0.003 0.022 0.845 0.014 0.250  
N 26 26 25 25 26 25 25 26 26 26 26 25 26 26 26 26
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Additional 
incentives are 
available to build 
in coastal counties
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Views from the Experts 
 Respondents were given an open-ended question that asked why a lack of 
sufficient units of affordable housing remained a problem after disaster recovery.  The 
question was answered by 23 respondents with responses following eight common 
themes (Table 5-6).  Major themes included: funding, public sentiment, policy, time, 
location, risk, tenant barriers, and costs.  Each of these categories are explored in greater 
detail to enhance meaning from the results overall. 
Funding 
The most common theme among respondents underscored the need for additional funding 
for affordable multifamily housing production.  Specific references were made to low 
insurance payouts or difficulty working with insurance companies.  Six were for 
additional funding.  Specific solutions included grants and forgivable loans.  One 
respondent added: 
 “most existing LIHTC properties have an equity partner and mortgage, 
both of which are very inflexible when it comes to putting additional debt 
on their colateral (sic) and the rental income restrictions usually won't 
support additional debt anyway.”   
Another respondent recognized how market dynamics affect costs during disaster 
recovery stating:  
“In a disaster recovery, the ability to rebuild affordable housing is solely 
related to the subsidies provided. Since construction costs are usually 
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escalated during a disaster recovery, there is need for even more subsidy 
than required in a "normal" market.”   
Policy 
Respondents were concerned with the impact of policies on the ability to produce 
adequate numbers of affordable housing during disaster recovery.  Comments suggested 
that policies should not encourage development in coastal areas. 
“Encouraging people to live in disaster-prone areas is not good policy. 
Encouraging people (all people, not just low income people) to move 
elsewhere is probably a positive, not a negative.”   
Another respondent faulted policies that encourage mixed income developments saying: 
 “Primarily due to the new trend where pure public and or affordable 
housing is not attractive and can not (sic) be easily financed. The trend is 
for mixed income communities which drastically reduce the number of 
pure public; and/or low to moderate income housing.”   
Others criticized government overreach, the breakdown in the functioning of government, 
and a lack of understanding of the LITHC program by government officials.   
Public sentiment 
Respondents suggested that lack of empathy from government and wealthy citizens, who 
are better connected to the leadership, are a factor in the unwillingness to provide 
sufficient resources for affordable housing production.   
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“Government and wealthy families and corporations do not care about 
low income families and are unwilling to provide the support services 
needed to help families become self sufficient (sic).” 
Others added that public sentiment leans toward personal responsibility and those that 
live on the coast are at fault because they choose to live in risky areas.  One respondent 
commented:  
“This is due in part to public sentiment that people who live in areas 
prone to damage from natural disasters are partly responsible for their lot 
because they "chose" to live in a disaster-prone area. This notion, which 
is false when it comes to affordable housing as choice is limited and 
families must choose from what is available and typically have to wait 
quite a while before a unit - any unit - of affordable housing becomes 
available. Nevertheless, the public sentiment impacts legislators' and local 
governmental officials' willingness to put the amount of resources needed 
to fully address the recovery needs.” 
Location 
Comments about location were either mentioned directly or in the context of other 
themes.  One respondent pointed out that those who need affordable housing cannot wait 
for restoration and recovery and will follow jobs by necessity, while another suggested 
that units that are available for the dislocated are not in areas that have accessibility to 
jobs and services.   
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“If dislocation leads low income households to quality housing in a safer 
location not a large distance from the original location, disaster recovery 
can help people move to safer affordable housing.” 
Still another respondent suggested that people should move to safer areas.  Another 
pointed out the desirability of coastal areas to high income earners and the high land costs 
associated with coastal development.   
Time and Barriers to Occupancy 
Developers were concerned with lag time between insurance settlements and the ability 
to reconstruct damaged properties.  Another said that redevelopment takes time, 
reiterating the interconnectedness of many of the other themes.  Still another noted that 
affordable housing is not available in the market while another said that the poorest could 
not wait.  Tenant barriers to occupancy include long waiting lists, unaffordable rents, and 
not enough units being built. 
“The additional resources contributed by federal, state and local 
government seldom outweigh the problems created by difficulties with 
insurance, both existing and new, changes to building/zoning codes, and 
simply the time involved in the redevelopment process - gaining local 
government approvals, assembling financing packages, obtaining 
community support, relocating residents, etc.” 
Development Costs and Risk 
Some respondents explicitly identified risk as a problem impacting affordable housing 
redevelopment stating:  
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“Not enough incentives to attract a development company to be willing to 
take the risk of another disaster or not a cap on potential losses.” 
Another suggested risk avoidance stating the problem is associated with the 
“unwillingness of investors to take greater risks in disaster recovery areas.” 
 Specific costs perpetuating the problem of insufficient numbers of 
affordable housing after disaster included high insurance costs, higher operating 
costs, less profitability, and higher labor and construction costs.  
 The results from Phase II clearly show that LIHTC developers are aware of the 
risks associated with coastal locations, particularly in storm surge areas.  LIHTC 
developers receive subsidies in the form of tax credits and other funding sources such as 
CDBG, HOME funds, and tax bonds among others.  The opportunity to reduce debt with 
these resources and Supplemental LIHTC appealed to the respondents, particularly when 
coastal development was factored in.  The idea that additional subsidies were essential for 
development along the coast is questionable at best because higher land costs and risk 
could feasibly be offset by higher rent and property value.  It seems counterintuitive that 
if risk is associated with coastal areas, as repeatedly stated by respondents answering the 
open-ended question, then additional subsidies should be targeted for risk avoidance.
 
170 
According to recent studies (Greene, 1992; Comerio et al., 1994; Finch et al., 2010) low-income households face dislocation 
because there are not enough low-income housing units constructed during disaster recovery. Why do you think this is a 
problem? 
Table 5-11: Common Themes 
FUNDING PUBLIC SENTIMENT POLICY TIME LOCATION RISK TENANT BARRIERS COSTS
Additional funding needed
Personal responsibility-should not 
live on coast
Should not encourage people to live 
in disaster prone areas
None available in the market
People should move to safer 
areas




Trends for mixed income 
development reduce availability
Takes time to redevelop People go to the jobs Risk of another disaster Unaffordable rents Higher operating costs
Additional funding to cover 
increased costs
Should not live on coast Regulatory difficulties Poorest cannot wait
Available units not accessible 
to jobs and services
Risk avoidance




Should not live in disaster prone 
areas
Breakdown of Government function
Lag time between settlement 
of insurance claims and 
reconstruction
Coastal areas desirable to high 
income earners
High labor
Insurance payouts to low
Government does not care about 
the poor
Government overreach




Inflexible mortgages reduce 
ability to add debt
Wealthy do no care about the poor
Not enough affordable housing 
being built
Additional subsidies needed NIMBY Program restrictions on tenant mix
Grants 
Lack of program understanding by 
government
Forgivable Loans Building code regulations 
Insufficient resources






Building codes increase 
costs
High insurance costs  
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PHASE III:  PREFERENCES REVEALED WITH GIS  
 Descriptive statistics were used to determine the number of LIHTC located in the 
boundaries of storm surge.  Storm surge is an abnormal rise of water generated by a 
storm with the potential to cause extreme flooding, property damage, and death.  Storm 
surge from Hurricane Katrina reached 27.8 feet at Pass Christian, exceeding the previous 
record set by Hurricane Camille (Fritz et al., 2008).   Peak surge often coincides with the 
landfall of a hurricane but can also occur before or after.  In 2005, a post-runner storm 
surge occurred after Hurricane Wilma struck the southwest coast of Florida.  Three years 
later, the landfall of Hurricane Ike was preceded by a forerunner surge in the 24 hours 
before the hurricane stuck the Texas coast (Kennedy et al., 2011).   
 Others have used GIS technology to analyze the storm surge risk of housing in 
Florida.  Since 2011, Core-Logic has completed an annual storm surge analysis of single-
family homes exposed to storm surge risk.  Researchers used the Sea, Lake and Overland 
Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) model from the National Weather Service (NWS) and 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to analyze single family 
homes on the U.S. coast.  The SLOSH model was run using the Maximum of the 
Maximum of High Water (MOM) data in the storm surge model.  According to the most 
recent findings, more than 6.5 million single-family homes with a reconstruction value of 
nearly $1.5 trillion are at risk of damage from storm surge in coastal communities (Botts 
et al., 2014).  The study identified Texas and Florida as the states with the greatest risk of 
damages due to storm surge.  Florida ranks number one for the number of homes at risk 
of storm surge with the potential for 2.5 million homes in harm’s way.  Botts and 
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colleagues estimated reconstruction costs for the state at more than $490 billion.  A 
Category 5 hurricane, considered an extreme storm and less likely to occur, was 
estimated to cause more than $70 billion in damages to single-family homes in the State 
of Florida alone.  Six of the top 15 metropolitan areas at greatest risk of damages from 
storm surge are located in in the state.  Miami, Florida has 562,410 single family homes 
potentially at storm surge risk for any category of hurricane representing a reconstruction 
value of $103 billion.   
 This study used the SLOSH model to identify the number of LIHTC located in the 
bounds of storm surge from two categories of hurricanes, Category 3 at mean tide (C3M) 
for an average risk and Category 5 at high tide (C5H) as a worst case scenario.  Since 
1987, Florida has produced 148,287 LIHTC units in 1,035 developments (Figure 5-9).  In 
Phase III of this study, geographic information systems (GIS) was used to analyze the 
number of LIHTC located in storm surge, and specifically how LIHTC development was 
dispersed as a result of the 2004 hurricane season.  Identifying LIHTC placed in service 
during the study period revealed location preferences of developers given the influence of 
public policy.  Phase I analyzed QAPs to determine stated preferences for LIHTC 
development by the FHFC acting as the public agency.  The public agency clearly 
preferred development in coastal counties.  Phase II analyzed the stated preferences of the 
LIHTC development community.  The results indicated that 1) low cost funding was 
critical for LIHTC development, and 2) developers stated a preference for locations in 
areas with less risk from the effects of hurricanes.  The LIHTC database provides very 
little funding data so determining the significance of funding resources for this phase 
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proved impractical.  Limited funding data was analyzed and discussed but additional data 
sources are needed for analysis of risk and preference.  This final phase of the study 
allowed comparisons to be made between stated preferences and revealed preferences for 
location.  Phase III analyzed LIHTC development between 2004 and 2010.  
 
 





 In 2003, LIHTC produced 60 affordable housing developments with 13,088 units 
in Florida.  Seventy seven percent of them were located in coastal counties.  In 2004, 
another 60 developments resulted in 11,199 units.  In both cases, the majority of units 
were constructed in coastal communities.  The 2003 and 2004 LIHTC served as the 
baseline of comparison for Phase III of this study.    
Coastal LIHTC Development 2004-2010 
 Since 2003, construction of Florida LIHTC has declined.  Intervening forces 
include the 2004 hurricane season followed by the Great Recession that disrupted the 
financial markets between 2007 and 2009.  The influence of these two events on LIHTC 
development has not been analyzed.  This study is more concerned with the percentage of 
LIHTC constructed in hazardous areas.  Phase III reveals if perceived location risk 
influences where LIHTC development actually occurs during recovery.  Between 2004 
and 2010, a total of 44,658 LIHTC units were produced in Florida (Table 5-7).  Seventy-
four percent were located in coastal counties.  Figure 5-10 shows where LIHTC 
developments were produced during the study period.  The greatest number of LIHTC 
units was placed in service in 2004 and 2005, averaging just over 7,200 units each year.  
On average, 3,000 units per year were placed in service in coastal counties between 2006 




Table 5-12:  Coastal and Non-Coastal LIHTC 2004-2010 
Baseline
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
60 60 47 36 35 59 52 25 314
13088 11199 8677 5380 4842 5765 5534 3261 44658
15 21 9 16 11 21 9 5 92
2959 3958 1466 2177 1002 1604 956 500 11663
45 39 38 20 24 38 43 20 222
10129 7241 7211 3203 3840 4161 4578 2761 32995
75% 65% 81% 56% 69% 64% 83% 80% 71%
77% 65% 83% 60% 79% 72% 83% 85% 74%
% Developments in Coastal Counties
% Units in Coastal Counties
Total LIHTC Units Placed in Service 2004 - 2010
LIHTC Units Placed in Service 2004 - 2010 in Non-Coastal Counties
LIHTC Developments Placed in Service 2004 - 2010 in Coastal Counties
LIHTC Units Placed in Service 2004 - 2010 in Coastal Counties
LIHTC Developments Placed in Service 2004 - 2010 in Non-Coastal Counties
TOTAL







Figure 5-10:  LIHTC Developments PIS 2004-2010 
 
 In Phase II, developers stated a preference to develop LIHTC away from the coast 
and hazards associated with storm surge.  Coastal population in the U.S. has outpaced 
inland population growth with the expectation that growth will continue for the 
foreseeable future (Crowell et al, 2010).  The hazards of coastal development are 
documented in Chapter 1, and Phase II reiterated an understanding of the potential 
hazards to LIHTC.  The discussion of Phase III results begins with an analysis of the total 
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number of LIHTC in each coastal county compared to the numbers of LIHTC to a C3M 
and C5H storm surge on the Florida coast.   
Florida UTM Zones 
 The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) projection is a two dimensional 
division of earth’s surface into sixty zones.  The United States is divided into zones ten 
through nineteen. Florida is predominantly located in Zone 17 with fifteen of its sixty-
seven counties located in Zone 16 (Figure 5-11). 
 




There were 936 LIHTC developments located in UTM Zone 16 with 132,968 units.  
Eight of these developments were located in storm surge boundaries impacting four 
counties.  Four developments were placed in service between 1987 and 1993, and two 
were placed in service in 2004.  The remaining two developments were placed in service 
in 2007 and 2011.  A total of 805 units placed in service between 1987 and 2011 are 
located in the boundaries of a C5H storm surge.  The minimum storm surge is 12.8 feet to 
a maximum of more than 19 feet.  These eight developments have been incorporated into 
the overall discussion of findings within UTM Zone 17.  
C3M - Category 3 Mean Tide 
 The greatest percentage of potential losses due to a CM3 storm surge includes 
four counties recommended for housing production by HWG: Monroe, Charlotte, Collier, 
and Lee (Table 5-8).  Charlotte was a Tier I county included in the 2005 and 2006 QAPs.  
Charlotte County has 1,481 LIHTC units and potentially faces the loss of 94% of LIHTC 
housing in the county.  Lee County has even more units located in a storm surge area.  
While only 74% of Lee County LIHTC is located in storm surge, this equates to 2,586 
potentially damaged units.  Collier and Monroe counties are Tier IV counties.  Monroe 
County has the least number of total units but 98% of the total stock could be potentially 
damaged from a CM3 storm surge.   
 The top five counties with the greatest number of LIHTC units in a C3M storm 
surge area includes four counties preferred in the HWG report and one or both 2005 and 
2006 QAPs.  Miami-Dade is most at risk with 8,137 units located in a C3M storm surge 
boundary.  Collier County followed with 3,532 units at risk.  Hillsborough and Lee 
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Counties have just over 2,500 LIHTC units in each county subject to damages from a 
C3M storm surge.  Charlotte County is at risk for fewer units, but the 1,399 units at risk 
are 94% of the total LIHTC stock in the county (Figure 5-13).     
A 2014 market update for LIHTC properties suggested that the value of a single 
LIHTC unit in the Southeast averaged $41,000 per unit (Tax Credit Group, 2014).  In 
2013, this same reporting agency analyzed the sales of 48 LIHTC properties in the 
Southeast with a median sales price of $34,700 per unit.  Based on this limited analysis, 
the average of the reported per unit values, or $37,850, was used to conservatively 
estimate the potential losses from each storm category.  A future study could result in a 
more reliable per unit value for a better estimate of potential damages.  For this study, the 
average value of $37,850 is sufficient to demonstrate risk.  
 The total value of all Florida LIHTC located within a Category 3 storm surge area 
is $988 million.  Miami-Dade accounts for over 30% of total damages potentially costing 
the county and industry more than $307 million (Figure 5-14).  Three counties 
represented in HWG tiers and the 2005/2006 QAPs have no units at risk in a C3M storm 
surge.  These counties are Brevard, Escambia, and Santa Rosa.  Combined, these three 














Table 5-13: Estimated Damages to LIHTC in C3M Storm Surge 
FIPS State/County Min Max
# of LIHTC 
Develop
ments
# of LIHTC 
Units in SS




12 Florida 5.2 23.3 191 26,111 143,409 18% 988,301,350$                 
86 Miami-Dade 5.2 12.8 57 8137 23048 35% 307,985,450$                 
21 Collier 15.8 17.4 19 3532 4059 87% 133,686,200$                 
57 Hillsborough 12.2 19.3 20 2591 12456 21% 98,069,350$                   
71 Lee 17.7 20.4 15 2586 3472 74% 97,880,100$                   
15 Charlotte 8.9 20.4 7 1399 1481 94% 52,952,150$                   
103 Pinellas 9.4 17.1 11 1373 2890 48% 51,968,050$                   
31 Duval 7.5 12.2 7 1298 9677 13% 49,129,300$                   
11 Broward 5.2 6.3 7 971 9370 10% 36,752,350$                   
127 Volusia 7 11.8 7 940 4036 23% 35,579,000$                   
87 Monroe 5.4 9.7 10 612 625 98% 23,164,200$                   
115 Sarasota 12.4 17.9 7 424 1069 40% 16,048,400$                   
99 Palm Beach 6.8 6.8 5 319 8388 4% 12,074,150$                   
61 Indian River 6.7 12.1 2 303 2366 13% 11,468,550$                   
101 Pasco 17.2 19.5 2 296 1429 21% 11,203,600$                   
89 Nassau 11.8 14.2 2 189 537 35% 7,153,650$                      
111 St. Lucie 5.2 5.2 1 182 2264 8% 6,888,700$                      
81 Manatee 10.6 10.6 1 176 2332 8% 6,661,600$                      
17 Citrus 18.2 23.3 3 170 458 37% 6,434,500$                      
5 Bay 7.9 7.9 1 160 1142 14% 6,056,000$                      
53 Hernando 20.1 20.1 1 128 878 15% 4,844,800$                      
35 Flagler 13.5 13.5 1 100 314 32% 3,785,000$                      
109 St. Johns 13.8 13.8 1 88 989 9% 3,330,800$                      
37 Franklin 15.9 18.2 2 55 85 65% 2,081,750$                      
19 Clay 5.7 5.7 1 53 877 6% 2,006,050$                      
75 Levy 21.7 21.7 1 32 221 14% 1,211,200$                      
9 Brevard 2882 0% -$                                  
33 Escambia 1410 0% -$                                  
91 Okalossa 460 0% -$                                  
113 Santa Rosa 212 0% -$                                  
45 Gulf 111 0% -$                                  
129 Wakulla 34 0% -$                                  



















C5H - Category 5 High Tide 
 A worst case scenario was applied to compare with an average Category 3 storm 
(Figure 5-15 and Figure 5-16).  Fifteen counties have the potential for damage to more 
than 50% of LIHTC housing stock in the event of a C5H storm.  Six of these counties 
were recommended for housing production by HWG.  The top five counties for 
percentage of losses are at risk of losing more than 94% or more of LIHTC stock.  
Charlotte, a Tier I county, and Wakulla counties could potentially see all LIHTC housing 
stock damaged or destroyed by a Category 5 storm.      
 The top five counties with the greatest number of LIHTC units in a C5H storm 
surge area includes three counties preferred in the HWG report in one or both 2005 and 
2006 QAPs (Table 5-9).  Nearly half of LIHTC in Miami-Dade is at risk with 12,833 
units located in a C5H storm surge boundary.  Broward County could potentially face 
damages to 83% of its LIHTC stock with 9,370 units at risk.  Hillsborough, Collier and 
Duval counties have a combined 10,853 LIHTC units subject to damages from a C5H 
storm surge.  Collier County is at risk for 87% of LIHTC units located in the county and 
could see potential damages to more than 3,500 household units.  
 Based on the two year average value from the Tax Credit Group sales analysis of 
LHTC properties in the southeast, the same estimated value of $37,850 was applied to 
potential damages in the C5H analysis.  The total value of all Florida LIHTC located 
within a Category 5 storm surge area is $1.8 billion.  As in the C3M analysis, Miami-
Dade accounted for the highest potential damage costs exceeding $485 million.  Three 
counties represented in HWG tiers or the 2005/2006 QAPs have units at risk in a C5H 
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storm surge.  Miami-Dade and Broward represent two HWG tiers and have the highest 
potential damage costs (Figure 5-17).  Every coastal county analyzed faces some 
potential for damages from a Category 5 storm.  Wakulla County is among those with the 
least potential dollar value of damages.  Wakulla has one LIHTC development with 34 
units.  Even this small county faces damages to all of its LIHTC units at a potential cost 















Table 5-14: Estimated Damages to LIHTC in C5H Storm Surge 













12 Florida 4.2 37.9 343 48,014 143,409 33% 1,817,329,900$  
86 Miami-Dade 4.2 19.5 99 12,833 23048 56% 485,729,050$      
11 Broward 5.5 13.1 46 7784 9370 83% 294,624,400$      
57 Hillsborough 20.8 32.6 25 3875 12456 31% 146,668,750$      
21 Collier 23.6 28.5 19 3532 4059 87% 133,686,200$      
31 Duval 14.5 24.5 19 3445 9677 36% 130,393,250$      
71 Lee 26.3 34.8 18 3270 3472 94% 123,769,500$      
127 Volusia 17 25.5 12 2149 4036 53% 81,339,650$        
103 Pinellas 16.7 26.4 14 1995 2890 69% 75,510,750$        
81 Manatee 17.8 27.5 13 1789 2332 77% 67,713,650$        
15 Charlotte 14.5 32.1 8 1481 1481 100% 56,055,850$        
61 Indian River 15.5 20 6 1085 2366 46% 41,067,250$        
9 Brevard 20.7 24.7 6 913 2882 32% 34,557,050$        
115 Sarasota 14.7 31.9 12 880 1069 82% 33,308,000$        
101 Pasco 24.1 29 5 769 1429 54% 29,106,650$        
33 Escambia 19.3 19.7 2* 667 1410 47% 25,245,950$        
87 Monroe 9.7 14.4 10 612 625 98% 23,164,200$        
89 Nassau 22.4 23.3 5 320 537 60% 12,112,000$        
99 Palm Beach 12.2 12.2 5 319 8388 4% 12,074,150$        
53 Hernando 30.1 32.9 2 318 878 36% 12,036,300$        
5 Bay 12.8 13.5 3 307 1142 27% 11,619,950$        
19 Clay 14.6 15.6 2 211 877 24% 7,986,350$          
111 St. Lucie 8.2 8.9 2 182 2264 8% 6,888,700$          
17 Citrus 32.7 37.9 3 170 458 37% 6,434,500$          
35 Flagler 20.1 24.4 2 142 314 45% 5,374,700$          
109 St. Johns 24.1 24.2 2 100 989 10% 3,785,000$          
45 Gulf 14.9 15.2 3 88 111 79% 3,330,800$          
37 Franklin 22.4 31.5 2 55 85 65% 2,081,750$          
91 Okalossa 17.3* 17.3 1 50 460 11% 1,892,500$          
113 Santa Rosa 18.9 18.9 1 46 212 22% 1,741,100$          
129 Wakulla 31.1 35.2 1 34 34 100% 1,286,900$          
75 Levy 36.8 36.8 1 32 221 14% 1,211,200$          


















Figure 5-17: Value of LIHTC in Category 5 Storm Surge 
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LIHTC Coastal and Non-Coastal Development Trends 2004-2010 
 A trend line was applied to LIHTC units developed between 2004 and 2010 
(Figure 5-18).  Overall LIHTC development declined during the study period.  Coastal 
LIHTC outpaced units developed in inland counties.  Development in inland counties 
remained fairly steady while coastal development closely followed the overall 
development trend.  A significant decrease in LIHTC development occurred before the 
onset of the economic downturn in 2007.  This observation could have been influenced 
by broader economic trends that were not tested for this study, but could be considered in 
any future research.  The subsequent decline in housing markets affected LIHTC because 
tax credits are used to offset income from profits.  Investors saw steep declines in income 
and the decline in value of tax credits by 2008, having a negative impact on the amount 
of capital available for the program (Harig-Blaine, 2011).  Non-coastal county LIHTC 






    Figure 5-18: LIHTC Development Trends 2004-2010 
 
A trend line was then applied only to coastal LIHTC development from 2004 to 2010 
(Figure 5-19).  Since 2004, coastal LIHTC development has declined while the number 
of units at risk of a C5H storm surge has increased.  Units in a C3M storm surge showed 
a marked decrease between 2004 and 2006 remaining steady through 2010.  As coastal 
LIHTC development has declined, units in the most hazardous areas have increased.  
Since 2006, developments in C3M and C5H storm surges have remained relatively stable 
with a slight dip in C5H development since 2009.  As a percentage, LIHTC development 








A GIS Analysis of LIHTC Funding 
 An analysis of funding resources was completed using the statistical analysis 
features of GIS.  The HUD database indicated that LIHTC producers used tax exempt 
bonds more often than any other subsidy, over 31% of the time between 1987 and 2012.  
HOME funds were reportedly used 5% of the time and CDBG was used only one percent.  
These percentages have little to no significance because of underreporting in these 
database categories.  CDBG was not reported 81% of the time.  HOME funds were 
unreported 77% of the time.  More than $18 million in HOME funds were allocated for 
24 projects in 25 years of LIHTC.   
 Total allocations for both programs were analyzed.  In 2003, no allocations were 
reported, and only minimal reporting was given from 2004 to 2007.  The final three years 
of the study period had more extensive reporting of funding data and will be discussed.  
The total allocations for CDBG and HOME ranged from a high of nearly $63 million in 
2009 to a low of $29 million in 2010.  Coastal counties received the greatest share of 
these funds.  In 2008, 74% of CDBG and HOME funds were applied to coastal 
developments.  This percentage increased to 90% in 2009 and exceeded even that in 2010 
(Table 5-10).  These figures are inconclusive and provide nothing more than anecdotal 
observations however they do indicate some support for HOME and CDBG based on the 






Table 5-15: LIHTC Allocations 2003-2010 
Year 2003 
1 2004 2 2005 2 2006 2 2007 2 2008 2009 2010
Total CC
Developments 45 37 38 20 24 38 43 20
Total Allocation 0 1,116,080$        6,875,524$        30,165,146$        29,374,556$        53,938,578$        62,639,332$        29,648,708$        
Allocation in CC 0 1,116,080$        6,012,471$        17,079,080$        21,262,413$        39,650,149$        56,236,336$        27,676,258$        
% Difference 100% 87% 57% 72% 74% 90% 93%
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development LIHTC Database
Notes: 1 Allocations were not reported in 2003
2 Allocation inputs for 2004-2007 were incomplete  
The Human Factor 
The results of this study focus primarily on developer risks and decision-making 
related to LIHTC development during disaster recovery.  One cannot discount the human 
factor.  Residents in LIHTC subject to storm surge are subject to risk too.  According to 
the U.S. Census Bureau, household size in Florida averages 2.61 persons per unit.  The 
number of people displaced in the state from a Category 5 storm during high tide could 
affect more than 125,000 people.  Charlotte County could face the loss of every LIHTC 
unit due to storm surge, impacting 3,873 low- and working-class households in the 
county.  Large counties like Miami-Dade and Broward face large scale population 
displacement.  Working class households living in Miami-Dade County would be 
devastated with more than 20,000 potential displaced by a Category 3 storm and over 
30,000 could be displaced should a Category 5 storm hit the area.  A Category 3 
hurricane in Broward County should have minimal impact, affecting 2,500 households.  
If a Category 5 hurricane hits Broward, that number increases exponentially to over 
20,000.  Additional studies can identify the extent of human risk associated with select 





Miami-Dade had the greatest number of LIHTC located in the boundaries of a 
potential storm surge.  There are 23,048 LIHTC units within the county and 35% of them 
are located within a C3M storm.  Over half, 12,833 units, are at risk of storm surge in the 
worst case scenario of a C5H storm hitting the Miami coast.  The next area most at risk 
was Broward County with 7,784 LIHTC units located in storm surge boundary.  While 
only 10% of Broward’s LIHTC units were at risk from a C3M, in a C5H worst case 
scenario, more than 83% of LIHTC in the county are at risk of incurring damages.   
The total LIHTC at risk in a C5H storm is more than $1.8 billion.  A Category 5 
storm could conceivably wipe out LIHTC units in Charlotte, Gulf, and Wiculla counties.  
Even a Category 3 storm would place a significant burden on affordable housing in 
Charlotte County with as many as 94% of LIHTC located within storm surge boundaries 
of between 9 and 20 feet.  Miami-Dade poses the greatest risk of loss to the state even 
though only 35% of units are at risk in a C3M storm and 56% of units are at risk in a 
C5H storm surge.  A Category 3 storm could potentially cost more than $307 million for 
reconstruction assuming all LIHTC units within the boundaries of the storm surge were 
damaged.  In a worst case scenario, a conservative estimate of $485 million is at stake for 
LIHTC properties for Miami-Dade alone.  Monroe County includes the Florida Keys.  
Phase I identified Florida Keys was a preferred location in each of the QAPs analyzed.  
Ninety eight percent of LIHTC is at risk from either storm category in Monroe County 
with potential loses of over $23 million. 
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The revealed preferences of LIHTC developers identified using GIS indicates that 
developers continue to develop a higher number of units on the coast.  Coastal 
development is driven by population, which is higher in densely populated coastal areas.  
LIHTC developers stated a preference for less risky coastal development, a sentiment that 
was diminished by policy preferences for coastal development.  Ultimately, coastal 




Chapter 6  
UNDERSTANDING DIVERGENT RISKS 
 
LIHTC DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE 2004 HURRICANE SEASON 
 The purpose of this study was to identify LIHTC risk during disaster recovery.  
The overriding force guiding this research was to understand how perceived risk from 
disaster influenced development decisions.  The case study approach was the perfect 
platform for conducting a robust investigation of public discourse, profitability, and 
affordable housing supply.   The practicality of the study offers implications for 
affordable housing policy in the context of disaster and the broader impact of climate 
change.   The study ultimately confirmed a conflict between the human systems we have 
created and the natural systems we must adapt to, particularly in the face of sea level rise 
and storm surge.     
 Policies that drive LIHTC housing production also drive thousands of low-income 
people into high hazard areas creating additional risk to those individuals, private owners, 
and government at the federal, state and local levels.   Quantitatively, the numbers speak 
for themselves.  More than 48,000 LIHTC households in Florida are at risk from storm 
surge.  Given that Florida averages 2.6 persons per household, this means that 
approximately 125,315 people live in LIHTC properties that are susceptible to storm 
surge from a Category 5 storm.  Owners of LIHTC also face hazards related to hurricane 
disaster.  Over 340 developments are located in storm surge hazard areas with potential 
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flooding in a range from 4.2 to 37.9 feet suggesting that potential damage could be 
significant.   
 This study undertook LIHTC risk from a social constructivist paradigm that 
reflects the experience and expertise of multiple stakeholders.  Figure 6-1 provides a 
comparison of the findings from the three phases of this research. Phases I and III built a 
foundation of thought for this study by identifying preferences from the public agency 
and verification of development outcomes for LIHTC.  Phase II provided the social 
context.  During this phase, developers said they need more resources, less regulation, 
more flexibility, and preferred to avoid location risk associated with storm surge.  They 
also prefer subsidies that allow them to be profitable.  Stated preferences reveal that 
developers understand risks associated with coastal development, and given the 
appropriate incentives, they would avoid hazardous areas, including areas subject to 
storm surge.  The fervor of the discussion, however, stems from the qualitative feedback 
that shows an awareness of unsustainable policies that ameliorate housing problems but 
also create unintended, risky consequences.  It is interesting to note, however, that in 
spite of the individual stated preferences indicating this awareness, preferences revealed 
in the GIS analysis indicate that developers most often developed in hazardous coastal 
areas more often than not.    Additional research is needed to differentiate the effects of 
policy and market forces that influence LIHTC development decisions. 
 This study recognizes the risks to people who live in LIHTC units subject to 
storm surge hazards by identifying the number of people at risk in Category 3 and 
Category 5 hurricanes.  Others have identified those groups most at risk within the  
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characteristics related to economic, gender, race, and age (Cutter and Emrich, 2006; 
Fothergill and Peek, 2004).   These are among the households that rely on the affordable 
rents available through the LIHTC program.  Many of the solutions provided in the 
context of this research address the LIHTC industry specifically as well as steps that can 
be taken to protect those households living in LIHTC situated in storm surge boundaries. 
 
                             6-1: Comparison of Phases I, II and III 
Total LIHTC Units 2004-2010 No of Units % of Total 
Total Non-Coastal 11663 26% 
Total Coastal   32995 74% 
Total QAP 2005 (Counties) 4818 11% 
Total QAP 2006 (Counties) 11253 25% 
Total HWG       
  Tier I   4874 11% 
  Tier II   5052 11% 
  Tier III   2256 5% 
  Tier IV   20052 45% 
 
 
 This purpose of this chapter is to present some concluding thoughts and 
recommendations for stakeholders of affordable housing in general, and specifically for 
disaster recovery.   
A BRIEF REVIEW 
 In Chapter 2, the concept of risk as a social science was introduced.  According to 
Bradbury (1989), this is where cooperative decision-making occurs.  The affordable 
housing literature amplifies the voices of the low and moderate income population.  We 
know that people who suffer in poverty suffer more during disaster recovery.  We know 
that housing cost burdens plague owners and renters alike regardless of income.  We are 
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aware that nearly 35% of households are renters, and many of these spend more than half 
their income on rent (JCHS, 2013).  Over 12% of the population lives in multifamily 
housing.  Less than 15% of these developments are funded using the LIHTC.  Even 
though most LIHTC households have higher incomes relative to those in other subsidized 
housing, nearly half the tenants have extremely low incomes and pay more than 30% of 
their income on rent.  In spite of a developer’s ability to acquire additional incentives for 
development, the program does little to offset cost burdens for most households.   
 Disaster exacerbates affordability, especially when affordable housing shortages 
existed prior to a disaster event (Comerio, 1997; Levine et al, 2007; Reece et al, 2011).  
Recovery is well understood to perpetuate rental housing shortages as redevelopment 
brings an influx of workers.  Development costs increase when land, labor and material 
are in greater demand.  Redevelopment brings the promise of a better community with 
better technology.  However, limited resources require that choices must be made.  
Affordable housing advocates argue that poverty solutions, such as HOPE VI and mixed 
income development, fail to provide sufficient quantities of affordable housing (Geotz, 
2004; McCarthy and Hanson, 2008; Unity, 2010).  Others point to private market 
solutions, such as vouchers, to suggest otherwise (Vuk, 2008).  LIHTC has faced 
criticism for its failure to provide housing for extremely low income households in 
general and during disaster recovery (Hooks and Miller, 2006).   This study began by 
recognizing the inability of multifamily owners to bring affordable properties online and 
sought to ask the question ‘why’.   The following sections discuss these questions and the 
broader implications of the study on the industry, policy, and disaster theory. 
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 The framework identified multiple stakeholders from four areas: housing 
producers (LIHTC for this study), advocacy groups speaking for tenants and low-income 
households, public policy identified through QAP analysis, and the merging of housing 
policy and disaster recovery in the wake of the 2004 hurricane season in Florida.  The 
following sets of questions were selected to guide the research: 
1) How do LIHTC developers perceive disaster risk?  What risk variables have the 
greatest influence on development decisions? 
2) What are the differences in risk perception between for-profit and non-profit 
LIHTC providers?  How do these differences impact the location of low-income 
multi-family housing within the LIHTC program? 
3) Where are LIHTC developments located over the disaster recovery period?  Do 
LIHTC developers avoid areas that experience the greatest impact from the 
disaster event? 
Additional research is needed to identify differences in risk perception between for profit 
and non-profit LIHTC providers.  This study was unable to differentiate development 
patterns between non-profit and for profit entities.  Developers from both business 
models are encouraged to partner for affordable housing production.  The study did, 
however, provide ample evidence to address how risk perception affects development and 
the role of policy for influencing location decisions. 
 The literature provides examples of how policies implemented during disaster 
assist homeowners over renters and economic redevelopment over affordable housing.  
Most policies work in favor of business and homeowners, neglecting the needs of 
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apartment owners who can scarcely take on more debt to repair and rebuild.  During 
recovery, policies tend to address areas with the greatest number of housing damages.  
Greater attention to storm surge areas could address the unintended consequences of 
producing replacement LIHTC housing in vulnerable areas. 
 This research proposes solutions within public choice theory and a social 
constructivist framework based on the individual experience and knowledge of LIHTC 
developers.  Recommendations have been provided for the industry and government at 
federal, state and local levels that incorporate findings from this study.  Inputs from 
stakeholders inform the social frame from which low risk, mutually beneficial 
recommendations are formed.  This study relied on the literature for contributions to the 
social frame and identified specific areas of concern from the Florida LIHTC community.   
IDENTIFYING LIHTC RISK 
 This research revealed that LIHTC professionals are well aware that the cost of 
affordable multifamily housing production is out of balance with project feasibility 
without additional incentives for development.  Disaster exacerbates this condition.  The 
LIHTC program is subject to typical development risks as well as risks specific to the 
LIHTC industry.  Real estate development and LIHTC risks are discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 2.  This study looked beyond these typical development risks to ask how 
LIHTC developers perceive recovery risk after a hurricane disaster.    
 Categorizing risk using a modified STEEP analysis identified the importance of 
technical risks characterized by those factors that affect real estate performance measures.  
Internal rates of return, costs, and rent are easily identifiable risks with benchmarks 
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established well before construction begins.  Risks associated with LIHTC dictate that 
management be especially diligent in maintaining the contracted tenant affordability ratio 
while staying profitable amidst tight margins (O’Regan and Quigley, 2013; Schwartz, 
2010).  Experienced management is essential for managing performance risk.  The most 
significant risk criteria identified in this study were economic, described as funding 
sources (or subsidies) emanating from government policy.  Policies that increase equity 
and reduce debt create the greatest risks when regulations are volatile, either from 
changes in government or political opinion.  Administering agencies can also increase 
risks when frequent policy changes are made.  Green and Olhshansky (2011) and Gotham 
and Greenberg (2008) described how agency volatility reduced the effectiveness of 
programs negatively impacting those who were supposed to benefit.  Effective and stable 
government boosts developer confidence but overreach and deep regulations increase risk 
to profitability.  This research does not include measurements of the level of risk that 
reduces participation because the LIHTC program often has more applications than 
available funding.  What the study does expose are the social constructs that guide 
LIHTC decision-making.  This study demonstrates a framework for the social paradoxes 
existing between business, people, and institutions.  Policies drive action. Available 
subsidies are distributed based on annual policies that encourage or give preference to 
coastal development driving LIHTC development in potentially hazardous areas, in spite 
of risk.  Future research is needed to determine if risk can be mitigated by directing 
subsidies to development in less hazardous areas.  
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 Government regulation can increase pre-construction costs making profit 
feasibility challenging.  High hazard states, like Florida, use regulatory procedures to 
enforce building codes and land use to mitigate damages from natural hazards.  
Mitigation techniques include zoning, flood zone regulations, and building codes.  
Policies that permit construction in high hazard zones, such as in storm surge boundaries, 
can potentially cause catastrophic damages.  Environmental hazards are often 
disregarded, most likely because increasing populations place demands on policy makers 
to secure affordable housing.  Developers will continue to build in hazardous areas if 
public policy and funding mechanisms subsidize it.  County government can mitigate 
development in high hazard areas by including public access to site characteristics that 
include storm surge vulnerability much in the same way that flood zone mapping is 
provided at the county level. 
 Chapter 5 identified studies of storm surge effects for specific areas (Fritz, 2008) 
and applying values to estimate potential losses (CoreLogic, 2011).   Policies to reduce 
the number of units constructed within storm surge areas have yet to be implemented 
through local planning.  Funding subsidies are among the top risks that influences LIHTC 
development.  The funding subsidy is relevant to the production of affordable housing in 
general.  No evidence was found to suggest a greater reliance on funding subsidies during 
disaster recovery than at any other time even though disaster does create additional 
burdens on available resources.  LIHTC developers require funding subsidies for 
housing, so risk can be addressed with mitigation or adaptation measures supported 
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through existing funding sources, such as hazard mitigation grants and low cost disaster 
loans. 
Funding LIHTC 
 Funding subsidy sources include tax credits, block grants, and special financing 
often used in conjunction with some traditional financing.  Developers stated a preference 
for additional subsidy allocations from existing programs.  This could be in part because 
of past volatility experiences or reports of program deficiencies by others.  LIHTC 
developers prefer Supplemental LIHTC over all other funding subsidy sources followed 
by HOME funds and CDBG.  Data collection fields in the LIHTC database for HOME 
and CDBG programs were blank more than two-thirds of the time.  A more concerted 
effort is needed at the state and federal level to collect and report accurate sources of 
public subsidies for LIHTC.  Federal and state policymakers also need to address funding 
needed to produce adequate numbers of affordable housing units, particularly during 
disaster recovery. 
Location Preferences 
 Low Income Housing Tax Credit developments are predominantly located on the 
coast in Florida.  Even in the immediate aftermath of disaster, coastal development 
outpaced LIHTC development in interior counties.  Given that Florida is facing hazards 
caused by climate change, such as sea level rise and extreme hurricane effects, policies 
could be more proactive in mitigating development in coastal areas.  LIHTC developers 
understand the implications of coastal development.  This study established that LIHTC 
is dependent on resources established in public policy despite developer understanding of 
 
206 
potential hazards.  Developers from this study were very clear.  Locations near the coast 
are less desirable, therefore more risky, than locations further from coastal hazards.    Yet 
developers construct LIHTC in high risk locations.  Intervening causes could include 
population, income potential, demand or other factors that have not been developed or 
analyzed here.  LIHTC developers specifically expressed a preference for development 
away from storm surge hazards.  LIHTC in storm surge is at greater risk than LIHTC 
developed inland; yet LIHTC exists in identifiable storm surge areas.  Technology is 
available to identify potential storm surge.  Similar to regulations that inhibit 
development in flood zones, policy can require multifamily housing be developed in 
areas with low risk of a storm surge hazard.  The high cost of flood insurance also signals 
that developers find sites in less vulnerable locations.  In spite of the cost of insurance 
and associated risks, developers continue to locate the majority of LIHTC in coastal 
areas.  Insurance costs will be absorbed until profitability is affected.  Policy can curtail 
cost and location risk by encouraging sustainable safe LIHTC development.  Storm surge 
risk reduction can be implemented with QAP guidelines and facilitated through local 
planning departments and public GIS systems at the county level.  Even though LIHTC 
developers indicated the high cost of insurance and slow insurance payouts as a deterrent 
to sufficient affordable housing production, flood insurance is essential for properties at 
high risk of storm surge.   
 This study does not presume to be a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, but does 
attempt to place an estimate of value on LIHTC at risk.  Over $123 million was allocated 
for coastal LIHTC from 2008 to 2010 accounting for 85% of total allocations across the 
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state.  The estimated value of coastal LIHTC within a Category 3 storm surge is more 
than $900 million.  A Category 5 storm puts nearly $2 billion in LIHTC at risk.  Either 
one of these events has the potential to wipe out taxpayer supported affordable housing 
investment.  It would seem that implementing a system to identify storm surge properties 
is a cost effective policy that could effectively reduce potential damages during disaster 
benefiting property owners, taxpayers, insurance companies, and tenants.  Future studies 
are needed for a more robust valuation of LIHTC units.   
 In summary, developers stated a preference for development on non-hazardous 
sites but Phase III results revealed the majority of LIHTC continue to be developed on 
the coast.  Population growth is a major driver for coastal development, so it is inevitable 
that more LIHTC or other affordable housing will be needed in coastal counties.  Policy 
drives development, which means it will be up to policymakers at all levels of 
government to control development in hazardous storm surge areas.     
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 The findings of this research suggest that policy drives LIHTC development.  
Market forces also influence where LIHTC development is needed due to economic 
development and coastal population trends.  Coastal population is expected to continue in 
an upward growth for the foreseeable future which means that policy and market forces 
are likely to support LIHTC growth in hazardous coastal communities.  Potential costs 
for at risk development suggest that an assessment should be undertaken to identify 
solutions to mitigate risks for public and private interests.  As more is learned about the 
impact of climate change on coastal systems, it has become obvious that a concerted 
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effort should be made to identify risks and adopt policies for adaptation and risk 
reduction techniques.  Studies for adaptation and mitigation come primarily from the 
climate change literature.  For the most part, the literature is largely conceptual.  
However recent studies are beginning to identify specific techniques and policy ideas.  
 Disaster risk reduction is defined by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR) as “the conceptual framework of elements considered with the 
possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid 
(prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, 
within the broad context of sustainable development.”  Risk reduction identified in this 
study includes development in low hazard areas, low cost grants and loans for 
production, and additional tax credits to aid in production.  Policy measures can be tied to 
these programs to implement adaptation and mitigation techniques for existing and new 
LIHTC development. 
 According to the Stockholm Environment Institute, adaptation is an ongoing, 
reiterative six stage process that includes “information development, awareness raising, 
planning, design, implementation, and monitoring” (Dougherty and Fencl, 2008, p. 38).  
Adaptation is “anything that reduces the negative effects of climate change” including 
minimizing exposure (Langis, 2013 quoting Warren and Egginton, 2008, p. 6).  
Adaptation and risk reduction are methods toward resiliency (Hamin and Gurran, 2009).  
Tol et al. (2008) define adaptation as “the planned or unplanned, reactive or 
anticipatory, successful or unsuccessful response of a system to a change in its 
environment” (p. 432).   
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 Adaptation has evolved from the initial idea that mitigation would be sufficient to 
curtail the impact of climate change.  Early literature focused on hard- and soft- structural 
techniques such as barricades and seawalls, beach nourishment, and strategic retreat 
(London and Volonté, 1991).   Klein et al (1999) stressed the importance of coastal 
adaptation through an iterative four-step process that includes data collection and raising 
awareness, identifying planning and design strategies, implementation, and monitoring 
and evaluation.  The first decade of 2000 saw increased calls for using technology to 
educate multiple stakeholders about the need to reduce coastal vulnerability to the effects 
of climate change (Klein et al, 2001; Adger et al, 2005).  Since then more attention has 
been given to the benefit of regional cooperation and identifying specific techniques for 
adaptation and risk reduction.  Specific tools to enhance resilience include taking action 
at local and regional scales and avoid incentives that increase hazardous conditions 
(Adger et al., 2005).  Jacob, Gornitz and Rosenzweig (2007) identified structural and 
non-structural solutions to reduce risk.  Structural solutions such as constructing artificial 
barriers and other physical defenses continue to be put forward.  Non-structural solutions 
involve policy initiatives to curtail growth in hazardous sites.  Some of these solutions 
address impending sea-level rise, but are also useful for reducing risk associated coastal 
hazards in general.  The remainder of this chapter will offer recommendations stemming 
from this study to address risks for existing and proposed LIHTC development.   
ADDRESSING LIHTC FUNDING AND STORM SURGE HAZARDS 
 This study suggested that policy influences development decisions.  Policy will be 
the driving force to mitigate hazardous effects with adaptation and risk reduction 
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techniques.  Technical guidelines presented by the IPCC have been accused of providing 
little usable information for policy makers, questioning the capacity to adapt given 
available resources and political will (Carter, et al, 1994).  Tol et al. (2008) suggest that 
vulnerability is determined by the capacity to adapt (p.434).  Options for adaptation are of 
little consequence if the capacity to employ them is out of reach.  Recommendations for 
adaptive and risk reduction measures resulting from this study attempt to be cognizant of 
the adaptive capacity for implementation specific to industry,  and policies at local, state, 
and federal levels.   
LIHTC Risk Reduction - Industry 
 The LIHTC industry has a responsibility to identify and promote strategies to 
reduce risk for existing building stock and mitigate risk for future development.  In the 
case of LIHTC, there is also the human factor and responsibility for those being served 
under the program.  This study identified stated preferences of LIHTC professionals 
acknowledging location risk relative to the coast and storm surge.  Revealed preferences 
identified a significant number of LIHTC units in storm surge areas.  Three steps are 
recommended at the industry level to address LIHTC risk reduction: 
1) Identify LIHTC inventory situated in storm surge boundaries in order to 
determine existing risk.   
2) Mitigate potential damages by purchasing flood insurance for existing properties 
located in storm surge areas.   




These three steps require the industry to take proactive steps to insure LIHTC 
developments are located in areas less vulnerable to flooding associated with storm surge.  
Identifying risk for existing units provides an opportunity to take steps to reduce future 
risks from storm surge.  
LIHTC Risk Reduction - Local Government 
 Local government is a frontline warrior against the impact of climate change and 
the threat of coastal hazards.  It is this level of government that faces the immediate threat 
to its population and existing development.  Policy measures and adequate enforcement 
from local government are essential for implementing actions that support risk reduction.  
Three recommendations for risk reduction from local government include: 
1) Provide public access to storm surge models in county geographic information 
systems. 
2) When considering approval for a local LIHTC development, require that the 
extent of storm surge hazard related to the proposed site be identified. 
3) Develop inter-agency policies addressing site risk of developments within storm 
surge areas. 
As stated in Chapter 3, local government is required to approve a specific LIHTC 
development before an application is filed with the housing authority.  This places some 
responsibility for hazard mitigation in the lap of local government.  County-level 
agencies, including planning and emergency management, should be consulted for policy 
development that determine acceptable risk for proposed LIHTC multifamily housing 
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within storm surge areas.  Absent such policies, public access to potential storm surge 
mapping resources will allow LIHTC developers and others to identify and mitigate risks 
for internal decision-making. 
LIHTC Risk Reduction - State Government 
 State government works as a conduit for services and funding between federal and 
local governments.  It is at this level of government that funding is identified and 
distributed.  Unlike local government, state measures can act with regional and federal 
stakeholders to adopt broader measures to produce adequate numbers of LIHTC in safe 
locations.  Recommendations for state government include: 
1)  Adopt funding restrictions that discourage development of LIHTC in storm 
surge areas.  
2) Create disaster bonds targeted for LIHTC as an additional subsidy for LIHTC 
development in non-hazardous areas. 
LIHTC Risk Reduction - Federal Government 
 The federal government has relinquished much of its capacity for action to the 
state level in recent years.  However there are some significant public policy actions that 
can support state and local efforts to mitigate coastal hazard risks while still supporting 
affordable housing production. 
1) Target disaster grants and mitigation grants to LIHTC during disaster 
recovery as additional support for new development in areas not subject to 
storm surge hazards. 
2) Increase access to funding using grants or supplemental tax credits that 
will support efforts by the affordable housing industry to improve 
resilience for existing developments. 
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CONTRIBUTION TO DISCOURSE IN DISASTER THEORY 
 Disaster theory seeks to understand decision-making and preferences in the 
context of disaster.  As stated in Chapter 2, political and social pressures require quick 
action while integrating lessons learned from past experience.  Complexity exists because 
limited resources are shared among multiple disciplines competing for attention based on 
political will and community needs.  Affordable housing is just one of the many 
disciplines that contribute to this emerging theory.  The findings from this study point to 
the significance of policy in decision-making for private production of affordable 
multifamily housing.  This research builds on other studies that have revealed how 
housing recovery takes place in the aftermath of disaster by focusing specifically on the 
LIHTC program.   
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 In order to gain a more thorough understanding of the risk associated with LIHTC 
during disaster recovery along the coast it is recommended that future research identify 
the extent of LIHTC units within all categories of storm surge.  Additional research is 
needed to determine the per unit value of LIHTC units.  Current valuation studies are 
formulated from national sales through private companies, only one of which was utilized 
in this work (Tax Credit Group, 2014).  A more robust study of LIHTC valuations is 
needed to understand the scope of potential losses at local, state, regional and national 
levels.   
 The study of LIHTC and disaster could also benefit from an expansion of the 
survey used in this study after some modifications.  While surveys could be conducted on 
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a state by state basis, this practice is impractical because of the number of national 
companies participating in the field.  The survey used in this study is not designed for 
other disaster types.  Any future survey should focus on disaster recovery associated with 
hurricanes in coastal states.   
 This study did little to identify similarities and differences between for profit and 
non-profit LIHTC producers.  Additional research can utilize the methods from this study 
to identify how for-profit and non-profit companies are influenced by risk in their 
development decisions.  In the future, the survey can be revised to allow for cross 
tabulations between for-profit and non-profit LIHTC.  Statistical analysis using GIS also 
has the capability of categorizing risk by for-profit and non-profit entities.  These steps 
are important to understand how business structure affects risk taking and if partnerships 
between the two types of entities results in less risk to LIHTC units and the households 
that inhabit them. 
CONCLUSION 
 This study was built from a concern for the failure of disaster recovery to solve 
affordable housing problems during disaster recovery.  Disaster recovery is a 
redevelopment opportunity that incorporates competing needs given available resources.  
Unfortunately, just as renters fall behind homeowners in disaster assistance, affordable 
multifamily housing owners also find it difficult to obtain sufficient funding to participate 
fully in recovery.  This study focused specifically on the LIHTC industry which faces 
fewer barriers to recovery, but is influenced by policy.  Policy drives the LIHTC industry 
by driving competition through limiting tax credits available at the federal level.  State 
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and local level preferences impact funding and location.  LIHTC producers are well 
informed of coastal risks and have indicated a preference to avoid hazardous conditions.  
LIHTC placed in service between 2004 and 2010 are predominantly in coastal areas in 
Florida, and some developments are located within hazardous storm surge boundaries.  
The financial risks associated with these properties are significant and warrant 
consideration of efforts to adapt and improve resiliency.   This study specifically 
identified risks for LIHTC in Florida and does not pretend to be significant to any other 
coastal state.  More in depth studies are needed to identify specific risks to each county 
within the state.  Case studies for other coastal states can begin the process of identifying 
storm surge hazards affecting affordable housing of all types at local, state, and regional 
levels so that adaptive management can effectively respond in case of disaster.  This 
study provides a foundation for policy makers, affordable housing advocates and 
producers to identify and support measures that will provide sufficient numbers of 
affordable housing in safer areas on the coast not only during disaster recovery, but in the 














Research Survey Instrument 
 
1   Information about Being in a Research Study 
Clemson University 
LIHTC Development, Disaster Recovery, and Perceptions of Risk 
 
Introduction        
This study attempts to collect information about the perception of risk during disaster 
recovery for Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) developers.              
 
Procedures           
You will be asked a series of questions that will help determine how your company 
makes development decisions during disaster recovery. The questionnaire consists of 
approximately 18 questions and will take about 15 minutes or less. Questions are 
designed to determine how you would expect to respond to development opportunities 
that are typical for developers of LIHTC projects during disaster recovery. This 
questionnaire is conducted with an online Qualtrics-created survey.                 
 
Risks/Discomforts     
Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. However, you may feel uneasy when 
asked to make judgments based on company experience.                  
 
Benefits            
As a participant in this survey, you have the option to receive a summary of the 
aggregated results as long as you provide your contact data. Your contact information 
will be completely confidential and will only be available to the principal investigator. It 
is hoped that through your participation, researchers and policy makers will learn more 
about how low-income housing programs can better assist developers during disaster 
recovery.                  
 
Confidentiality  
All data obtained from participants will be kept confidential and will only be reported in 
an aggregate format (by reporting only combined results and never reporting individual 
ones). All questionnaires will be concealed, and no one other than then principal 
investigator listed below will have access to them. The data collected will be stored in the 
HIPPA-compliant, Qualtrics-secure database until it has been deleted by the primary 






Compensation            
There is no direct compensation for participation in this research study. 
 
Participation           
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You have the right to 
withdraw at anytime or refuse to participate entirely without jeopardy. If you desire to 
withdraw, please close your internet browser and notify the principal investigator at this 
email: vhammet@clemson.edu.  Or, if you prefer, inform the principal investigator by 
telephone at 864-247-0600.                     
 
Questions about the Research            
If you have questions or concerns about this study or if any problems arise, please contact 
Dr Stephen Verderber at Clemson University at 864-656-3896, sverder@clemson.edu.                
 
Questions about your Rights as Research Participants           
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights in this research study, please 
contact the Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-6460 
or irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside of the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the 
ORC's toll-free number, 866-297-3071.        
 
Q2   I have read, understood, and printed a copy of, the above consent form.  I agree to 
participate in this study.  
 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 




Q3 When was the first time you worked on a project that utilized the LIHTC program? 
(Enter the approximate year as yyyy.) 
 
Q4 Please provide details about the ownership structure of your company. (Select one) 
 Private, for-profit (1) 
 Non-Profit, 501(c)3 (2) 
 Non-Profit, not tax exempt (3) 
 I'm not sure. (4) 
If Private, for-profit Is Selected, Then Skip To What is the geographic scope of the c... 
 
Q5 Does your company operate as a Community Development Corporation (a not-for-
profit organization that is specifically incorporated to offer services, provide programs, 
and engage in activities that promote and support community development)? 
 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 I am not sure. (3) 
 
Q6 What is the geographic scope of the company's LIHTC activities? (This question will 
help us understand the geographical reach of the company's LIHTC development 
activities. PLEASE SELECT ONE.) 
 
 Within one county (parish or borough) (1) 
 Multiple counties (parishes or boroughs) within one state (2) 
 Multiple states (3) 
 
Q7 Does your company engage in development projects that do not participate in the 
LIHTC program? 
 
 Yes (1) 




Q8 Does your company own LIHTC multi-family developments in a coastal county? (A 
county can also include a parish or borough) 
 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q9 Has your company sustained damages to a LIHTC unit as a result of hurricane 
damages? (A LIHTC unit is a single housing unit, such as a single apartment unit.) 
 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Has your company sustained damages to a LIHTC unit as a r... Yes Is Selected 
 
Q10 How many LIHTC units have been damaged as a result of a hurricane? A LIHTC 
unit is a single housing unit, such as a single apartment unit.  (Select one) 
 
 1 (1) 
 2 - 5 (2) 
 6 - 10 (3) 
 11-20 (4) 
 More than 20 (5) 
 
Q11 Development in coastal counties involves additional risk because of the natural 
hazards from hurricanes.  Hurricane Hugo caused extensive damage along the Atlantic 
coast in 1989.  More than 18,000 multi-family housing units were damaged or destroyed. 
 Hurricane Andrew struck the south and caused extensive housing damage in Florida and 
Louisiana. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita caused damages on the Gulf 
Coast displacing many low-income households. Galveston, Texas lost nearly all multi-
family housing units when Hurricane Ike hit the Gulf Coast in 2008. More recently, 
Hurricane Sandy hit the northeast damaging single-family and multi-family housing units 
in New Jersey and New York. Each of these hurricane events became presidentially 
declared disaster areas which opened access to disaster relief and funding for 
reconstruction and redevelopment. The following questions are intended to evaluate the 





Q12 To what degree would the following general categories derail a LIHTC project 
during disaster recovery? Move the slider to rank the categories by level of importance 
from 0 (will definitely not derail) to 10 (would derail). 
 
______ SOCIAL: (i.e., public sentiment, advocacy group activities) (1) 
______ TECHNICAL: (i.e., Cap Rates, IRR, Income/Expenses) (2) 
______ ECONOMIC: (i.e., government funding,  land acquisition) (3) 
______ ENVIRONMENTAL: (i.e., proximity to the coast, proximity impact areas) (4) 
______ GOVERNMENT: (i.e., government priorities, program changes) (5) 
 
Q13 During disaster recovery, LIHTC is often combined with other programs to increase 
funding and encourage recovery participation. The following questions are intended to 
help us understand the programs that would influence your company participation in the 
recovery phase of disaster. 
 
Q14 Given the following incentives, how likely would your company be willing to build 
a LIHTC multi-family development in an impact zone that has sustained severe damage 
from a hurricane disaster? An impact zone is often the area that was directly hit by the 





Q15 Please rank additional funding programs that may be combined with LIHTC that are 
critical to your company's participation in the development of LIHTC multi-family 
housing during disaster recovery. Move the slider to rank the program by level of 
importance from 0 (not critical) to 10 (extremely critical).  
 
______ Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) (1) 
______ Supplemental LIHTC (2) 
______ New Market Tax Credits (NMTC) (3) 
______ HOME FUNDS (4) 
______ Small Business Administration (SBA) Loans (5) 
______ Physical Disaster Business Loans (6) 
______ Disaster Bonds (7) 
______ Federal Disaster Loans (8) 
______ Federal Disaster Grants (9) 
______ Road Home Small Rental Property Funding (10) 
______ Mitigation Grants (11) 
______ Private Insurance (12) 
______ Traditional financing (13) 




Q16 When thinking about disasters, please rate the location preference for each of the 
following for a potential LIHTC development. Provide a rating using the following scale 
with 0 being Least Preferred to 10 being Most Preferred. 
 
______ The available site is NEXT to a parcel that flooded in a previous storm (1) 
______ An upcoming election may change disaster recovery priorities (2) 
______ Site location IS in a coastal county (3) 
______ Site location IS NOT in a coastal county (4) 
______ A development site is within 1 to 5 miles of the coast (5) 
______ A development site is between 5 and 10 miles from the coast (6) 
______ A development site is more than 10 miles from the coast (7) 
______ A development site is more than 25 miles from the coast (8) 
______ A site location is within a storm surge boundary (9) 
______ A site is not within a storm surge boundary (10) 
______ There could be some flooding  during a hurricane. (11) 
______ There is some potential for storm surge damage during a hurricane (12) 




Q17 With all else being equal, to what degree would each of the following statements 
affect your willingness to participate in a LIHTC development project during disaster 
recovery? (Please rank each of the following statements along the scale of 0 to 10 using 
the sliders, with 0 indicating an unwillingness to participate and 10 indicating willingness 
to participate.) 
 
______ Public sentiment is against low-income housing (1) 
______ More regulations are imposed in coastal counties (2) 
______ Insurance costs are higher in a coastal area (3) 
______ Financing the project has unfavorable terms (4) 
______ More flexible regulations in a non-coastal county (5) 
______ Construction costs are rising in the recovery zones (6) 
______ Land costs are higher along the coast (7) 
______ Insurance costs are lower in counties that are not along the coast (8) 
______ Financing the project with favorable terms (9) 
______ Land costs are lower in areas away from the coast (10) 
______ Construction costs are stable in the recovery zones (11) 
______ Disaster relief programs are available for low-income multifamily housing (12) 
______ An advocacy group supports low-income housing in a specific community (13) 
______ Supplemental tax credits are available (14) 
______ A non-profit organization is willing to partner with us in developing the project 
(15) 
______ A for-profit organization is willing to partner with us in developing the project 
(16) 
______ A local neighborhood group is against low-income housing (17) 
______ Additional incentives are available to build in coastal counties (18) 




Q18 Thank you so much for your patience. There are only 3 questions left. These 
questions are asking for your expert opinion as a stakeholder in the field of low-income 
housing.  
 
Q19 According to recent studies (Greene, 1992; Comerio et al., 1994; Finch et al., 2010) 
low-income households face dislocation because there are not enough low-income 
housing units constructed during disaster recovery. Why do you think this is a problem? 
 
Q20 What suggestions would you offer to advocacy groups and community leaders to 
address low-income housing needs for low-income households? 
 
Q21 How can housing and recovery programs be improved to encourage low-income 
housing development during disaster recovery? 
 
Q22 The compiled data is strictly confidential and will be published in aggregated form. 
 As a participant in the survey, your company has the option of receiving a summary of 
the results.  Would you like to receive a summary of the results? 
 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If The compiled data is strictly confidential and will be pu... Yes Is Selected 
 
Q23 You have indicated that your company would like to receive a summary of the 
survey results. In order to have results forwarded to you, please complete the form below. 
 Your contact information is completely confidential and will only be used to deliver the 
summarized results. To maintain confidentiality, your contact information will not be 
matched with your survey answers. 
 
Company Name (1) 




Q24   This is the end of the survey.    We appreciate the information you have shared 
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